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Securing Deliberative Autonomy
James E. Fleming*
In this article, ProfessorFleming proposes to tether the right of autonomy
by groundingit within a constitutionalconstructivism, a guidingframeworkfor
constitutional theory with two fundamental themes: deliberative democracy
and deliberativeautonomy. He advances deliberativeautonomy as a unifying
theme that shows the coherence and structure of certain substantive liberties
on a list offamiliar "unenumerated"fundamental rights (commonly classed
under privacy, autonomy, or substantive due process). The bedrock structure
of deliberative autonomy secures basic liberties that are significantpreconditions for persons' ability to deliberate about and make certain fundamental
decisions affecting their destiny, identity, or way of life. As against critics'
charges that the right of privacy or autonomy is dangerously unruly and unconstrained,ProfessorFleming argues that deliberative autonomy is rooted,
along with deliberative democracy, in the language and design of our Constitution. Each theme, he contends, has a structuralrole to play in securing the
basic liberties that are preconditionsfor our scheme of deliberative self-governance. Finally, ProfessorFleming arguesfor reconceiving the substantive
due process inquiry in terms of a criterion of the significance of an asserted
libertyfor deliberativeautonomy, chartinga middle course between Scaliathe rock of liberty as "hidebound" historicalpractices-andCharybdis-the
whirlpool of liberty as unbounded license.
The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable to the
pursuit of happiness.... They conferred, as against the Government, the right
to be let alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by
civilized men.
Justice Louis D. Brandeis'
* Associate Professor of Law, Fordham University. Ph.D. 1988, Princeton University; J.D. 1985,
Harvard University; A.B. 1977, University of Missouri.
I am grateful to Akhil Amar, Sot Barber, Jill Fisch, Martin Flaherty, Ned Foley, Samuel Freeman,
Abner Greene, Will Harris, Tracy Higgins, Nick Johnson, Bob Kaczorowski, Greg Keating, Sandy Levinson, Steve Macedo, Frank Michehnan, Wayne Moore, Walter Murphy, John Rawls, Bill Treanor,
Mark Tushnet, and Ben Zipursky for helpful comments relating to this article. Special thanks go to
Linda McClain for constructive readings of numerous drafts and for countless discussions. I also would
like to thank my research assistants Alan Rabinowitz, Sabrena Silver, and Anthony Cicia. Fordham
University School of Law provided generous research support. I benefitted greatly from presenting
drafts at a Fordham University School of Law Faculty Work-in-Progress Colloquium and an Ohio State
Legal Theory Workshop. Finally, my thinking about this article owes much to the valuable discussion
of an earlier work that I presented at the New York University School of Law Colloquium on Constitutional Theory, especially to the comments of Chris Eisgruber and Larry Sager.
I. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); see also
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) ("Those who won our independence believed that the final end of the State was to make men free to develop their faculties; and
that in its government the deliberative forces should prevail over the arbitrary. They valued liberty both
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INTRODUCTION

The Problem of Tethering Autonomy in ConstitutionalLaw

A.

The right of privacy or autonomy, once loosed, is not easily tethered. 2 It is,
however, easily caricatured. Robert H. Bork asserts that" 'the right of privacy'

has become a loose canon in the law" and that the recognition of such a right in
Griswoldv. Connecticut was tantamount to the "construction of a constitutional

time bomb."'3 Catharine A. MacKinnon attacks it as "a right of men 'to be let
alone' to oppress women one at a time" in private realms of sanctified isolation.4 Michael J. Sandel and Mary Ann Glendon portray persons endowed with

the right of autonomy as "unencumbered selves" or as "lone rights-bearers"
who indeed are "let alone" and thus deprived of the constitutive bonds of community.5 John Hart Ely belittles "the right to be different" as an upper-middleclass right: "the right of my son to wear his hair as long as he pleases. '

6

The

right of privacy or autonomy on the loose in these caricatured renditions is so
unruly, dangerous, or rootless that one might wonder whether such a right can
be tethered in constitutional law.
In this article, I shall tether the right of autonomy by grounding it within a
constitutional constructivism, 7 a guiding framework for constitutional theory
with two fundamental themes: first, securing the basic liberties that are preconditions for deliberative democracy, to enable citizens to apply their capacity for

a conception ofjustice to deliberating about the justice of basic institutions and
social policies, and second, securing the basic liberties that are preconditions

for deliberativeautonomy, to enable citizens to apply their capacity for a conception of the good to deliberating about and deciding how to live their own
as an end and as a means. They believed liberty to be the secret of happiness and courage to be the
secret of liberty.").
2. Cf ARcHImALD Cox, THE WARREN COURT 6 (1968) ("Once loosed, the idea of Equality is not
easily cabined."); PHILIP B. KURLAND, PoLmcs, nm CoNsTITUToN, AND a WARREN COURT 165
(1970) (quoting Cox, supra). The Supreme Court proved Cox and Kurland wrong, easily (though problematically) cabining equality in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1,5155 (1973), which limited the expansion of both the "fundamental rights" and the "suspect classifications" strands of equal protection doctrine.
3.

ROBERT H. BORK,Tim TEMpnr oF AmRIcA: THE POLIrICAL SEDUCnON oF a

LAW 95, 97

(1990) (criticizing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)).
4. CATHARnm A. MAcKINNON, Privacy v. Equality: Beyond Roe v. Wade, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 93, 102 (1987) (citations omitted).
5. MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND ma Lmirrs OF JUSTICE 182 (1982); MARY ANN GLENDON, RZIGHTs TALK: TnE IMPovEuSHMENT OF POLITCAL DISCOURSE 47-48 (1991); Michael J. Sandel,
The ProceduralRepublic and the Unencumbered Self, 12 POL. THEORY 81, 85-87 (1984).
6. John Hart Ely, Democracy and the Right to be Different, 56 R.Y.U. L. REv. 397, 405 (1981).
7. This article carries forward my project of developing a constitutional constructivism. See
James E. Fleming, Constructing the Substantive Constitution, 72 TEx. L. Rnv. 211 (1993). Constitutional constructivism is analogous to John Rawls' political constructivism, a theory developed in his
important book, Political Liberalism. Rawls seeks to construct principles of justice that provide fair
terms of social cooperation on the basis of mutual respect and trust among free and equal citizens in a
morally pluralistic constitutional democracy such as our own, rather than to discover principles of justice that are true for all times and all places. The latter project is that of theorists of moral realism or
natural law. JOHN RAWLs, POLrIICAL LIBERALISM 90-99 (1993). I mean constitutional constructivism
in both a methodological sense-as a method of interpreting the Constitution-and a substantive
sense-as the substantive political theory that best fits and justifies our constitutional document and
underlying constitutional order.
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lives. Together, these themes afford everyone the common and guaranteed status of free and equal citizenship in our morally pluralistic constitutional democracy. 8 They reflect two bedrock structures of our constitutional document and
underlying constitutional order: deliberative political and personal self-government.9 The second theme bounds the right of autonomy by limiting it to protection of basic liberties that are significant preconditions for persons'
development and exercise of deliberative autonomy in making certain fimdamental decisions affecting their destiny, identity, or way of life. Thus, constitutional constructivism, in the spirit of Justice Brandeis' famous formulation,
undertakes to "secure conditions favorable to the pursuit of happiness" by securing the preconditions for deliberative autonomy.1 0
My aim in developing a constitutional constructivism is not to unveil a new
package of basic liberties that We the People never knew we had. Nor is it to
provide a new justification for any particular liberty. Rather, I aim to reinterpret familiar understandings of our basic liberties as manifestations of two fundamental themes: deliberative democracy and deliberative autonomy. I also
put forward a guiding framework incorporating these two themes to help orient
our deliberations, reflections, and judgments about our Constitution and constitutional democracy.1" In this article, I advance deliberative autonomy as a unifying theme that shows the coherence and structure of certain substantive
liberties on a list of familiar "unenumerated" fundamental rights (commonly
classed under privacy, autonomy, or substantive due process) 12 and argue that
deliberative autonomy is rooted, along with deliberative democracy, in the language and design of our Constitution.
To the extent that my project succeeds, responsible constitutional interpreters may become less vulnerable to the temptation to take flights from protecting
such substantive liberties - to merely perfecting processes of democracy or
preserving original understanding, narrowly conceived - in the name of

8. See Fleming, supra note 7, at 280-97.
9. I do not mean to imply that the realms of political self-government and personal self-government (or self-determination) are entirely distinct. See text accompanying notes 150-164 infra.
10. In this article, I do not claim to be elaborating Brandeis' vision of"the right to be let alone." I
quote Brandeis' famous passage because I wish to echo his idea that the Constitution "secure[s] conditions favorable to the pursuit of happiness" and because many critics of the right of autonomy quote
Brandeis in caricaturing this idea. Some scholars have distinguished between "informational privacy"
and "decisional privacy" (or autonomy), and argued that Brandeis contemplated the former and not the
latter. See Michael J.Sandel, Moral Argument and Liberal Toleration:Abortion and Homosexuality,77
CAL. L. REv.521, 524, 525-31 (1989) (citation omitted) (distinguishing between the "old privacy," or
an "interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters," and the "new privacy," or an "interest in independence in making certain kinds of important decisions"). Laurence H. Tribe believes that "privacy" is
a misnomer for the latter idea, which is better expressed by "autonomy." See LAURENCE H. TRINE,
AMERucAN CoNsTrrTToNAL LAW 1352 (2d ed. 1988). I believe that these two understandings of "privacy" are two aspects of a larger conception of autonomy, not irreconcilable ideas.
11. See RAwas, supra note 7, at 156,368; Fleming, supra note 7, at 283,289-90. Throughout this
article, my use of such terms as "our" Constitution is inclusive and should not be read as ignoring the
tension between such inclusive references and the historical exclusion of categories of persons from
"We the People" as well as from "free and equal citizenship."
12. I list many of these "unenumerated" rights below. See text accompanying note 27 infra.
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avoiding "Lochnering."' 13 Furthermore, interpreters may become less likely to
lapse into constitutional illiteracy concerning deliberative autonomy, as the
Supreme Court did in Bowers v. Hardwick14 and as Justice Scalia did in his
apoplectic dissent in Planned Parenthoodv. Casey.15 Finally, the right of autonomy may become less susceptible to caricature.
B.

Toward a FundamentalTheme of Securing DeliberativeAutonomy

This article will elaborate constitutional constructivism's second fundamental theme, securing deliberative autonomy. I conceive it as carrying forward
what I call "the unfinished business of Charles Black": constructing a structure
of fundamental rights integral to free and equal citizenship, and showing its
coherence. In his classic book, Structure and Relationship in Constitutional
Law, Black demonstrated that responsible constitutional interpretation requires
not mere textual exegesis and historical research concerning isolated clauses
but also reasoning from structures and relationships manifested in the constitutional document and implicit in the underlying constitutional order as a
whole.' 6 In his famous article, The Unfinished Business of the Warren Court,
he applied a similar analysis to resolve the "methodological crisis" precipitated
by Griswold's recognition of an "unenumerated" right of privacy. There he
called for the construction of a structure or corpus juris of fundamental rights
essential to full citizenship.' 7 Ever since, Black has been building that structure, arguing for protection of "unenumerated" rights that are analogous to or

13. For analysis of the "flights from substance" to process and narrowly conceived original understanding, see, e.g., RoNAL Dwoxrw, The Forum of Principle,56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 469 (1981) (originally titled The Flightfrom Substance, see Commentary, 56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 525, 539 n.* (1981)),
reprinted in A MATrER OF PRINCIPLE 33 (1985); LAURENCE H. TlIE, The Puzzling Persistence of
Process-Based Constitutional Theories, 89 YALE L.J. 1063 (1980), reprinted in CONSTITUIO AL
CHOICES 9 (1985) (retitled The Pointless Flightfrom Substance). Here, I shall focus on the flight from
substance to process. Ely apparently coined the term "Lochnering" or "to Lochner," meaning to impose
one's own substantive fundamental values in the guise of interpreting the Constitution. See John Hart
Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf.A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920, 943-44 (1973). The

idea derives from the infamous case, Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53, 61 (1905) (invalidating,
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, a state maximum hours law that the Court
described as "mere meddlesome interference[ ]with the rights of the individual" to liberty of contract).
14. 478 U.S. 186, 194-95 (1986) (rejecting the argument that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects a right to homosexual sodomy on the ground that such a right has "little or
no cognizable roots inthe language or design of the Constitution").
15. 112 S.Ct. 2791, 2873-85 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting
in part). Scalia bitterly protested against the official reaffirmation of the "central holding" of Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects the
right of women to decide whether to terminate a pregnancy, and confidently declaimed that he is sure
that it does not "because of two simple facts: (1) the Constitution says absolutely nothing about [a right
to abortion], and (2) the longstanding traditions of American society have permitted [abortion] to be
legally proscribed." Id. at 2874.
16. See generally CHAi..s L. BLACK, JR., STucrUaE AND RELATIONSmP IN CoNSIrTUoNAL
LAW (1969).
17. Charles L. Black, Jr., The Unfinished Business of the Warren Court,46 WAsH. L. REv. 3, 3145 (1970) [hereinafter Black, Unfinished Business].
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presupposed by already recognized rights and using neglected "stones" such as
the Ninth Amendment to justify their protection.18
Black's project of persuading the discipline that constitutional interpretation
requires drawing inferences from structures and relationships has been more
successful with regard to institutional structures (e.g., separation of powers and
federalism) and procedural liberties (e.g., the right to vote) than it has been with
respect to substantive liberties (e.g., the right of privacy or autonomy). For
example, even narrow originalists such as Bork and Scalia today accept the
trilogy of "text, history, and structure" as legitimate sources of constitutional
values. They readily engage in structural reasoning concerning separation of
powers, federalism, and a republican form of government, yet they still attack
or flee from, as "Lochnering," drawing inferences from a structure of ordered
liberty, privacy, or autonomy.1 9 The same can be said of process-perfecting
theorists like Ely 2° and, to a lesser extent, Cass R. Sunstein. 2 1 Much work
remains to be done in articulating such substantive liberties as stemming from
coherent structures or patterns rooted in the language and design of our Constinothing more than episodic "ukases" by rovtution, rather than as representing
22
ing philosopher-judges.
This essay takes up this unfinished business of Charles Black, by showing
the coherence and structure of certain familiar basic liberties (commonly
grouped under the names of privacy, autonomy, or substantive due process) on
the basis of a fundamental theme of securing deliberative autonomy. I certainly
do not expect to complete that work, for the structure of fundamental rights
integral to free and equal citizenship "will always be building," whether
through reasoning by analogy or through working toward reflective equilib2 3
rium.
Bork may call that project the construction of a time bomb. 24 Black
18. See e.g., CHARLEs L. BLACK, JR., DECISION ACCORDING TO LAW: THE 1979 HoLMEs LzcTupns 43-54 (1981) [hereinafter BLACK, DECISION]; Charles L. Black, Jr., Further Reflections on the
ConstitutionalJustice of Livelihood, 86 COLUM. L. Rv. 1103, 1104 (1986) [hereinafter Black, Livelihood]; Charles L. Black, Jr., On Reading and Using the Ninth Amendment, in 1 THE RIGHrs RETAINED
BY Tm PEOPLE: Tim ISTORY AND MEANING OF TE NnrH AMEDmtNT 337, 337-49 (Randy Barnett
ed., 1989) [hereinafter Black, Ninth]. The allusion to "stones" is to Black, Unfinished Business, supra
note 17, at 44 ("The stone the builders rejected [the Ninth Amendment] may yet be the cornerstone of
the temple."). Black largely rejects the distinction between "enumerated" and "unenumerated" rights.
See texts accompanying notes 209 & 390 infra.
19. See, e.g., Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2883 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part); Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 123-27, 127 n.6 (1989) (plurality opinion); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 715 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting); BoRK, supra note 3, at 85-87, 95-100,
110-26, 150, 351-55; Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. C. L. R.xv. 849, 853-54,
862-65 (1989).
20. See JoHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY Am DsRusr 73-104 (1980); Ely, supra note 13, at 93536.
21. See CAss R. SuNsrEN, THE PARTIAL CoNsTrrurioN 119-22,259-61 (1993); Cass R. Sunstein,
Liberal Constitutionalismand LiberalJustice, 72 TEx. L. RP'. 305, 312 (1993) (responding to Fleming,
supra note 7, at 260-75).
22. BoRic, supra note 3, at 120 n.*.
23. Black, Ninth, supra note 18, at 343. For reasoning by analogy, see, e.g., id. at 342-44; Black,
UnfinishedBusiness, supra note 17, at 37-45. For reflective equilibrium, see, e.g., RAwLs, supranote 7,
at 8; JoHN RAwLs, A THEORY OF JusTicE 20-21, 48-51 (1971); RONALD DwoRcN, TAKrNG RiGHrs

SERIOUSLY 159-68 (1977). For an analysis of the differences between reasoning by analogy and work-
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terms it decision
according to law.2 5 I call it constructing the substantive
26
Constitution.
In Part II, I describe deliberative autonomy and outline a constitutional constructivism with two fundamental themes: deliberative democracy and deliberative autonomy. I show that both themes have structural roles to play in our
scheme of deliberative self-governance, and that both are integral to our dualist
constitutional democracy. I also contend that we should not flee deliberative
autonomy for deliberative democracy (or liberty for equality), but should deploy both grounds in deriving basic liberties essential to free and equal
citizenship.
In Part III, I elaborate the idea of deliberative autonomy, exploring its underpinnings in liberty of conscience and freedom of association and showing
that its scope is limited to significant basic liberties. I indicate what deliberative autonomy is not, distinguishing it from the familiar understandings or caricatures of privacy, autonomy, or liberty mentioned above. I also argue that
deliberative autonomy constitutes a realm of personal sovereignty and that it
provides an "exit" option from majoritarian oppression to a figurative
"frontier."
Finally, in Part IV, I propose a reconception of the substantive due process
inquiry that bases the recognition of "unenumerated" fundamental rights on
their significance for deliberative autonomy. With this criterion of significance, constructivism's guiding framework would chart a middle course between Scylla (Scalia)-the rock of liberty as "hidebound" historical
practices-and Charybdis-the whirlpool of liberty as unbounded license. I
also attempt to bring a sense of order and discipline to (supposedly wild and
unruly) judgments about significance for deliberative autonomy by exploring
homologies between the structure of deliberative autonomy and that of deliberative democracy. I show that substantive due process and First Amendment
jurisprudences are mirror images of one another with respect to the judgments
that they make regarding significance for deliberative autonomy and deliberative democracy, respectively.
II.

CONSTRUCTING A FUNDAMENTAL THEME OF DELIBERATIVE AuTONOMY:

BEYOND DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY TO CONSTITUTIONAL
CONSTRUCTIVISM

In this Part, I present deliberative autonomy as a unifying theme that shows
the coherence and structure of a list of familiar "unenumerated" fundamental
rights. Then, I argue for moving beyond process-perfecting theories of deliberative democracy to constitutional constructivism, a theory that can fit and jusing toward reflective equilibrium, see Cass R. Sunstein, Commentary: On Analogical Reasoning, 106

HARv.L. REv. 741, 781-87 (1993).
24. BORK,supra note 3, at 95.
25. BLACK, DECISIoN, supra note 18.
26. Fleming, supra note 7. I also call my project constructing a "Constitution-perfecting" theory,
as distinguished from a "process-perfecting" theory. Id. at 214 & n.15; see also text accompanying
notes 84-91 infra.
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tify such substantive liberties as preconditions for deliberative autonomy rather
than recasting them as preconditions for deliberative democracy or disregarding
them entirely.
A.

What Deliberative Autonomy Is
1. Constructing the structure of deliberative autonomy from a list of
familiar "unenumerated"fundamental rights.

Imagine that you are a constitutional archaeologist and that you dig up the
following bones or shards of a constitutional culture: liberty of conscience and
freedom of thought; freedom of association, including both expressive association and intimate association, whatever one's sexual orientation; the right to
live with one's family, whether nuclear or extended; the right to travel or relocate; the right to marry; the right to decide whether to bear or beget children,
including the rights to procreate, to use contraceptives, and to terminate a pregnancy; the right to direct the education and rearing of children; and the right to
exercise dominion over one's body, including the right to bodily integrity and
ultimately the right to die.27 You may recognize this as a list of familiar
"unenumerated" fundamental rights. The Supreme Court has recognized most
of these rights under the rubrics of privacy, autonomy, or substantive due pro-

27. See, e.g., West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (liberty of
conscience and freedom of thought); Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 617-18 (1984)
(freedom of association, including both expressive association and intimate association); Moore v. City
of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503-04 (1977) (right to live with one's family, whether nuclear or
extended); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629-30 (1969) (right to travel or relocate); Turner v.
Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 95-96 (1987) (right to marry); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (right to
marry); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (right to procreate); Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965) (right within marital association to use contraceptives); Eisenstadt v.
Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (right of individual, married or single, to use contraceptives); Carey v.
Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 694 (1977) (right to distribute contraceptives); Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (right of a woman to decide whether to terminate a pregnancy); Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2812 (1992) (reaffirming "central holding" of Roe); Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923) (right to direct the education of children); Pierce v. Society of
Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (right to direct the upbringing and education of children); Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210,221-22 (1990) (right to bodily integrity, in particular, to avoid unwanted
administration of anti-psychotic drugs); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172-73 (1952) (right to
bodily integrity, in particular, to be protected against the extraction of evidence obtained by "breaking
into the privacy" of a person's mouth or stomach); Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S.
261, 279 (1990) (assuming for purposes ofthe case a "right to die"); id.at 339-45 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that decisions about death are a matter of individual conscience); see also Whalen v. Roe,
429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977) (right of privacy includes both an "individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters" and an "interest in independence in making certain kinds of important decisions"); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969) (right to receive ideas and to be free from
unwanted governmental intrusions into the privacy of one's home).
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cess. 2 8 The challenge that you face is to decide whether these bones
or shards
29
fit together into, and are justifiable within, a coherent structure.
Let us consider how originalist, process-perfecting, and constructivist archaeologists might view these materials. Generally, originalists hold that interpreters must limit themselves to giving effect to the specifically enumerated
30
provisions or narrowly conbeived original understanding of the Constitution.
Process-perfecters believe that interpreters must confine themselves to perfecting the processes of democracy rather than imposing substantive fundamental
values. 3 ' Constructivists contend that interpreters should perfect the whole
Constitution by reinforcing not only the procedural liberties of democracy but
also the substantive liberties of autonomy embodied in it.
If you were an originalist archaeologist, you might conclude, from the fact
that these shards were not specifically enumerated in the constitutional document, that you had unearthed the junk pile of the constitutional culture. From
that viewpoint, the only thing that these shards have in common is that they are
anomalies that have nothing to do with the language and design of the Constitution. Or, perhaps you might decide that what they have in common is that they
evince the hubris and futility of judges episodically succumbing to the temptation of imposing their personal visions of utopia upon the polity in the guise of
interpreting the Constitution. Indeed, you might speculate that you had exhumed a ghost town, and that these shards were lying here together because
judicial protection of32them culminated in the destruction of the Supreme Court
and the Constitution.
28. But, for example, the Supreme Court refused to recognize a right of intimate association for
homosexuals. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191 (1986) (rejecting right of homosexuals to
engage in sodomy). But see Commonwealth v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487, 497 (Ky. 1992) (criticizing
Bowers as a "misdirected application of the theory of original intent" in light of precedents such as
Loving, and interpreting the Kentucky Constitution's privacy and equal protection guarantees to prohibit
a criminal statute outlawing consensual homosexual sodomy).
29. In speaking of the bones or shards as fitting into, and being justifiable within, a coherent
structure, I refer to Dworkin's formulation of the two dimensions of best interpretation: fit and justification. See RONALD DwoxmrN, LAW'S EmPrra 239 (1986).
30. See note 19 supra (identifying Bork and Scalia as narrow originalists). Some constitutional
theorists have sought to develop broader conceptions of originalism. See, e.g., MICHAL J. PimUy, Tim
CoNsTrrrtmoN N Tma COuRTs 54-115 (1994); Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEx. L.
REv. 1165, 1264 (1993); Lawrence Lessig, Understanding ChangedReadings: Fidelity and Theory, 47
STAN. L. REV.395 (1995). One might also understand the work of Bruce Ackerman as an attempt to
develop a broader form of originalism. See BRucE AcKxmuAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 3-33
(1991); James E. Fleming, We the Exceptional American People, 11 CoNST. Comm.355, 369-70 (1994)
(interpreting Ackerman's constitutional theory along these lines); Martin S. Flaherty, History "Lite" in
Modern American Constitutionalism, 95 COLUM. L. REv. 523, 579-90 (1995) (same). To make clear
that I am criticizing narrow conceptions of originalism, I speak of "narrowly conceived original understanding" or use similar expressions.
31. See notes 20 & 21 supra (identifying Ely and Sunstein as proponents of process-perfecting
theories).
32. I draw this account of a narrow originalist archaeologist from several sources. See, e.g.,
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2874,2884 (1992) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in the judgment
in part and dissenting in part); Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 300 (1990)
(Scalia, J., concurring); Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 123-27 &n.6 (1989) (Scalia, J., plurality
opinion); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 194-95 (1986); Bor,, supranote 3,passim; Scalia, supra
note 19.
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If you were a process-perfecting archaeologist, you might conclude, from
the fact that many of these bones do not readily fit the procedural mold of
representative or deliberative democracy, 33 that they were alien substances,
malformed growths upon the body of the Constitution. Yet if you were imaginative, you might reconstruct or recast some of these substantive growths as
legitimate procedural appendages to the skeleton. In performing that reconstruction, however, you would have to force fit these bones into the body of the
Constitution, lopping off or leaving out some of them. Thus, the fit would be
34
Procrustean, not Herculean.
But if you were a constructivist archaeologist, you would accept these
bones as stipulated features (or fixed points) of a skeleton that you had a responsibility to construct. You would be able to construct the unity of these
bones in a structure of deliberative autonomy that, along with a framework of
35
deliberative democracy, is an integral part of the body of the Constitution.
From that standpoint, you would comprehend that all of these bones constitute
rights that reserve to persons the power to deliberate about and decide how to
live their own lives, with respect to certain matters unusually important for
such personal self-governance, over a complete life. 36 Put another way, the
bones represent basic liberties that are significant preconditions for persons'
development and exercise of deliberative autonomy in making certain fundamental decisions affecting their destiny, identity, or way of life, and they span a
complete lifetime. Hence, constructivists would fit these bones together into
and justify them within a coherent structure of deliberative autonomy in a Constitution that embodies both deliberative autonomy and deliberative democracy
as aspects of "a political ideal . . . of a society of citizens both equal and
free."3 7

33. Elsewhere, I have distinguished between Ely's theory of "representative democracy" and Sunstein's theory of "deliberative democracy." See Fleming, supra note 7, at 219 n.35. Here, I use the two
terms interchangeably.
34. I base this account of a process-perfecting archaeologist on ELY, supra note 20, at 73-104,
and, to a lesser extent, on SuNs'rN, supra note 21, at 133-41. Procrustes was a mythical Greek giant
who stretched or shortened captives to make them fit his beds. Hercules is Dworkin's mythical philosopher-judge who, in order to decide hard cases, constructs a substantive political theory that best fits and
justifies the Constitution as a whole. See note 73 infra and accompanying text.
35. This account of a constructivist archaeologist is based on DwonXmN, supra note 23, at 159-68;
RA.w..s, supra note 23, at 46-53, 577-87; RAwLS, supra note 7, at 89-129.
36. I am persuaded by the arguments of Ronald Dworkin and Justice Stevens that there is no right
to life before birth. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2839 (1992) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); RoNqALD Dwoarw, LiE's Do~mUoN 109-16 (1993). In speaking of
such rights as reserving to persons powers to make certain decisions, I mean to echo Ely, supra note 6,
at 402.
37. Ronald Dworkin, UnenumeratedRights: Whether and How Roe Should Be Overruled,59 U.
Cm. L. REy. 381,382 (1992); see also RAwi~s, supra note 7, at 15-20, 29-35, 299-304 (grounding equal
basic liberties on a conception of citizens as free and equal persons, together with a conception of
society as a fair system of social cooperation).
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2. Familiarunderstandings of deliberative autonomy in our
constitutionalculture.
Returning from this imaginary archeological excavation to our constitutional culture, we can find many familiar understandings of deliberative autonomy with respect to "unenumerated" fundamental rights on the foregoing list.3S
For example, it is illustrated by Justices Stevens' and Blackmun's dissents in
Bowers v. Hardwick.39 Stevens writes that the Court's "privacy" decisions
have actually been animated by fundamental concerns for "'the individual's
right to make certain unusually important decisions that will affect his own, or
his family's, destiny' " and " 'the abiding interest in individual liberty that
makes certain state intrusions on the citizen's right to decide how he will live
his own life intolerable.' "40 In Whalen v. Roe, Stevens describes this right as
an "interest in independence in making certain kinds of important decisions."'4'
In his dissent in Bowers, Blackmun characterizes this liberty in terms of "freedom of intimate association" and the "decisional and the spatial aspects of the
right to privacy." 42 His discussion builds upon Justice Brennan's powerful
analysis of the right of intimate association in Roberts v. United States Jaycees:
"The Court has long recognized that, because the Bill of Rights is designed to
secure individual liberty, it must afford the formation and preservation of certain kinds of highly personal relationships a substantial measure of sanctuary
from unjustified interference by the State." 4 3 This protection, Brennan states,
"safeguards the ability independently to define one's identity that is central to
any concept of liberty."44
Similar conceptions of deliberative autonomy appear in Planned
Parenthoodv. Casey, not only in the opinions of Justices Stevens and Blackmun but also in the joint opinion of Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter.
As Stevens puts it, "Decisional autonomy must limit the State's power to inject
into a woman's most personal deliberations its own views of what is best,"
because a woman's decision to terminate her pregnancy "is nothing less than a
matter of conscience. '45 He emphasizes liberty of conscience and decisional
38. See note 27 supra and accompanying text.
39. 478 U.S. 186, 199-214 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting); id. at 214-20 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see Fleming, supra note 7, at 254-55.
40. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 217 (Stevens, J.,dissenting) (quoting Fitzgerald v. Porter Memorial
Hosp., 523 F.2d 716,719-20 (7th Cir. 1975) (footnotes omitted), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 916 (1976)); see
generally John Paul Stevens, The Bill ofRights: A Century of Progress,59 U. Cm. L. REv. 13 (1992)
(discussing his conception of liberty protected by the Constitution).
41. 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977) (writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Stevens stated that the
right of privacy includes both decisional and informational dimensions).
42. 478 U.S. at 202, 204 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting). For a critique of Blackmun's dissent and, in

particular, the conception of autonomy it expresses, see Sandel, supra note 10, at 530, 533-38.
43. 468 U.S. 609, 618 (1984).
44. Id. at 619.
45. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S.Ct. 2791, 2840 (1992) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (emphasis added); see also Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S.
261, 339-45 (1990) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that choices about death are a matter of individual
conscience).
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autonomy (as well as equal dignity and respect for women and men).4 6 Likewise, Blackmun's opinion in Casey emphasizes that cases protecting the fundamental right of privacy embody "the principle that personal decisions that
profoundly affect bodily integrity, identity, and destiny should be largely beyond the reach of government." 4 7 He, too, stresses personal self-government or
self-determination (along with gender equality).48 Similarly, the joint opinion
in Casey speaks of a woman's liberty at stake in the decision whether to have
an abortion as
involving the most intimate and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy .... At the heart of
liberty is the right to define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the
universe, and of the mystery of human life. Beliefs about these matters could
not define4 9the attributes of personhood were they formed under compulsion of
the State.
The joint opinion's explication of this personal liberty, rooted in decisional
autonomy and bodily integrity, evinces deliberative autonomy. (Like the opinions of Stevens and Blackmun, the joint opinion intertwines concerns for personal liberty and gender equality.50 )
Landmark substantive due process cases such as Meyer,51 Pierce,52 Griswold,5 3 Loving,5 4 Eisenstadt,55 Moore,56 Carey,5 7 and Roe5 8 also illustrate de46. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2840, 2842 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Jane
Cohen analyzes Stevens' idea of decisional autonomy in terms of "deliberative autonomy." See Jane
Maslow Cohen, A Jurisprudenceof Doubt: DeliberativeAutonomy and Abortion, 3 CoLuM. J. GmNDE
& L. 175 (1992).
47. 112 S. Ct. at 2846 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and

dissenting in part).
48. Id. at 2846-47.
49. Id at 2807; cf. Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649,2658 (1992) (affirming that the First Amendment protects freedom of conscience). The joint opinion in Casey went on to state: "Abortion is a
unique act. It is an act fraught with consequences for others...." 112 S. Ct. at 2807.
50. See Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2809, 2812, 2831.
51. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 402 (1923) ("jThe] ideas touching the relation between
individual and state [in ancient Sparta and Plato's ideal commonwealth, which 'submerge the individual
and develop ideal citizens'] were wholly different from those upon which our institutions rest."). For
statements of the holdings of Meyer and the other cases I discuss in this section, see note 27 supra and
accompanying text.
52. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925) ("The fundamental theory of liberty
upon which all governments in this Union repose excludes any general power of the state to standardize
its children by forcing them to accept instruction from public teachers only. The child is not the mere
creature of the state.").
53. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965) ("We deal with a right of privacy older
than the Bill of Rights .... Marriage is... intimate to the degree of being sacred. It is an association
that promotes a way of life . .

").

54. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) ("The freedom to marry has long been recognized as
one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.").
55. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438,453 (1972) ("If the right of privacy means anything, it is the
right of the individual,married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.'). As Tribe has
noted, "the effect of Eisenstadtv. Baird was to single out as decisive in Griswold the element of reproductive autonomy," not just the protection of the heterosexual marital relationship. TRiBE, supra note
10, at 1339 (footnotes omitted). For critiques of Eisenstadtprecisely because of this aspect of it, see
GLENDON, supra note 5, at 57; Sandel, supra note 10, at 527-28.
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liberative autonomy. Justice Jackson expresses deliberative autonomy in
perhaps the most stirring terms in Barnette:
[W]e apply the limitations of the Constitution with no fear that freedom to be
intellectually and spiritually diverse or even contrary will disintegrate the social organization ....

[F]reedom to differ is not limited to things that do not

matter much. That would be a mere shadow of freedom. The test of its substance59is the right to differ as to things that touch the heart of the existing
order.
Jed Rubenfeld has argued persuasively that such cases reflect an antitotalitarian
principle of privacy: they are concerned with the danger of "creeping totalitarianism, an unarmed occupation of individuals' lives."' 60 Constitutional constructivism incorporates a similar antitotalitarian principle of liberty, along with
a parallel anticaste principle of equality, as aspects of the free and equal citizen61
ship that is due everyone in our morally pluralistic constitutional democracy.
Below, I shall focus upon the idea of liberty of conscience and freedom of
association as underwriting deliberative autonomy.
The eloquent formulations of deliberative autonomy in Casey and the dissents in Bowers aptly distill the core of the cases involving decisional autonomy, bodily integrity, and dignity. They have consolidated a framework of
"reasoned judgment" concerning our Constitution's "promise" of a "rational
continuum" of liberty,62 rather than just recapitulating doctrines. These formulations, uttered in the contexts of abortion and intimate association, also apply
56. Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 506 (1977) ('.[T]he Constitution prevents [the
city] from standardizing its children-and its adults-by forcing all to live in certain narrowly defined
family patterns.").
57. Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 687-88 (1977) (stressing that prior decisions
such as Griswold, Eisenstadt, and Roe protected the right of "[i]ndividual autonomy in matters of
childbearing" and the individual's "right of decision" about procreation from unjustified intrusion by the
government).
58. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) ("Th[e] right of privacy, whether it be founded in the
Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon state action, as we feel it is,
or, as the District Court determined, in the Ninth Amendment's reservation of rights to the people, is
broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.").
59. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 641-42 (1943). In Barnette,the
Court invalidated a state board of education's requirement that students salute the flag as a violation
both of "a right of self-determination in matters that touch individual opinion and personal attitude" and
of the First Amendment. Id. at 630, 641.
60. Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARv. L. Ray. 737, 784 (1989). For example,
Rubenfeld emphasizes the profound sense in which laws restricting abortion reduce women to "mere
instrumentalities of the state," and "take diverse women with every variety of career, life-plan, and so
on, and make mothers of them all." Id. at 788, 790; see also LAURENcE H. TRIBE, ABORTION: THE
CLASH OF ABsoLuTrs 92-93 (1990) (characterizing Meyer and Pierceas "bulwarks in our legal system"
and as ancestors of the right of women "not to be made mothers against their will"); TRmF, supra note
10, at 1302-21, 1337-62 (discussing the parameters of the rights of privacy and personhood and the
judicial decisions that have developed them).
I refer to the right of privacy or autonomy as an "antitotalitarian principle of liberty" to suggest a
parallel with Sunstein's anticaste principle of equality. See SUtsraIN, supra note 21, at 137-41.
61. Elsewhere, I have explored the relationship between liberty and equality in grounding the
basic liberties associated with deliberative autonomy, arguing that we need not and should not flee
substantive due process for equal protection but should deploy both grounds. See Fleming, supra note 7,
at 260-78; text accompanying notes 267-282 infra.
62. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2805-06, 2833 (1992) (joint opinion).

November 1995]

DELIBERATIVE A UTONOMY

to the other types of personal decisions encompassed by the rights on the foregoing list.63 They succinctly capture what is at stake in these unusually important decisions profoundly affecting persons' destiny, identity, or way of life,
and why such decisions lie in "a realm of personal liberty which the government may not enter." 64 In other words, these rights represent basic liberties
that are significant preconditions for deliberative autonomy.
Notwithstanding the cogency and coherence of these formulations, Bork
asserts that the recognition of a right of privacy in Griswold amounted to "the
construction of a constitutional time bomb" whose full extent we still do not
know many years later. 65 One thing that we do know, however, is that for
Bork, Griswold indeed proved to be a constitutional time bomb, for it blew up
in his face during his Supreme Court nomination hearings in 1987. It did so
because he still had not articulated or embraced a theory of constitutional inter66
pretation that could justify it.
Bork's hearings, and all of the subsequent confirmation hearings of
Supreme Court nominees, suggest that Griswold, far from being a constitutional time bomb, has become a "fixed star in our constitutional constellation."' 67 Brown v. Board of Education68 in the 1950s, and Griswold in the
1960s, provoked methodological crises in constitutional law. 69 Yet like Brown,
Griswold today is a case that any nominee, to stand a chance of being confirmed, has to say was rightly decided. Thus, Justices Kennedy, Souter, and
Thomas were as scrupulous about saying that they recognized a constitutional
right of privacy and accepted Griswold as they were about declining to say
whether they recognized a right to abortion and accepted Roe. 70 Justices Gins63. See note 27 supra and accompanying text.
64. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2805.
65. BoRa, supra note 3, at 95-100. We still do not know the full extent of the right of privacy 30
years later (and it's a good thing, too). For that matter, we never know the full extent of any constitutional principle, least of all any important one.
66. See Ronald Dworkin, Bork's Jurisprudence,57 U. Cm. L. Rv. 657, 657 (1990) (reviewing
BoRi, supranote 3) (arguing that Bork was not confirmed largely because of his rejection of a constitutional right of privacy).
67. Cf. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Bamette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) ("If there is any
fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall
be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by
word or act their faith therein.").
68. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (holding that racial segregation of public schools violated the Equal
Protection Clause).
69. Charles Black offered sensible resolutions for the methodological crises that Brown and Griswold provoked in constitutional law. See Charles L. Black, Jr., The Lawfulness of the Segregation
Decisions, 69 YaLE LJ. 421 (1960) (defending Brown); Black, Unfinished Business, supra note 17, at
31-45 (defending Griswold).
70. See Nomination of Anthony M. Kennedy to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the
United States: HearingsBefore the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 135-36, 16465 (1988); Nomination ofDavid H. Souter to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United
States: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 172-76 (1990); 1
Nomination of Judge Clarence Thomas to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United
States: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 225, 364 (1991).
Even Justice Scalia strains to say that Griswoldwas rightly decided according to his conception of the
due process inquiry. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 128 n.6 (1989).
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burg and Breyer accepted both Griswold and Roe as settled law. 71 (So it is in
our constitutional culture that the most controversial cases of earlier decades
become litmus tests for later decades.)
Constructing a fundamental theme of deliberative autonomy does not entail
constructing a constitutional time bomb. Nor does it involve drawing bright
lines around privacy, autonomy, or liberty. Instead, it entails tethering the right
of autonomy, and what Casey called "Griswold liberty," 72 to a bedrock structure inour constitutional democracy.
3.

Beyond deliberative democracy to constitutionalconstructivism.

I shall situate these familiar understandings of deliberative autonomy and
"unenumerated" fundamental rights in the framework of a constitutional constructivism, an alternative to process-perfecting and narrow originalist theories.
What is a constitutional constructivism? First, I intend a general methodological sense of constructivism, illustrated by Ronald Dworkin's conception of constitutional interpretation as requiring the construction of a substantive political
theory (or scheme of principles) that best fits and justifies our constitutional
document and underlying constitutional order as a whole.73 Second, I intend a
specific substantive sense of constructivism, exemplified by John Rawls' conception of the equal basic liberties in a constitutional democracy such as our
own as being grounded on a conception of citizens as free and equal persons,
together with a conception of society as a fair system of social cooperation. 74
Constitutional constructivism is analogous to Rawls' political constructivism.75
Constitutional constructivism has two fundamental themes, securing deliberative democracy and securing deliberative autonomy. I seek to develop a
constitutional constructivism because it can better fit and justify the foregoing
substantive liberties associated with autonomy, as manifested in our constitutional document and implicit in our underlying constitutional order, than can
process-perfecting'and narrow originalist theories.
71. See Nomination of Ruth Bader Ginsburgto be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the
United States: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong., IstSess. 207, 282
(1993); Nomination of Stephen G. Breyer to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United
States: HearingsBefore the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 138 (1994). Breyer,
while a law clerk, wrote the first draft of Justice Goldberg's concurrence in Griswold. See DAvm J.
GARRow, LIBERTY AND SExuALTY: THE RIOHT TO PRIVACY AND ThE MAKING OF ROE . XidDE 250
(1994).

72. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2810 (1992) (referring to the line of decisions
exemplified by Griswold, which protect "liberty relating to intimate relationships, the family, and decisions about whether or not to beget or bear a child").
73. See Dwo, nm, supra note 29, at 239, 355-99; DwORKIN, supra note 23, at 105-30. For another development of a constructivism in a general methodological sense, see Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A
Constructivist Coherence Theory of ConstitutionalInterpretation, 100 HARv. L. Ray. 1189 (1987).
Dworkin initially put forth a constructivist method of legal interpretation by analogy to Rawls' conception of justification in political philosophy as a quest for reflective equilibrium between our considered
judgments and underlying principles of justice. Dworkin argued that legal interpretation proceeds back
and forth between extant legal materials and underlying principles of law toward reflective equilibrium
between them. See DwosmN, supra note 23, at 159-68.
74. See RAWLs, supra note 7, at 15-20, 29-35, 299-304.
75. See Fleming, supra note 7, at 282-83.

November 19951

DELIBERATIVE AUTONOMY

For example, Ely argues that the Constitution is principally concerned with
establishing a procedural framework of democracy and protecting procedural
liberties rather than securing substantive liberties. 76 Nonetheless, he admits
that there are numerous expressions of substantive values, in addition to procedural values, on the face of the Constitution for which his process-perfecting
theory does not account. 77 These substantive values (manifested in the First,
Third, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, Thirteenth, and Fourteenth Amendments) include
liberty of conscience, freedom of association, autonomy, privacy, and independence.7 8 Yet Ely suggests that to represent such concerns for substantive liberties "as a dominant theme of our constitutional document one would have to
concentrate quite single-mindedly on hopping from stone to stone and averting
79
one's eyes from the mainstream."
Notwithstanding Ely, constitutional constructivism concentrates on constructing the unity or structure of these substantive "stones." These stones do
not necessitate hopping; they form a bedrock structure of deliberative autonomy. This fundamental theme powerfully fits and justifies these substantive
liberties, and shows them to be integral to the language and design of the Constitution. In the words of Charles Black, "[t]he stone[s] the builders rejected
may yet be the cornerstone of the temple."8 0 Ely's and Sunstein's processperfecting theories recast such substantive liberties as procedural preconditions
for democracy or, worse yet, omit them altogether.8 1 Narrow originalists like
Scalia and Bork are even less faithful to the constitutional scheme, in effect
repealing these substantive liberties by construction.82 In short, these two types
of theories take "fights from substance" to process and narrowly conceived
original understanding.8 3 Constitutional constructivism instead treats these
substantive liberties reflected on the face of the Constitution and these
"unenumerated" fundamental rights recognized in landmark cases as crucial
features (or fixed points) of our constitutional practice, tradition, and culture. It
accepts the responsibility to fit and justify these materials in constructing a
constitutional theory.
To construct the substantive Constitution, we need to move beyond process-perfecting theories to a Constitution-perfecting theory: a theory that reinforces not only the procedural liberties of deliberative democracy but also the
84
substantive liberties of deliberative autonomy embodied in our Constitution.
76. ELY, supra note 20, at 87, 92.
77. Id. at 87-101.
78. Id. at 93-100. Ely also acknowledges that the Constitution protects the substantive values of
private property and the obligation of contracts. Id. at 91-92, 97-98.
79. Id. at 101.
80. Black, Unfinished Business, supra note 17, at 44 (referring to the Ninth Amendment).
81. See Fleming, supra note 7, at 233-35, 256-60.
82. See notes 19 & 32 supra.
83. See note 13 supra.
84. See Fleming, supra note 7, at 214 & n.15. I mean "perfecting" in the sense of interpreting the
Constitution with integrity so as to render it as a coherent whole, not in Monaghan's caricatured sense of
"Our Perfect Constitution" as a perfect liberal utopia or an "ideal object" of political morality. See
Henry P. Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 353, 356 (1981); cf. Frank I.
Michelman, Constancyto an Ideal Object, 56 N.Y.U. L. PEv. 406, 407 (1981) (distinguishing "weak-
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Constitutional constructivism is such a theory. It is, however, a theory of constructing our substantive Constitution, as distinguished from a theory of con-

structing a perfectly just constitution (unmoored by the constraints of our
constitutional 5text, history, and structure, to say nothing of practice, tradition,
8

and culture).

In other words, constitutional constructivism is not a theory of natural law
or natural rights, and does not conceive the foregoing substantive liberties as
prepolitical or given by a prior and independent order of moral values that is
binding for all times and all places.8 6 Thus, it does not attempt to impose
claims to philosophical truth upon an unwilling people.8 7 Instead, it is what
Frank Michelman, analyzing Rawls' political constructivism, has called an "interpretative theory" drawn from the ongoing political practice of a constitutional democracy.8 8 Constitutional constructivism draws our principles and
substantive liberties from our constitutional democracy's ongoing practice, tradition, and culture. 89 These principles are aspirational - the principles to
which we as a people aspire, and for which we as a people stand - and may
not be fully realized in our historical practices, statute books, and common
law. 90 Accordingly, constitutional constructivism recognizes that our principles may fit and justify most of our practices or precedents but criticize some of
them for failing to live up to our constitutional commitments to principles such
as liberty and equality.9 1

sense perfectionism" or "constitutional rationalism" from "strong-sense perfectionism"f). For the notion
of law as integrity, see DwoyiaN, supra note 29, at 176-224.
85. Nonetheless, constitutional constructivism is wary of the specter of Lochner. See Fleming,
supra note 7, at 211-14, 246-48, 302; text accompanying notes 386-389 infra (discussing competing
understandings of what was wrong with Lochner).
86. See RAwLs, supranote 7, at 89-99 (contrasting political constructivism with theories of moral
realism (including natural law and natural rights) along these lines).
87. Id. at 28, 66-71; see also John Rawls, Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory, 77 J. Pire.
515, 554-72 (1980) [hereinafter Rawls, Kantian Constructivism];John Rawls, Reply to Habermas,92 J.
PHIL 132, 156-70 (1995) [hereinafter Rawls, Reply] (responding to the charge that his political liberalism is such a theory advanced in Jorgen Habermas, Reconciliation through the Public Use of Reason:
Remarks on John Rawls' Political Liberalism, 92 J. Prim. 109, 128-31 (1995)).
88. See Frank I. Michelman, On RegulatingPracticeswith Theories Drawnfrom Them: A Case of
Justice as Fairness,in NoMos: THEoRY AN PAcrncE 309 (Ian Shapiro & Judith Wagner DeCew eds.,
1995).
89. See Fleming, supra note 7, at 286 (observing that within Rawls' political constructivism, equal
basic liberties are conceived, not as "true," but as "most reasonable for us," and are worked up from the
way citizens are regarded in the public political culture of our constitutional democracy, in the basic
political texts (e.g., the Constitution and the Declaration of Independence), and in the tradition and
practice of the interpretation of those texts).
90. For discussion of aspirational principles, see notes 334 & 338 infra; texts accompanying notes
327-337, 360-361.
91. For the formulation "fits most and criticizes some," I am indebted to Lewis D. Sargentich. See
Gregory C. Keating, Fidelity to Pre-existing Law and the Legitimacy of Legal Decision, 69 NoTRE
DAME L. REv. 1, 38 (1993) (using this formulation in developing a general conception of legal
justification).

November 1995]
B.

DELIBERATIVE AUTONOMY

An Outlinefor a ConstitutionalConstructivism
1. A guidingframeworkfor securing deliberative democracy and
deliberative autonomy.

Constitutional constructivism advances a guiding framework with two fundamental themes, securing deliberative democracy and securing deliberative
autonomy. I am developing this guiding framework by analogy to Rawls'
political constructivism, but I make no claim that everything Rawls argues is
required by justice is also mandated by our Constitution. Nor do I rely upon
Rawls as an authority for what the Constitution means, much less hold an absurd anachronistic view that the constitutional framers and ratifiers in 1791
enacted a book published by Rawls in 1971 or 1993.92 I simply use the guiding
framework because it suggests certain interpretive strategies to help orient our
deliberations, reflections, and judgments about our Constitution and constitutional democracy. 93 The usefulness of the framework is to be assessed by ordinary criteria for an acceptable theory of constitutional interpretation and
judicial review.94 To explain that framework, I must put forth several abstract
conceptions from Rawls' theory.
Politicalconception ofjustice:fair terms ofsocial cooperationon the basis
of mutual respect and trust. In PoliticalLiberalism, Rawls reformulates his
well-known theory-justice as fairess-as an example of a political liberalism or a political conception of justice, as distinguished from a comprehensive religious, philosophical, or moral conception of the good. 95 First, political
liberalism accepts the "fact of reasonable pluralism"--the fact that a diversity
of reasonable yet conflicting and irreconcilable comprehensive religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines may be affirmed by citizens in the free exercise
of their capacity for a conception of the good-as a feature of the political
culture of a constitutional democracy, not to be regretted and not soon to pass
away. 96 Second, political liberalism emphasizes the related "fact of oppression"-the fact that a single comprehensive religious, philosophical, or moral
doctrine could be established as a shared basis of political agreement or public
justification in a constitutional democracy only through the intolerably oppressive use of coercive political power-as an entailment of accepting the fact of
reasonable pluralism. 97 Political liberalism generalizes the principle of religious toleration to apply to reasonable conceptions of the good.98
92. See Born:, supra note 3, at 210-11 (ridiculing an effort to apply Rawls' A Theory ofJustice to

interpreting the Constitution).
93. See RAwLs, supra note 7, at 156, 368 (arguing that the proper role of his conception of justice
is as a framework which may help others in their deliberations on constitutional essentials).
94. See Fleming, supra note 7, at 298-300 (arguing that constitutional constructivism better satisfies Ely's three criteria for an acceptable theory than does his own theory: (1) how well it fits and
justifies the constitutional document and underlying constitutional order; (2) whether it is consistent
with and supportive of the underlying political system; and (3) whether it assigns judges a role that they
are well situated to perform).
95. See RAWvLS, supra note 7, at xv-xviii.
96. Id. at 36-37, 144.
97. Id. at 37.
98. Id at 9-10, 154.
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Despite these two related facts, Rawls argues that citizens in a constitutional democracy who hold opposing and irreconcilable conceptions of the
good, such as comprehensive religious, philosophical, or moral doctrines, may
be able to find a shared basis of reasonable political agreement or public justification through an overlapping consensus concerning a political conception of
justice. This sort of consensus would obtain where different persons, from the
standpoint of their own divergent conceptions of the good, affirmed a shared
political conception ofjustice. 99 Such a political conception of justice, with the
following basic liberties embodied in a constitution, 10 0 would provide fair
terms of social cooperation on the basis of mutual respect and trust that citizens
might reasonably be expected to endorse, whatever their particular conceptions
of the good.
By analogy to Rawls' political liberalism, constitutional constructivism accepts the fact of reasonable pluralism and recognizes the related fact of oppression. Moreover, it conceives our Constitution as partially embodying a
political conception of justice that provides fair terms of social cooperation on
the basis of mutual respect and trust. It does not, however, import any basic
liberties from Rawls' theory of justice as fairness as such, irrespective of
whether they have a firm grounding in our constitutional practice, tradition, and
culture.
Conception of citizens as free and equal persons: the two moral powers.
Constitutional constructivism, like Rawls' political liberalism, understands our
basic liberties as being grounded on a conception of citizens as free and equal
persons, together with a conception of society as a fair system of social cooperation. 10 1 It views such persons engaged in such cooperation as having two
moralpowers.
The first moral power is the capacityfor a sense ofjustice-the capacity to
understand, apply, and act from (and not merely in accordance with) the political conception of justice that characterizes the fair terms of social cooperation
in a constitutional democracy. Citizens apply this capacity in deliberating
about and judging the justice of basic institutions and social policies, as well as
about the common good.' 0 2
The second moral power is the capacityfor a conception of the good-the
capacity to form, revise, and rationally pursue a conception of the good, individually and in association with others, over a complete life. A conception of
the good is a conception of what is valuable in human life. It typically consists
of ends and aims derived from certain religious, philosophical, or moral doctrines, as well as attachments to other persons and loyalties to various groups
reaand associations. Citizens apply this capacity, their power of deliberative
10 3
son, in deliberating about and deciding how to live their own lives.
99. Id. passim.
100. See text accompanying notes 106-115 infra.
101. See RAwLS, supra note 7, at 15-20, 29-35, 299-304.
102. Id. at 19, 302, 332.
103. Id. at 19, 302, 332, 335.
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The basic idea is that by virtue of their two moral powers persons are free
and that their having these powers makes them equal. Possession of the two
10 4
moral powers constitutes the basis of the status of free and equal citizenship.
The basic liberties are understood as preconditions for the development and
10 5
exercise of the two moral powers.
Deliberative democracy and deliberative autonomy: the two fundamental
cases. Constitutional constructivism arranges our basic liberties so as to show
their relation to the two fundamental cases in which citizens exercise their two
moral powers. The first fundamental case is that of deliberative democracy:
the equal political liberties and freedom of thought enable citizens to develop
and exercise their first moral power (their capacity for a sense of justice) in
understanding, applying, and acting from their conception ofjustice in deliberating about and judging the justice of basic institutions and social policies, as
well as about the common good. 10 6 In the first instance, the Constitution is
seen as establishing a just and workable political procedure without imposing
any explicit constitutional restrictions on legislative outcomes. 0 7 It incorporates the equal political liberties and seeks to guarantee their fair value, so that
the processes of political decision will be open to all on a roughly equal basis.08 It also protects freedom of thought (including freedom of speech and
press, freedom of assembly, and the like), so that the exercise of those liberties
in those processes will be free and informed.' 0 9
The second fundamental case is that of deliberative autonomy: liberty of
conscience and freedom of association enable citizens to develop and exercise
their second moral power (their capacity for a conception of the good) in forming, revising, and rationally pursuing their conceptions of the good, individually and in association with others, over a complete life-that is, to apply their
power of deliberative reason to deliberating about and deciding how to live
their own lives. 110 In the second instance, the Constitution is seen as establish104. Id. at 19, 29-35, 79. 109; RAwLS, supra note 23, at 504-12.
105. RAWLS, supranote 7, at 332. For an insightful analysis of Rawls' political conception of the
person, see Frank I. Michelman, The Subject ofLiberalism, 46 STA. L. REv. 1807 (1994) (reviewing
RAtus, supra note 7).
106. See RAwLs, supranote 7, at 332-35. For the sake of simplicity, I use Sunstein's term, "deliberative democracy," to refer to this first fundamental case or theme. James W. Nickel has criticized
Rawls' idea of the first fundamental case as being too narrowly defined. James W. Nickel, Rethinking
Rawls's Theory of Liberty and Rights, 69 Cmi.-KEN L. Rev. 763, 781-82 (1994). I broaden it by
proposing a theme of deliberative democracy that is quite similar to Sunstein's principal (and general)
theme of deliberative democracy. See Fleming, supra note 7, at 256, 292-93.
107. RAwIs, supra note 7, at 337.
108. Rawls explains that the guarantee of "fair value" means that "the worth of the political liberties to all citizens, whatever their social or economic position, must be approximately equal, or at least
sufficiently equal, in the sense that everyone has a fair opportunity to hold public office and to influence
the outcome of political decisions." Id. at 327. "Formal equality is not enough" where the equal political liberties are concerned. Id. at 361. For a provocative analysis that has affinities to Rawls' idea, see
Edward B. Foley, Equal-Dollars-Per-Voter: A Constitutional Principle of Campaign Finance, 94
CoLum. L. RE'. 1204 (1994).
109. RAwLs, supra note 7, at 335, 337.
110. See id. at 332-35. Deliberative autonomy includes not only deliberation but also decisionmaking. For the sake of simplicity, I intend to encompass the concepts of "deliberating about and
deciding how to live their own lives" within the expressions "deliberative autonomy" or "deliberating
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ing constitutional restrictions upon the grounds for political decisions."'

It

protects liberty of conscience and freedom of association both to secure citizens' free exercise of deliberative autonomy and to assure that political decisions will not be justifiable solely on the basis of comprehensive religious,
philosophical, or moral conceptions of the good.
Finally, constitutional constructivism connects the remaining (and supporting) basic liberties to the two fundamental cases by noting that it is necessary to
secure them in order properly to guarantee the preceding basic liberties associated with deliberative democracy and deliberative autonomy. These remaining
and supporting liberties include "the liberty and integrity of the person (violated, for example, by slavery and serfdom, and by the denial of freedom of
movement and occupation) and the rights and liberties covered by the rule of
law." 112 The constitutional essentials also include due process of law, equal
protection of the laws, the right to personal property, and the right to basic
necessities.' 13 In other words, guarantees of these basic liberties are preconditions for securing both deliberative democracy and deliberative autonomy.
Possession of this whole family of basic liberties constitutes the common
and guaranteed status of free and equal citizenship. 114 Moreover, the preconditions for both deliberative democracy and deliberative autonomy are preconditions for the sovereignty of free and equal citizens. 115
2.

The Constitution as securing deliberative democracy and deliberative
autonomy: the two fundamental themes.

Constitutional constructivism conceives our Constitution as a "constitution
of principle," which embodies (or aspires to embody) a coherent scheme of
basic liberties, or fair terms of social cooperation on the basis of mutual respect
and trust, for our constitutional democracy. The Constitution is not merely a
"constitution of detail," which enacts a discrete list of particular rights narrowly
about their conception of the good." For an explanation of my usage of the term "deliberative autonomy" to refer to this second fundamental case or theme, see Fleming, supra note 7, at 253 n.210; text
accompanying notes 169-172 infra.
Nickel has criticized Rawls' idea of the second fundamental case as being too broadly defined.
Nickel, supra note 106, at 782-83. I narrow it by outlining a theme of deliberative autonomy that is
bounded by a criterion of significance. See text accompanying notes 227-243 infra.
111. See RAwI-s, supra note 7, at 337-38.
112. Id. at 335. The rights and liberties covered by the rule of law include, for example, procedural due process, habeas corpus, freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures, and freedom from
self-incrimination. See RAwLs, supra note 23, at 235-43; Samuel Freeman, OriginalMeaning, Democratic Interpretation,and the Constitution, 21 PIUL. & PUB. Are. 3, 26, 31 (1992).
113. Notably, the constitutional essentials do not include Rawls' famous "difference principle,"
that "[s]ocial and economic inequalities ... are to be to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged
members of society." RAWLs, supra note 7, at 6, 228-30, 337. Moreover, the right to basic necessities
may not be judicially enforceable in the absence of legislative or executive measures. Similarly, the
right to personal property may be judicially underenforced. See text accompanying notes 259-260 infra.
114. See RAwLs, supra note 7, at 335. For a critique of Rawls' list of basic liberties, see Nickel,
supra note 106, at 766-72 (proposing a reconstructed list).
115. See Freeman, supra note 112, at 30-33 (arguing that equal political rights and other basic
liberties such as liberty of conscience and freedom of association are essential to democratic
sovereignty).
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conceived by framers and ratifiers." 6 Nor does it simply establish a procedural
framework of democracy. Furthermore, constitutional constructivism views interpreting the Constitution as specifying basic liberties in terms of the significance of an asserted liberty for the development and exercise of one (or both)
17
of the two moral powers in one (or both) of the two fundamental cases."
But constitutional constructivism distinguishes between the partial, judicially enforceable Constitution and the whole Constitution that is binding
outside the courts upon legislatures, executives, and citizens generally. 118 In
other words, it is a theory of the Constitution, not merely a theory ofjudicial
review. Certain constitutional norms, including aspects of deliberative democracy and deliberative autonomy, may be judicially underenforced because of
the institutional limits of courts, and left to the political processes for fuller
enforcement. For example, the Constitution might impose affirmative obligations upon the legislative and executive branches to provide basic necessities
for all citizens, but it might not afford a judicially enforceable right to these
necessities in the absence of legislative or executive measures." 19
Constitutional constructivism entails a theory ofjudicial review with an active role for courts with respect to the two fundamental cases or corresponding
themes: first, securing the basic liberties that are preconditions for deliberative
democracy, and second, securing the basic liberties that are preconditions for
deliberative autonomy. Both themes are necessary to afford everyone the common and guaranteed status of free and equal citizenship in our constitutional
democracy. Courts should exercise stringent review to strike down political
decisions that do not respect the two types of basic liberties because both are
preconditions for the trustworthiness of such decisions. (The remaining and
supporting basic liberties, as stated above, also must be guaranteed in order to
secure these preconditions.)
Constitutional constructivism's first theme emphasizes the equal political
liberties and freedom of thought. This theme resembles Sunstein's principal
116. See DwoRKIN, supra note 36, at 119, 126-29 (contrasting a "constitution of principle" (a
scheme of abstract, normative principles) with a "constitution of detail" (a list of particular, antique
rules)); Dworkin, supra note 37, at 382 (same); see also Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791,

2833 (1992) (conceiving the Constitution as a "covenant" or "coherent succession" embodying "ideas
and aspirations that must survive more ages than one"); id. at 2838-42 (Stevens, J., concurring in part

and dissenting in part) (interpreting the constitutionally protected concept of liberty as embodying abstract principles); id. at 2853 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and
dissenting in part) (construing the Court's personal-liberty cases as protecting the general right of privacy rather than a "laundry list of particular rights').
117. See texts accompanying notes 227-243,372-382 infra;see also RAwLS, supra note 7, at 33239; Freeman, supra note 112, at 30-33.
118. Fleming, supra note 7, at 291; see also RAWLS, supra note 7, at 240. Others have expressed
similar views concerning the gap between the partial, judicially enforceable Constitution and the whole
Constitution that is binding outside the courts. See, e.g., SuNsrmnm, supra note 21, at 9-10, 138-40, 14561, 350; Lawrence G. Sager, Justice in Plain Clothes: Reflections on the Thinness of Constitutional
Lmv,88 Nw. U. L. RE-. 410, 419 (1993); Lawrence Gene Sager, FairMeasure: The Legal Status of
Underenforced ConstitutionalNorms, 91 Hagv. L. Rav. 1212, 1213 (1978).
119. See, eg., SunSrmN, supranote 21, at 145-53; Fleming, supra note 7, at 291-92. It is not the
role of courts to say in the first instance what arrangements are necessary to secure the preconditions for
deliberative democracy and deliberative autonomy, but to assure that the arrangements enacted by legislatures do not flout these preconditions. See RAWLs, supra note 7, at 362.
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theme of securing deliberative democracy and, to a lesser extent, Ely's dominant theme of reinforcing representative democracy. 120 It seeks to secure the
preconditions for political self-government, conceiving our political system as a
public facility for deliberation concerning the common good, not a veritable
political market for aggregation of self-interested preferences.1 2 1 This theme
aims to assure that political decisions will be impartial in the sense that they are
justifiable on the basis ofpublic-regardingreasons (common good), not merely
the self-interested preferences of private groups or individuals. Also, it forbids
political decisions that violate the constraints of impartiality by denying equal
citizenship on the basis of morally irrelevant characteristics, such as race, sex,
or sexual orientation.' 22
Constitutional constructivism's second theme is underwritten by liberty of
conscience and freedom of association. This theme articulates and unifies the
concerns for substantive liberties that process-perfecting theories such as those
of Sunstein and Ely recast or neglect: liberty of conscience, freedom of intimate association, decisional autonomy, decisional privacy, spatial privacy, bodily integrity, and an antitotalitarian principle of liberty. 123 It seeks to secure
these preconditions for personal self-government, or deliberation and decision
by citizens, individually and in association with others, about how to lead their
own lives. Moreover, at least where constitutional essentials and matters of
basic justice are at stake, this theme aspires to assure that political decisions
will be impartial in the sense that they are justifiable on the basis of public
reasons (common ground)-on grounds that citizens generally can reasonably
be expected to accept, whatever their particular conceptions of the good, because they come within an overlapping consensus concerning a political conception of justice.' 24 These constitutional restrictions must be honored if free
and equal citizens are to engage in social cooperation on the basis of mutual
respect and trust in a constitutional democracy such as our own, which is characterized by the fact of reasonable pluralism and which recognizes the related
fact of oppression. Constitutional constructivism conceives our polity as being
subject to the limits of public reason, rather than being free to make collective
judgments founded solely on comprehensive religious, moral, or philosophical
12 5
conceptions of the good.
Thus, constitutional constructivism is concerned with securing preconditions for processes of deliberation and decision with respect to both deliberative
democracy and deliberative autonomy. By virtue of these concerns, it is a the120. See Fleming, supra note 7, at 256, 292-93.
121. See RAWLS, supra note 7, at 219-20, 359-63; RAwIs, supra note 23, at 221-28, 356-62.

122. See RAWLs, supra note 7, at 79-81, 335.
123. See Fleming, supra note 7, at 233-35, 256-60, 294-95.
124. See RAWLS, supra note 7, at 213-20, 223-30; Freeman, supra note 112, at 17, 20-29.
125. Rawls speaks of the limits of public reason as imposing "a moral, not a legal, duty-the duty
of civility." RAwLs, supra note 7, at 217. Elsewhere, I plan to elaborate upon the constraints of public

reason in our constitutional democracy. For recent valuable discussions and applications of Rawls' idea
of public reason to constitutional theory, see Samuel Freeman, PoliticalLiberalismand the Possibility of
a Just Democratic Constitution,69 Cmn.-KEmrr L. REv. 619 (1994); Lawrence B. Solum, Inclusive Pub-

lic Reason, 75 PAC. PffL. Q. 217 (1994).
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ory of constitutional democracy and trustworthiness, an alternative to Ely's theory of representative democracy and distrust. I mean trustworthiness in the
sense of Rawls' remark: "By publicly affirming the basic liberties citizens...
express their mutual respect for one another as reasonable and trustworthy, 126
as
well as their recognition of the worth all citizens attach to their way of life."
Constitutional constructivism is a fuller theory of perfecting the trustworthy
Constitution than is Ely's (or Sunstein's) process-perfecting theory.
3.

The value of the apparatusof the guidingframework.

Why do I stress using the apparatus of the guiding framework with two
fundamental themes instead of just putting forward a stand-alone conception of
deliberative autonomy? I do so because the guiding framework underscores
that the basic liberties associated with the second theme of deliberative autonomy, like those related to the first theme of deliberative democracy, have a
"structural role to play" in securing and fostering our constitutional democracy.1 27 Together, their structural roles are to secure the preconditions for deliberative self-governance in political and personal senses. The guiding
framework keeps in view that the basic liberties that are preconditions for deliberative autonomy are rooted in the language and design of our constitutional
document and underlying constitutional order, not usurpations by illegitimate
philosopher-judges who roam beyond process or narrowly conceived original
understanding.

128

The guiding framework also demonstrates that constitutional constructivism's conception of citizens (with two moral powers) is writ large in its conception of our Constitution (with two fundamental themes). 12 9 It presents our
Constitution as embodying (or aspiring to embody) a coherent scheme of basic
liberties fit for use by free and equal citizens, rather than as enacting an antique
list appropriate for ancestor worship. t 30 And constitutional constructivism
frames questions of constitutional interpretation in terms of the significance of
an asserted liberty for such citizens' application of their two moral powers in
the two fundamental cases that arise in our constitutional scheme.
126. RAWI.S, supra note 7, at 319; see ELY, supra note 20, at 101-04.
127. Cf. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 587 (1980) (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment ("[The First Amendment ... has a structuralrole to play in securing and fostering
our republican system of self-government.").
128. Contra BoRK, supra note 3, at 120, 351-55, passim (asserting that protection of substantive
rights such as privacy ignores original understanding and illegitimately imposes rights derived from
abstract moral philosophy upon democracy); ELY, supranote 20, at 56-60 (suggesting that protection of
substantive fundamental values like autonomy illegitimately superimposes the "reason" of moral philosophers or philosopher-kings upon democracy).
129. Cf. THE RErPUBLIC OF PLATO, Book II, at 368e, Book VIII, at 543c-545c (Francis MacDonald
Cornford trans., 1941) (suggesting that the constitution of individuals is writ large in the constitution of
a state).
130. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 220 (1824) (Marshall, C.J.) (criticizing antifederalists, who argued for a narrow construction of the Constitution in general and the commerce power in
particular, contending that they would "explain away the constitution of our country, and leave it, a

magnificent structure, indeed, to look at, but totally unfit for use"). On narrow conceptions of originalism as forms of "ancestor worship," see Freeman, supra note 112, at 16.
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Finally, by putting these two fundamental themes of deliberative democracy
and deliberative autonomy side by side as reflecting two bedrock structures, the
guiding framework invites us to inquire whether homologies exist between
these structures (and between the doctrines of constitutional law that they undergird).1 31 As Charles Black might put it, rubbing these two stones together
may generate some illuminating sparks. 132 Below, I use the guiding framework
to suggest such homologies and thus to bring a sense of order and discipline to
33
deliberative autonomy.
4.

Constitutionalconstructivism is dualist.

Constitutional constructivism embraces both deliberative autonomy and deliberative democracy as integral to our scheme of government because it conceives that scheme as "dualist" in three ways. Many claims that rights of
autonomy are anomalies or mere add-ons 134 stem from impoverished views of
our scheme as a "monist" or majoritarian representative democracy. Constitutional constructivism provides a richer and better account, normatively and historically, of our constitutional tradition, practice, and culture than do such
views.
First, constitutional constructivism is dualist in the general sense that it distinguishes between the constituent power of We the People, expressed in the
higher law of the Constitution, and the ordinary power of officers of government, expressed in the ordinary law of legislative bodies. 135 Moreover, it
reconstructs the classical, dualist justification of judicial review: to preserve
the fundamental rights ordained and established by the higher law of the Constitution against encroachments by ordinary law. 136 Thus, it rejects monist
131. By homology or homologous, I mean "having the same relation to an original or fundamental
type; corresponding in type of structure." 5 THE OXFoRD ENGLISH DIcTnoNAaY 359 (1933). Homology
also connotes "symmetry in organization." Id. For a sophisticated analysis of homologies in constitutional interpretation, see WILAM F. HAIus, II, THE INTERPxTABLE CONSTrrTION (1993).
132. Cf.Black, Ninth, supra note 18, at 349 ("This process of combination has naturally engendered some new ideas; even two musical tones, sounded together, produce a third.").
133. See text accompanying notes 371-395 infra.
134. In speaking of "anomalies," I echo THOMAS S. KuHN,THE STRuCrna oF Scnwaroc REvOLUnONS 52-53 (enlarged 2d ed. 1970). In referring to "add-ons," I am following Freeman, supra note
112, at 41.
135. Thus, it is similar to Ackerman's theory of dualist democracy. See AcKamuA,
supra note
30, at 3-33. Elsewhere, I have argued that constitutional constructivism can be dualist in a general sense
without being committed to dualism in Ackerman's specific sense. See Fleming, supra note 7, at 290
n.405; Fleming, supra note 30, at 356 n.3. That is, one can accept the idea of two tracks of lawmaking
without endorsing his complex apparatus of higher lawmaking through "structural amendments" to the
Constitution outside the formal Article V amending procedures. Nor need one embrace his purported
distinction between "dualism" and "rights foundationalism" on the ground that the former theory but not
the latter rejects the idea that a duly ratified amendment to the Constitution might be unconstitutional
(such as ones repealing constitutional protection for liberty of conscience or freedom of speech). Id. at
366-73; Rawls, Reply, supra note 87, at 158 n.40. I argued that Ackerman has not established his case
for dualism over rights foundationalism as the better account of the American scheme of government
through his contrast between the American Constitution and the German Basic Law with respect to
explicit entrenchment of constitutional provisions against subsequent amendment. Fleming, supra note
30.
136. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177-78 (1803); Tam FEDERALiST No. 78, at
467, 469 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
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views of our scheme, which emphasize popular sovereignty and majoritarianpopular
ism over and against fundamental rights, and therefore tend to equate
137
sovereignty with the British model of parliamentary sovereignty.
Second, constitutional constructivism is dualist in the substantive sense that
it conceives the content of the higher law of the Constitution as a synthesis of
the conflicting traditions of civic republicanism and liberalism. This conflict is
encapsulated in Benjamin Constant's famous contrast between, respectively,
the tradition associated with Jean-Jacques Rousseau, which gives primacy to
the liberties of the ancients, such as the equal political liberties and the values
of public life, and the tradition associated with John Locke, which gives greater
weight to the liberties of the moderns, such as liberty of conscience, certain
basic rights of the person and of property, and the rule of law.138 Despite
arguments that liberalism triumphed over republicanism at the founding, 139 the
conflict has resurfaced periodically in various guises throughout our history in
attempts to recover the communitarian aspirations of the republican tradition
and to critique the individualist presuppositions of the liberal tradition. 140 Constitutional constructivism seeks to resolve this conflict by combining a "republican" theme of securing the preconditions for deliberative democracy (or the
liberties of the ancients) with a "liberal" theme of securing14the
preconditions
1
for deliberative autonomy (or the liberties of the modems).
Third, constitutional constructivism is also dualist in another substantive
sense: It understands our scheme of government as a hybrid of the competing
traditions of constitutionalism and democracy, or a constitutional democracy.
In their purest forms, constitutionalism is concerned with limited government
and democracy with unfettered majority rule.142 Democracy gives primacy to
137. See AcERNLAN, supra note 30, at 7-10, 35 (coining the term "monism").
138. RAwI.s, supra note 7, at 4-5, 299 (referring to Benjamin Constant, Liberty of the Ancients

Compared with That of the Modems, Address Before the Athrnre Royal in Paris (1819), in BENJAMIN
CoSArNT, POLITICAL WRTInGS 307 (Biancamaria Fontana ed. & trans., 1988)); see RAWLS, supra note
23, at 201; Rawls, Kantian Constructivism, supranote 87, at 519; Rawls, Reply, supra note 87, at 15061; see also STmEN HoLMEs, BENjAMN CONSTANT AND THE MAKING OF MODERN LIBERALIsM 31-52
(1984) (recounting Constant's distinction between the "liberties of the ancients" and the "liberties of the
modems"). Locke's most significant work in this respect is JOHN LocKE, Two TREATISES OF GovERNMENT (Peter Laslett ed., 2d ed. 1967) (3d ed. 1698), and Rousseau's is JEAN-JAcQUES RoussEAu, THE
SoCiAL CoNTR~cr (Roger D. Masters ed. & Judith R. Masters trans., 1978) (1762).

139. See, e.g.,

Louis HArez, Tim LmERAL TRADITION IN AMERIcA: AN INTERPRETATION OF

AMERICAN POLImcAL THouGHT SiNcE THE REVOLUTION (1955); HERBERT J. STORING, WHAT THE ANTIFEDERALISTS WERE Fs (1981).
140. See, eg., J.G.A. PococK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN MoMErr: FLORENTINE PoLTIcAL THOUGHT
AND Ta ATANic REPUHUCAN TRADITION (1975); GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF Tm AMERICAN REPUBLIc, 1776-1787 (1969); GORDON S. WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERiCAN REVOLUTIoN
(1992); Symposium, The Republican Civic Tradition, 97 YALE U. 1493 (1988).

141. See Fleming, supra note 7, at 249-50, 252-53. I have argued that constitutional constructivism's synthesis of these traditions is superior to Sunstein's synthesis, a liberal republican theory of
deliberative democracy, because the latter emphasizes the liberties of the ancients to the neglect of the
liberties of the modems. Id. at 256-60, 300-01.
142. For formulations of the tension between the competing traditions of constitutionalism and
democracy along these lines, and of constitutional democracy as a hybrid form of government, see, e.g.,
WALTER F. MURPHY, JANms E. FLEMING & Sormos A. BARBER, AMERICAN CoNsrrTIoNAL INTERPRETATIoN 41-53 (2d ed. 1995); Walter F. Murphy, The Art of ConstitutionalInterpretation:A Preliminary Showing, in ESSAYS oN Tim CoNSTITTmoN OF Tim UNITED STATES 130, 133-35 (M. Judd Harmon
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open political process, while constitutionalism insists that limits exist on what
government may do. The tradition of constitutionalism is sounded, for example, in the famous cases of Calder v. Bull, where Justice Chase contended that
the Constitution includes "certain vital principles in our free republican governments, which will determine and overrule an apparent and flagrant abuse of
legislative power," 143 and Corfield v. Coryell, where Justice Washington proclaimed that the Constitution embraces "those privileges and immunities which
are fundamental; which belong, of right, to the citizens of all free governments."' 144 ("Free government," a term many early Americans used and which
Alpheus Thomas Mason kept alive, 145 is the functional equivalent of constitutional democracy. 146)
Constitutional constructivism melds these competing traditions into a conception of constitutional democracy, and it rejects understandings of our system
as a majoritarian representative democracy. A constitutional democracy is a
system in which a constitution imposes limits on the content of legislation: To
be valid, a law must be consistent with fundamental rights and liberties embodied in the constitution. A majoritarian representative democracy, by contrast, is
a system in which there are no constitutional limits on the content of legislation: Whatever a majority enacts is law, provided the appropriate procedural
preconditions are met. 147 Thus, a constitutional democracy combines the democratic notion that "the people should govern through those whom they elect"
with the constitutionalist idea that "there are critical limitations on both what
government - however democratically chosen - may validly do and on how
it may carry out its legitimate powers."' 14 8 And so, within a scheme of constitutional democracy, constitutional limitations such as the basic liberties associed., 1978); Walter F. Murphy, An Orderingof Constitutional Values, 53 S.CAL. L. Rnv. 703, 707-08
(1980); see also HAmRs, supra note 131, at 162 (speaking of the "tense juncture of liberalism and
democracy which, as substantive political models oriented alternatively to individual- and collectiveoriented rights, underlie the American constitutional enterprise"); ALPHEUS THOMAS MASON, THE
SUPREME COURT FROM TA-r To BURGER 9-10, 150-173 (3d ed. 1979) (tension between "free govemment" and "popular sovereignty"); ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERmcAN SUPREME COURT 7-9, 1314 (Sanford Levinson ed., rev. 2d ed. 1994) (tension or "dualism" between "fundamental law" and
"popular sovereignty"); CHAsRLS H. MclLwAin, CoNsrrruriowAusM: ANmcENr AND MODERN 129-46
(rev. ed. 1947) (tension betweenjurisdictio,the restriction of power by judicial proclamation of rights,
and gubernaculum, the concentrated exercise of power for the common good); GiovANm SARTOEU,
DEMOCRATIC THEORY 353-83 (2d ed. 1962) (tension between liberalism, concerned with limited government, freedom, the rights of the individual, and the rule of law, and democracy, concerned with unfet-

tered majority rule, equality, general welfare, and the rule of legislators). Sunstein claims to dissolve
"the much-vaunted opposition between constitutionalism and democracy" through his theory of deliberative democracy. See SuNs rn, supra note 21, at 142. But he does so by either recasting constitutionalist rights as preconditions for democracy or leaving them out altogether.
143. 3 U.S. (3 Dal].) 386, 388 (1798).
144. 6 F. Cas. 546, 551 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3,230) (Washington, J., riding circuit).
145. See ALPHEus THOMAS MASON & GORDON E. BAKER, FE GoVEMETr IN THE MAKING
(4th ed. 1985); MASON, supra note 142, at 9-10.
146. James E. Fleming, A Critiqueof John HartEly's Questfor the Ultimate ConstitutionalInterpretivism of RepresentativeDemocracy, 80 MicH. L. R-v. 634, 642-43 (1982).
147. See John Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Brief Restatement § 43 (1992) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author); see also RAwI.s, supra note 7, at 233-34 (same); Rawls, Reply, supra
note 87, at 158 (stating that in a constitutional democracy, a constitution limits majority rule).
148. MURPHY, FLEMING, & BARBER, supra note 142, at 41.
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ated with deliberative autonomy are indeed
counter-majoritarian but they are
149
not for that reason anomalous or deviant.
Thus, constitutional constructivism, with its two themes of deliberative democracy and deliberative autonomy, synthesizes our traditions and practices of
higher law and ordinary law, civic republicanism and liberalism, and democracy and constitutionalism, in a conception of dualist constitutional democracy.
That conception better fits and justifies our constitutional scheme than do views
of the scheme as a monist or majoritarian representative democracy.
5. Is constitutional constructivism too dualistic?
My formulation of constitutional constructivism's two fundamental themes
as dualist may seem overly dualistic, dichotomous, or schematic. By putting
the two themes of deliberative democracy and deliberative autonomy so schematically, I do not mean to imply that the realms of political self-government
and personal self-government are entirely distinct. 150 Nor do I intend to deny
what Michelman has cogently emphasized, that democracy and autonomy are
complementary aspects of one unified vision that coexist in a dialectical relation of mutuality, reciprocity, and entailment. 15 1 Nonetheless, I do mean to
contend that an adequate unified account in constitutional theory requires both
of these themes instead of just one principal theme of democracy.
The first reason is prophylactic: articulating a constitutional constructivism
with these two themes protects us against taking flights from substance to process or to narrowly conceived original understanding by recasting or neglecting
substantive liberties.' 52 Even if imaginative process-perfecting theorists can
recast some of the substantive liberties that are preconditions for deliberative
autonomy as preconditions for deliberative democracy, renditions of those liberties in such terms fail to capture what is at stake in some instances or leave
out something important in the translation.' 53 Constitutional constructivism is
not driven to undertake such reductive flights in the first place, for it does not
entertain any (untenable) presupposition that the idea of democracy is relatively
uncontroversial and a matter of stable consensus while the idea of autonomy is
hopelessly contested and a matter of profound disagreement. It understands
that both structures are normatively contested and that both can be elaborated
149. See RAwLS, supra note 7, at 233-34. By using "counter-majoritarian" and "deviant," I am
echoing Bickel's famous formulation of the idea that judicial review poses a "counter-majoritarian difficulty" or is a "deviant institution" in a representative democracy. ALEXmANR M. BICKEL, THE LEAST
DANrEROUS BRANCH: TBE StPPamE COURT AT ThE BAR oF PoLurcs 16, 18 (2d ed. 1986).
150. To the contrary, for active, responsible citizens, deliberation concerning the common good in
the political realm may be an important aspect of their pursuit of their conception of the good or of how
to lead their own lives. See RAWLS, supra note 7, at 206.
151. See Frank Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493, 1524-37 (1988) [hereinafter
Michelman, Law's Republic]; Frank Michelman, Fizrv-te Personalbut Not Split: Radin Versus Rorty, 63
S. CAL. L. Ray. 1783, 1790 (1990).

152. See note 13 and text accompanying notes 76-83 supra. Constitutional constructivism recognizes the pointlessness or futility of such flights, for it comprehends that perfecting processes and enforcing original understanding inevitably require the sort of substantive constitutional choices that these
strategies seek to avoid. Fleming, supra note 7, at 213.
153. See Fleming, supra note 7, at 267-68, 273-75; texts accompanying notes 34 & 76-81 supra.
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only through substantive political theory or substantive constitutional
54
choices.'
A second, related reason is architectonic: Presenting our basic liberties
through the guiding framework illustrates that the two fundamental themes of
deliberative democracy and deliberative autonomy are co-original and of equal
weight.15 5 For both themes derive from a common substrate: a conception of
citizens as free and equal persons (with two moral powers) and a conception of
society as a fair system of social cooperation. Thus, the guiding framework
may help meet long-standing objections, such as those stemming from the traditions of civic republicanism and discourse ethics, that liberal theories treat the
liberties of the modems (associated with autonomy) as being "prepolitical" or
"prior to all political will formation" and thus as having "priority" over the
liberties of the ancients (related to democracy). 156 Similarly, it may rebut objections that the basic liberties associated with autonomy are anomalies while
the basic liberties related to democracy are integral. 157 For it shows that both
themes are constitutive of and articulate preconditions for the sovereignty of
free and equal citizens.
The third, more general reason is heuristic: Articulating our basic liberties
through the abstract, simplifying device of the guiding framework with two
themes keeps in view that our constitutional scheme is a dualist constitutional
democracy, not a monist or majoritarian representative democracy. Hence, doing so fortifies us against being fooled by the tyranny of simple labels like
"democracy" into thinking that there is something illegitimate or embarrassing
about arguing for rights related to autonomy (or that there is nothing illegitimate or problematic about majoritarian representative democracy). 158 It also
154. Compare Sunstein's critique of Ely for apparently assuming that democracy is a relatively
uncontroversial notion. SuNsrmw, supra note 21, at 104-05 (criticizing ELY, supra note 20). Yet Sunstein himself is vulnerable to a similar critique regarding autonomy, for he asserts, without justification,
that protecting certain rights in the name of reinforcing democracy is "less adventurous" than protecting
the very same rights in the name of securing autonomy. See Sunstein, supra note 21, at 312 (replying to
Fleming, supra note 7, at 260-75).
155. My argument here parallels that of Rawls replying to Habermas' charge that Rawls' political
liberalism treats the "modem liberties" or "private autonomy" as "prepolitical" or "prior to all political
will formation." See Rawls, Reply, supra note 87, at 156-70 (arguing that the "liberties of the moderns"
(which I relate to deliberative autonomy) and the "liberties of the ancients" (which I associate with
deliberative democracy) are co-original and of equal weight).
156. For examples of such critiques, see, e.g., BarMJAMIN R. BARBER,STRONG DnaIOCRACY: PAR"nCtPATORYPoLrrcs FOR A NEw AGE 30-32, 43-44, 142-43 (1984) (from standpoint of civic republicanism); Habermas, supra note 87 (from standpoint of discourse ethics). For Rawls' reply to Habermas'
critique, see Rawls, Reply, supra note 87, at 156-70; note 155 supra.
157. For critiques along these lines, see, e.g., BoRuc, supra note 3, at 139; ELY, supra note 20, at
100-01 (discussed in text accompanying notes 76-83 supra).

158. See RONALD DwoRmN, FREEDoM'S LAW (forthcoming 1996) (criticizing "majoritarian" conceptions of democracy that accept "the majoritarian default," or the principle that when a group or polity
must make a collective decision, fairness requires the decision favored by a majority of its members;
arguing for a "constitutional" conception of democracy that defines democracy as requiring that certain
preconditions of democratic legitimacy be satisfied (which for Dworkin include rights of moral independence or autonomy)); Lawrence G. Sager, The IncorrigibleConstitution, 65 N.Y.U. L. REv. 893, 897909 (1990) (criticizing majoritarian theories of popular sovereignty on the ground that they are beset by
the "majoritarian difficulty" and are irreconcilable with the Constitution, which places limits on
majoritarianism).
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wards off any illusion that we can accomplish an easy resolution between democracy and autonomy through a unified account of democracy, as in: "de15 9
mocracy and autonomy are one and that one is democracy."
A final reason is elegance: the importance of being elegant (though not too
reductive) in constructing a constitutional theory. 160 A major reason for the
attractiveness of Ely's theory of reinforcing representative democracy is its elegance.16 1 Ely provides an elegant account of judicial review as perfecting the
processes of representative democracy through two intelligible, comprehensive
themes: first, keeping the processes of political communication and participation open, and second, keeping those processes free of prejudice against discrete and insular minorities, in order to assure equal concern and respect for
everyone alike. 162 Elsewhere, I have suggested that an important reason for the
persistence of process-perfecting theories such as Ely's, notwithstanding the
resistance to them, is that no one has done for "substance" what Ely has done
for "process." That is, no one has developed an alternative Constitutionperfecting theory - a theory that would reinforce not only the procedural liberties but also the substantive liberties embodied in our Constitution - with
the elegance of his process-perfecting theory. 163 I am attempting to develop a
Constitution-perfecting theory with two fundamental themes of deliberative democracy and deliberative autonomy that emulates the elegance of Ely's theory
without taking a reductive flight from substance to process like that which he
takes. 164
III.

CONSTITUTING DELBERATVE AUTONOMY

In this Part, I further elaborate the constitution (or Constitution) of deliberative autonomy. First, I sketch the idea of deliberative autonomy. Second, I
159. Cf. CATHARm A. MAcKqNoN, ToWAID A FNIMST THEORY OF THE STATE 3 (1989)

("Marxism and feminism are one and that one is Marxism.") (quoting Heidi Hartmann and Amy
Bridges, The Unhappy Marriageof Marxism and Feminism). I do not mean to imply, at text accompanying note 151 supra, that Michelman labors under any such illusion.
160. By "elegant," I mean to suggest the notion of elegance in the construction of scientific theories. Ely emphasizes that the value of Democracy and Distrust,which elaborates the Carolene Products
framework, is that it (elegantly) frames the appropriate set of questions for constitutional interpretation.
See Commentary, 56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 525, 528 (1981) (statement of Ely); see also ELY, supra note 20, at
75-77 (characterizing his own theory as filling in the outlines of United States v. Carolene Products Co.,
304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938)). I contend that my guiding framework has a similar value, although of

course it frames the appropriate questions differently.
161. For an assessment of Ely's theory that stresses its elegance, see Harry H. Wellington, The
Importance of Being Elegant,42 Omo ST. LJ. 427 (1981).
162. ELY, supra note 20, at 75-88.

163. See Fleming, supranote 7, at 215. Nevertheless, there has been a great deal of sophisticated
work about the need for substantive political theory or substantive constitutional choices in interpreting
the Constitution. Id. at 215 n.21 (citing numerous works).
164. A final, related reason for presenting constitutional constructivism as having two fundamental themes is the imperative of being superficial-or staying near the surface-in constitutional theory.
Even if there is some deeper common substrate or unified vision of democracy in political philosophy
from which the two themes derive, constitutional theory may do better to articulate it through two
themes, for the reasons stated in the text. Although constitutional theory delves into fundamental matters, it should stay near the surface and not resort to, much less impose, deep or controversial philosophical conceptions.
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take up its underpinnings and scope and defend it against certain criticisms.
Finally, I put forward two additional structural justifications for securing it.
The first is that deliberative autonomy constitutes a realm of personal sovereignty contemplated by the Ninth and Tenth Amendments; the second is that it
secures an "exit" option from majoritarian oppression.
A.

The Idea of DeliberativeAutonomy
1. The term "deliberative autonomy."

Why do I use the term "deliberative autonomy" instead of simply "autonomy"? In a word, to differentiate it from the welter of usages of the term
"autonomy" in contemporary discourse. Gerald Dworkin has observed:
[Autonomy] is used sometimes as an equivalent of liberty (positive or negative
in Berlin's terminology), sometimes as equivalent to self-rule or sovereignty,
sometimes as identical with freedom of the will. It is equated with dignity,
integrity, individuality, independence, responsibility, and self-knowledge. It is
identified with qualities of self-assertion, with critical reflection, with freedom
from obligation, with absence of external causation, with knowledge of one's
own interests. It is even equated by some economists with the impossibility of
interpersonal comparisons. It is related to actions, to beliefs, to reasons for
165
acting, to rules, to the will of other persons, to thoughts, and to principles.
Nevertheless, the etymology of the term suggests the basic idea underlying the
concept of autonomy: autos (self) and nomos (rule or law).' 66 Familiar formulations such as "self-rule," "self-determination," "self-government," "independence," or "sovereignty" express this underlying meaning. 167 Moreover,
or to
commentators apply these terms both to nation-states and to individuals,
168
refer to self-government in a political sense and a personal sense.
I speak of "deliberative autonomy" for four reasons: first, to emphasize
that the idea builds upon Rawls' idea of persons' second moral power, the
69
capacity for a conception of the good, as the power of "deliberative reason";1
165. GERALD DwopmclN, TnE THEoRY AND PRAcrI" or, AUToNoMY 6 (1988); see also John
Christman, Introduction,in THE INNER CrrADEL: ESSAYS ON INDrIvIrDuAL AuroNom" 3 (John Christman

ed., 1989) (analyzing many different conceptions of autonomy in contemporary discourse).
166. See DwoRiun, supra note 165, at 12; JoEL FEiNBERG, HARM TO SELF 27 (1986).
167. FEn,mERo, supra note 166, at 27-28.

168. See, e.g., id. at 27-28, 49-51 (distinguishing between national sovereignty and personal sovereignty and referring to personal autonomy as "the realm of inviolable sanctuary most of us sense in
our own beings"); Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1985 Term-Foreword: Traces of SelfGovernment, 100 HARv. L. REv. 4, 55-56 (1986) (stating that the conflict between "tvo principles-of
'individual' and 'community' self-determination-reflects a characteristic tension in the general concept
of self-government"); see also DwoPcrN, supra note 36, at 53 (referring to privacy or autonomy as a
matter of "sovereignty over personal decisions"); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Two Senses ofAutonomy, 46
STAN. L. REv. 875, 877-78 (1994) (distinguishing between "descriptive" autonomy, which refers to the
actual condition of persons, and "ascriptive" autonomy, which "marks a moral right to personal
sovereignty").
169. See text accompanying notes 103 & 110 supra. For another application of "deliberative" to
refer to an idea similar to Rawls' idea of the capacity for a conception of the good, see David 0. Brink,
Mill's Deliberative Utilitarianism,22 PHIL. & PuB. Ant. 67 (1993) (arguing that Mill advanced a "deliberative conception of happiness"); see also DwoRKiN, supra note 36 (referring to exercise of autonomy
as involving deliberation).
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second, to recognize its similarity to Justice Stevens' analysis of "decisional
autonomy" in terms of "deliberation" about important decisions concerning
how to live one's own life; 170 third, to suggest parallels between the structure
of "deliberative" autonomy and that of "deliberative" democracy; 171 and
fourth, to acknowledge affinities between constitutional constructivism and
other theories that conceive our Constitution as a scheme of deliberative or
172
reflective self-government.
I should clarify that constitutional constructivism deploys ecumenical or
"thin" conceptions of both "deliberation" and "autonomy." They are compatible with, and have affinities to, a number of "thicker" conceptions drawn from
diverse constitutional and political theories, whose common concern is the centrality of freedom to form, revise, and pursue a conception of the good. 173 But
the main idea in developing the theme of deliberative autonomy is to articulate
a structure that houses basic liberties associated with autonomy, not to advance
a sectarian or "thick" conception of autonomy.
2.

The idea of deliberation.

What, in general, is "deliberative" about deliberative democracy and deliberative autonomy? In what senses do the basic liberties associated with both
themes secure preconditions for deliberation? First, the two fundamental cases
in which persons apply their two moral powers involve deliberation: deliberation about justice or the common good and deliberation about their own good
or way of life, respectively. Second, deliberation in each fundamental case is a
process whereby persons engage in self-governance, realizing their freedom
and, indeed, their sovereignty. Thus, both themes safeguard processes for deliberation rather than imposing outcomes. 174 To acknowledge this structural
affinity between constitutional constructivism and process-perfecting theories,
170. See text accompanying notes 40 & 45 supra.
171. See text accompanying notes 127-133 supra and text accompanying notes 371-395 infra.
172. See, ag., STEPrHN MACEDO, LMERAL. VIRTUES 163-202 (1990) (analyzing the Constitution
as reflecting a liberal scheme of "reasonable self-government" or "reflective self-governance"); ROGERS
M. S'urm, LMERALISM AND AmERCAN CONsTrrrIoNAL LAW 198-259 (1985) (analyzing the Constitution as embodying a liberal scheme of "rational liberty," "deliberative self-direction," or "reflective self-

governance"). Smith, however, presents his liberal theory, derived from Locke, as an alternative to neoKantian and Rawlsian theories. Id. at 216-25; see also Rogers M. Smith, The Constitution andAuton-

omy, 60 Tax. L. REv. 175, 195-96, 204-05 (1982) (contrasting his Lockean conception of "rational
liberty" with conceptions of autonomy derived from Kant and Rawls). I believe that Smith may overstate the differences between his own theory and Rawlsian theories.
173. There is a rich, sophisticated, and powerful literature discussing substantive liberties embraced by deliberative autonomy in terms of privacy, autonomy, or liberty. There is also a similarly rich
literature analyzing deliberation about and pursuit of conceptions of the good. See, e.g., DwoRKIN,
supra note 36; MACEDO, supra note 172; DAVID A.J. RtCHARas, CoNscmNcE AND Tnm CoNsnrmrlON"
HISTORY, THEORY, Am LAw OF Ta RECONSrRuCrION AMENDMENTs (1993) [hereinafter RicHARns,
CONscENCE]; DAVID AJ. RicHARDs, TOLERAnoN AND a CoNsntrrON (1986) [hereinafter RIcHARDS, ToLERA=nON]; Srn, supra note 172; see also ViLu. K'MLIcrA, LmERALISM, COMMUNrrY AND
CutruRE (1989); JOSEPH RAZ, THa MoRALr
OF FREEDOM (1986); Martha C. Nussbaum, Human
Functioning and Social Justice: In Defense of Aristotelian Essentialism, 20 POL. THEORY 202 (1992).

174. The two themes protect processes for deliberative self-governance against the authoritarianism of majoritafianism (might makes right). For a view of Bork's majoritarianism as a form of "legal
authoritarianism," or "might makes right," see SuNsTErN, supra note 21, at 107.
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while also recognizing that the former theory secures two types of preconditions for deliberation rather than just one, I have characterized it as a Constitu175
tion-perfecting theory.

In our scheme of deliberative self-governance, some matters are committed
to resolution through the process of democratic deliberation and others are reserved to resolution through the process of personal deliberation, individually
and in association with others. For example, just as the right to vote is justified
as an essential precondition for the process of deliberating about the common
good, so too, liberty of conscience and the right of procreative autonomy are
justified as essential preconditions for the process of deliberating in forming,
revising, and pursuing one's conception of the good.
Both deliberative democracy and deliberative autonomy may involve individual or collective deliberation. "Deliberative democracy" may conjure up for
us a citizen making her decision in the secrecy of the voting booth; here, selfgovernment manifests itself through an individual act of deliberation. Or, we
might picture a citizen participating in a town meeting, speaking or listening at
a political rally, or discussing matters of public concern with fellow citizens;
here, we see a collective dimension of deliberation. Similarly, "deliberative
autonomy" may connote a person making a decision, deemed private and intimate, about her sexual or reproductive life. Although "deliberative autonomy"
in this sense stresses that the individual person is the unit of deliberation and
decision making,' 76 the term also allows room for a social dimension. 177 It
contemplates that exercises of deliberative autonomy may include consulting
with others, taking their views into account, and associating with them. The
crucial point is that in an important way, the individual person is the locus of
1 78
moral agency, responsibility, and independence.
What, in particular, is "deliberative" about liberty of conscience and freedom of association, along with the foregoing "unenumerated" fundamental
rights? 1 79 How do these basic liberties come within a structure of deliberative

autonomy? For one thing, all of them implicate deliberations, or the capacity to
deliberate, concerning certain fundamental decisions affecting persons' identity, destiny, or way of life. They reserve to persons the power to deliberate
about and decide how to live their own lives, concerning certain matters that
175. See text accompanying notes 84-85 supra.
176. Deliberation is dialectical or Socratic-a quest for reflective equilibrium between considered
judgments and underlying principles. See RAWLs, supra note 23, at 49. Socrates characterized the
dialectic as a dialogue of the soul with itself. See PLATO, supra note 129, at Book VII, 531c-535a.
177. Liberal theorists rarely hold as self-determining or "unencumbered" a view of the self as
communitarians and deconstructionists assign to them, but usually recognize the important shaping role

of society. See, e.g., STEPHEN HOLMES, THE ANATOMY OF ANTHIIBERALI5M 176-79, 190-97 (1993);
RAwLS, supra note 7, at 27. They typically, however, reject strong social constructionist models of the
self because such models undermine the possibility of a commitment to agency and autonomy. Cf
SaYLA BENHABM, SITUATING THE SELF 228-29 (1992) (arguing that a strong version of postmodernism
would undermine "feminist commitment to women's agency and sense of selfhood").
178. See DwoRaxN, supra note 36, at 148-68. Many communitarians and perfectionists dispute
the idea of the individual as the site of moral agency, responsibility, and independence. See, e.g., RoaERT P. GEORGE, MAKING MEN MORAL: CrviL LmERTIS AND PUBLIC MORALITY 83-109, 129-60 (1993);
SANDEL, supra rnote 5, at 15-65.
179. See note 27 supra and accompanying text.
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are unusually important or significant for such personal self-governance, over a
complete life.
For another, the landmark cases and powerful dissents that I have offered as
illustrations of deliberative autonomy 8 0 reflect an antitotalitarian principle
concerned with safeguarding against the danger of "creeping totalitarianism, an
unarmed occupation of individuals' lives,"' 81 or coercion of conformity concerning "the most intimate and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime."18 2 If persons do not have the freedom to deliberate about and make such
decisions, they are not free.
The idea of "deliberation" in deliberative autonomy does not stem from an
abstract philosophical conception that lacks roots in our constitutional practice.
Rather, our constitutional practice has identified basic liberties such as those on
the foregoing list as involving central "attributes of personhood"' 8 3 and as being "essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness"'1 4 by free persons. The deliberations and decisions encompassed by the list typically figure prominently
in conflicting and irreconcilable comprehensive religious, philosophical, and
moral conceptions of the good that reside in the background culture of our
constitutional democracy. These basic liberties are and will remain controversial, precisely because of the centrality of such matters in conflicting comprehensive views. Governmental restriction or regulation of such personal
decisions triggers the risk of majoritarian oppression and transgression of the
limits of public reason.
The basic liberties on the foregoing list do not define or exhaust deliberative autonomy. My project here is not to delineate the exact scope of this structure but simply to outline its parameters so as to tether the right of autonomy in
constitutional law. As explained below, its general scope is limited to securing
significant basic liberties. Deliberative autonomy is much narrower than comprehensive libertarian or liberal principles of autonomy or individuality.
3. Avoiding misconceptions about the idea of deliberative autonomy.
It is important to recognize that deliberative autonomy is concerned with
securing basic liberties that are preconditionsfor the development and exercise
of persons' capacity for a conception of the good in deliberating about and
making decisions concerning certain fundamental matters, and does not guarantee or require actual conscientious deliberation in applying that capacity.
This theme reflects general assumptions about persons' second moral power,
and does not call for or require an inquiry by the government into the actual
deliberations, responsibility, and judgment of particular exercises of that
180. See text accompanying notes 39-72 supra.
181. Rubenfeld, supra note 60, at 784.
182. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791,2807 (1992); DwoRlcN, supra note 36, at
150-59 (distinguishing between encouraging responsibility and coercing conformity).
183. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2807.
184. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
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power.18 5 Indeed, such an inquiry concerning most of those important decisions (encompassed by the foregoing list)1 8 6 would be intolerably intrusive or
oppressive.
To be sure, military conscription statutes might provide for draft boards to
interview draftees seeking conscientious exemption from service in order to
insure that their objections are rooted in conscience.18 7 But restrictive abortion
laws may not require a pregnant woman to demonstrate that her decision to
have an abortion is for her a matter of conscience or a responsible exercise of
her reproductive freedom.1 88 Even if the government tries to encourage a pregnant woman to deliberate conscientiously or responsibly about her decision
through measures like the 24-hour waiting period and informed consent requirements upheld in Casey,189 it may not compel her to give testimony proving that she has done so or to provide reasons for her decision. 1 90
Perhaps this feature of deliberative autonomy - that it secures basic liberties as preconditions for deliberation without guaranteeing or requiring actual
deliberation - will seem less peculiar or problematic if we draw an analogy
between a basic liberty associated with deliberative autonomy and one related
to deliberative democracy. The "unenumerated" right to vote is justified because it is a significant precondition for deliberative democracy, 191 just as the
185. See MACEDO, supra note 172, at 214-27; Linda C. McClain, Rights and Irresponsibility,43
DuKE L.J. 989, 1070-75 (1994).
186. See note 27 supra and accompanying text.
187. See, e.g., Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 441 (1971) (upholding, against a challenge
under the Free Exercise Clause, a statute exempting from military conscription any person who "is
conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any form" and requiring a showing that the objection
must have a grounding in "religious training and belief").
188. Nonetheless, Robin West has suggested that support for reproductive freedom "should rest
upon the demonstrated capacity of pregnant women to decide whether to carry a fetus to term or to abort
responsibly." Robin West, The Supreme Court, 1989 Term-Foreword: Taking Freedom Seriously, 104
HARv. L. REv. 43, 82-83 (1990). But see Linda C. MeClain, "Atomistic Man" Revisited: Liberalism.
Connection, and FeministJurisprudence,65 S. CAL. L. REv. 1171, 1252-53 (1992) (expressing concern
that West's approach might open the door to requiring individual women to demonstrate that they have
exercised their reproductive freedom responsibly).
189. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2818, 2821 (1992) (stating that the government "may enact rules and regulations designed to encourage [a pregnant woman] to know that there are
philosophic and social arguments of great weight.., in favor of continuing the pregnancy to full term,"
for "[w]hat is at stake is the woman's right to make the ultimate decision, not a right to be insulated
from all others in doing so"). But see id. at 2840 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(agreeing with the joint opinion that the government 'may take steps to ensure that a woman's choice 'is
thoughtful and informed,'" but insisting that "[d]ecisional autonomy must limit the State's power to
inject into a woman's most personal deliberations its own views of what is best").
190. See DwopxcN, supra note 36, at 150-59 (distinguishing between encouraging responsibility
and compelling or coercing conformity); McClain, supra note 185, at 1083-88 (same). I nonetheless
believe that Casey was wrong in upholding the 24-hour waiting period and certain aspects of the informed consent requirements. In time of war, we may have a regime of compulsory military service,
absent demonstration of conscientious refusal. But we do not have a regime of compulsory motherhood,
forcing women to be mothers against their will, absent an analogous showing. (Nor, for that matter,
should we have a regime of compulsory heterosexuality, or of compulsory life sentences on life support
systems.)
191. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964); Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383
U.S. 663, 670 (1966). It may be long since forgotten that the right to vote (at least in state elections) is
an "unenumerated" fundamental right, and that cases such as Reynolds and Harper, like Griswold and
Roe, met with charges by commentators and judges that the Court was engaging in "Lochnering." See,
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"unenumerated" right to abortion is justified on the ground that it is a significant precondition for deliberative autonomy. This justification for the right to
vote is not undercut by the observation that not everyone who votes actually
conscientiously or responsibly deliberates about the common good before casting a vote. Nor is this justification for the right to abortion undermined by the
objection that not every woman who has an abortion actually conscientiously or
responsibly deliberates about a conception of the good life before having an
abortion. 192 The best justification for each right is still framed in terms of
securing the preconditions for deliberation, even if that justification cannot
vouchsafe the deliberativeness, much less the responsibility, of each individual
decision.
Furthermore, constitutional constructivism does not stem from an overly
rationalistic or romantic conception of the person that presupposes or demands
too much deliberation to be attractive, realistic, or useful. First, its conception
of the person is a political conception that is advanced to provide a ground for
justifying basic liberties in our constitutional democracy; it is not a biological
or psychological conception of the human being as such. 193 Second, this political conception of the person is not part of what Rawls calls a comprehensive
moral view with respect to either democracy or autonomy. 194 Thus, constitutional constructivism does not subject the first moral power (and the theme of
deliberative democracy) to the demands, rigors, and commitments of comprehensive moral views like those associated with civic humanism, which idealize
taking part in politics "as the privileged locus of the good life." 195 Nor does it
subject the second moral power (and the theme of deliberative autonomy) to the
challenges, reflectiveness, and experiments of comprehensive moral views like
those exemplified by Kant's or Mill's theories, which idealize autonomy or
individuality as a way of life. 196 In sum, constitutional constructivism's political conception of the person is simply an abstract device to model the capacities of citizens which are most salient to grounding our basic liberties and
interpreting our constitutional order. It does not glorify a life of deliberation.
Finally, deliberative autonomy does not entail that every exercise of the
police power concerning fundamental decisions affecting persons' identity,
destiny, or way of life is presumptively illegitimate. Far from it. Precisely
e.g., Ely, supra note 13, at 935-37, 943-45 (criticizing such pre-Roe charges by analogy to the fable of
the boy who cried "wolf"). Technically, Harperdid not decide whether the Constitution protects a right
to vote in state elections, for the Court stated: "[lit is enough to say that once the franchise is granted to
the electorate, lines may not be drawn which are inconsistent with the Equal Protection Clause ......
383 U.S. at 665.
192. One could press the analogy between voting and abortion further. Literacy tests for voting
can be seen as analogous to informed consent requirements for abortion. Many measures that were once
defended as safeguarding deliberative or responsible voting, such as literacy tests, poll taxes, and property requirements, have been invalidated. See, e.g., U.S. CoNsT. amend. XXIV (prohibiting poll tax for
federal elections); Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973b (1988) (banning states from requiring
certain literacy tests); Harper,383 U.S. at 666 (invalidating poll tax for state elections).
193. See RAWrs, supra note 7, at 18 n.20, 86-88.
194. See id. at 13, 175.
195. Id. at 206 (mentioning, as an example, HAI
AREor, THm HuMAN CoNDamoN (1958)).
196. Id. at 37, 78, 145, 199-200 (discussing the comprehensive liberalisms of Kant and Mill).
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because those matters are so important or significant, a government dedicated
to securing the preconditions for deliberative autonomy and deliberative democracy would enact many legislative measures to foster the development and
exercise of persons' moral powers. Deliberative autonomy hardly rules out
such measures; it does, however, safeguard against legislation that coercively
standardizes persons with respect to such matters. Justice Jackson's famous
words in Barnette remind us that freedom embraces "the right to differ as to
197
things that touch the heart of the existing order."
B.

The Underpinningsand Scope of DeliberativeAutonomy
1. The matrix values underwriting deliberative autonomy: liberty of
conscience andfreedom of association.

Why do I stress liberty of conscience and freedom of association in developing the fundamental theme of deliberative autonomy instead ofjust using the
more common ideas of privacy, autonomy, or liberty? I do so because those
basic liberties are matrix values that underwrite deliberative autonomy.
First, I emphasize liberty of conscience to make clear that this theme involves persons' deliberations and decisions concerning unusually important
matters of conscience or basic decisions implicating beliefs that "could not define the attributes of personhood were they formed under compulsion of the
State."' 198 Liberty of conscience is more abstract than freedom of religion (or
the religion clauses of the First Amendment) and so it undergirds free exercise
not only of religion but also of deliberative autonomy as to certain fundamental
decisions.
Thus, constitutional constructivism generalizes liberty of conscience from a
narrow principle applicable only to religious persons to a general principle applicable to all persons. It generalizes the principle of religious toleration to
apply not only to traditional religious conceptions of the good but also to reasonable moral and philosophical conceptions of the good. 199 Given the fact of
reasonable pluralism, conceiving liberty of conscience narrowly would unfairly
privilege traditional religious conceptions. 200 In a morally pluralistic constitutional democracy such as our own, liberty of conscience secures preconditions
for the development and exercise of all persons' capacity to pursue their conception of the good; it does not merely confer a privilege upon religious per20
sons to obey the commands or dictates of their conception of a God. '
197. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
198. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2807 (1992).
199. See RAwLS, supra note 7, at 9-10, 154. Ronald Dworkin and David Richards have already
compellingly generalized liberty of conscience beyond narrow, traditional religious liberty. See, e.g.,
DwoRuuN, supra note 36, at 160-68; RiCHARDs, CoNscmNacE, supra note 173; RicHADs, ToLEnRAio,
supra note 173.
200. For a valuable discussion of the difference between privileging and protecting religious conceptions of the good, see Christopher L. Eisgruber and Lawrence G. Sager, The Vulnerability of Conscience: The ConstitutionalBasis for ProtectingReligious Conduct, 61 U. Cm. L. Rzv. 1245, 1250-54

(1994).
201. For contrary views that liberty of conscience should be interpreted narrowly to protect only
religious liberty, rather than broadly to protect autonomy, see Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and
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To be sure, some religious persons may view liberty of conscience, not as
involving deliberation about their conception of the good at all, but instead as
involving obedience to God. That fact does not undermine the justification for
liberty of conscience as a precondition for deliberative autonomy-any more
than the fact that such persons may view themselves as voting the commands
and dictates of conscience, rather than engaging in deliberation about the common good, undercuts the justification for the right to vote as a precondition for
202
deliberative democracy.
Second, I emphasize freedom of association to bring out that deliberative
autonomy relates to persons' deliberations and decisions in pursuing their conceptions of the good, individually and in association with others. It is not,
contra Sandel and Glendon, merely a right of "unencumbered selves" or "lone
rights-bearers" to be "let alone. 20 3 Freedom of association includes both expressive association and intimate association.2 04 Furthermore, constitutional
constructivism recognizes the human goods promoted through freedom of asso20 5
ciation and not simply the individual choices protected by that freedom
Third, the fundamental theme of deliberative autonomy, underwritten by
liberty of conscience and freedom of association, may provide a more secure
basis for certain "unenumerated" fundamental rights2 06 deemed "essential to
the orderly pursuit of happiness" 20 7 than does privacy or due process. Even
narrow originalists, deeply skeptical about rights of privacy, autonomy, or liberty when unconnected to specific provisions of the Constitution or when connected to the Due Process Clauses, are hard pressed to deny that liberty of
20 8
conscience and freedom of association have firm First Amendment roots.
Ronald Dworkin and Charles Black have argued persuasively that the distinction between "enumerated" and "unenumerated" rights in our constitutional
practice is largely "spurious" or "bogus," and that objections to recognizing
Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HARv. L. REv. 1410, 1488-1500 (1990)
[hereinafter McConnell, Historical Understanding];Michael W. McConnell, Religious Freedom at a
Crossroads,59 U. Cm. L. REv. 115, 172-75 (1992) [hereinafter McConnell, Crossroads];Michael J.
Sandel, Freedom of Conscience or Freedom of Choice?, in ARnicL.s oF FArm, ARTrcLEs OF PEACH 74,
87-92 (James Davison Hunter & Os Guinness eds., 1990).
202. It is not my project here, however, to put forward a theory of the religion clauses or of the
relationship between those clauses and liberty of conscience generally. While much important work
remains to be done in this regard, which I hope to pursue elsewhere, many scholars of the religion
clauses have already taken up such matters. See, eag., RcHARus, CoNscrNCE, supra note 173; RiCHARDS, TOLERATiON, supra note 173; Abner S. Greene, The PoliticalBalance of the Religion Clauses,
102 YALE L.J. 1611 (1993); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Religion andLiberal Democracy, 59 U. Cm. L. REv.
195 (1992).
203. See SANDEL, supra note 5, at 182; GLENDON, supra note 5, at 47-61.
204. See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 617-18 (1984) (distinguishing "expressive association" from "intimate association"); Kenneth L. Karst, The Freedom ofintimate Association,
89 YALE L.J. 624 (1980).
205. But see Sandel, supra note 10, at 533-38.
206, See Dwocn4, supra note 36, at 160-68 (suggesting that there is no dearth of "textual
homes" for such rights, including the Due Process Clauses, the Equal Protection Clause, and the First
Amendment, to say nothing of the Privileges or Immunities Clause).
207. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
208. Nonetheless, narrow originalists resist generalizing liberty of conscience (or freedom of association) to embrace ideas like deliberative autonomy. See McConnell, Crossroads,supra note 201, at
172-75; McConnell, Historical Understanding,supra note 201, at 1488-1500.
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asserted rights on the ground that they are "unenumerated" are often overstated
or off the mark.20 9 Nonetheless, the incubus of such objections does (for some
people) encumber the ideas of privacy, autonomy, and liberty. Liberty of conscience and freedom of association may offer a fresh start in undergirding those
basic liberties that are " 'so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.' ",210
It may be instructive to revisit Griswold,the first case explicitly to recognize the "unenumerated" right of privacy. There Justice Douglas recast Meyer
and Pierce, two substantive due process cases from the Lochner era, as securing First Amendment freedoms. 2 1' Justice Harlan did likewise in dissent in
Poe.21 2 Indeed, even Bork, for whom substantive due process and the right of
privacy are anathema, concedes that Meyer and Pierce are justifiable on First
Amendment grounds.2 1 3 Also, an early draft of Justice Douglas' opinion in
Griswold framed the right in question as freedom of association secured by the
First Amendment.2 14 With the specter of Lochner haunting constitutional law,
grounding the right of privacy in freedom of association might have seemed
less frightening or spooky to some people than summoning forth penumbras
and emanations from the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments. 2 15
Finally, I should explain what I mean when I state that liberty of conscience
and freedom of association "underwrite" the theme of deliberative autonomy
rather than, say, "enumerate" it. These basic liberties underwrite deliberative
autonomy in the sense that they are, in Justice Cardozo's terms in Palko v.
Connecticut, "matrix values," or "indispensable conditions" for nearly every
other form of freedom associated with it.216 Similarly, the equal political liberties and freedom of thought are matrix values underwriting deliberative democ209. DwoRaxN, supra note 36, at 129-31, 143-44 ("spurious"); BLAcK, DECIsioN, supra note 18,
at 41-54; Black, Livelihood, supra note 18, at 1108-11; Black, Ninth, supra note 18, at 342-49; Dworkin, supra note 37, at 381, 381-91 ("bogus").
210. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937) (citations omitted); see also Corfield v.
Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 551 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3,230) (Washington, J., riding circuit) (proclaiming that the Privileges or Immunities Clause embraces "those privileges and immunities which are, in
their nature, fundamental; which belong, of right, to the citizens of all free governments"); cf Sanford
Levinson, ConstitutionalRhetoric and the Ninth Amendment, 64 Cm.-KaiNr L. REv. 131, 145 (1988)
(offering as one possible explanation of recent attention to the Ninth Amendment, rather than the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the "clean slate" and lack of embarrassing
precedent attributable to the former).
211. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482-83 (1965).
212. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 544 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("[T]oday those decisions
would probably have gone by reference to the concepts of freedom of expression and conscience... .
213. BoR , supra note 3, at 48-49.
214. GARuow, supra note 71, at 245-56.
215. I do not concede that there is anything spooky or scary about penumbras and emanations,

whether from particular provisions, Griswold, 381 U.S. at 483-85, or from the "totality of the constitutional scheme under which we live," Poe, 367 U.S. at 521 (Douglas, J., dissenting). I simply observe
that in our constitutional culture many people are frightened by such talk. I should like to write an
article entitled Rewriting Griswold. Cf Donald H. Regan, Rewriting Roe v. Wade, 77 MicH. L. REv.

1569 (1979) (articulating an equal protection justification for Roe against the background of samaritan
law as an alternative to the privacy justification advanced in Roe).
216. 302 U.S. 319, 327 (1937) ("Of that freedom [of thought and speech] one may say that it is
the matrix, the indispensable condition, of nearly every other form of freedom.'). My discussion of

"matrix values" benefits from, though is not the same as, the analysis in HA~ms, supra note 131, at 97.
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racy, for they are "preservative of all rights., 2 17 Both types of basic liberties
are rooted in "fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base
2 18
of all our civil and political institutions."
To contend that liberty of conscience and freedom of association underwrite
deliberative autonomy is not necessarily to argue that they or the First Amendment provide a new "textual home" or doctrinal basis for every hitherto
"unenumerated" fundamental right associated with deliberative autonomy that
has been protected through the Due Process Clauses or the Equal Protection
Clause. 2 19 These basic liberties instead provide a matrix, or undergirding structure, for such "unenumerated" rights. Therefore, such rights have a deeper basis in our constitutional "scheme of ordered liberty"2 20 than is acknowledged
by proponents of a "constitution of detail," who demand to know where these
'22
rights are "enumerated" in the expressions "liberty" or "equal protection." '
Furthermore, even if as a doctrinal matter the textual home of "unenumerated" fundamental rights associated with deliberative autonomy largely remains
"liberty" of the Due Process Clause, that does not mean that deliberative autonomy rests on that clause alone. The clauses of the Constitution are not isolated,
self-contained units. Within our "constitution of principle," as Dworkin argues,
we should not be surprised to find underpinnings for basic liberties in more
than one clause.2 22 Conceiving liberty of conscience and freedom of association as matrix values in an underlying structure shows that "unenumerated"
fundamental rights such as those on the foregoing list223 "emanate[ ] from the
totality of the constitutional scheme under which we live," 224 even if they are
not dictated by a particular clause.22 Put another way, the basic liberties associated with deliberative autonomy are implicit in a "transcendent structure" em226
bodied in the scheme as a whole.
217. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964) (quoting Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356,

370 (1886)).
218. Palko, 319 U.S. at 325, 328 (citation omitted).
219. See DwoomN, supra note 36, at 160-68 (arguing that the First Amendment, along with the
Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause, provides a "textual home" for the right of procreative autonomy).
220. Palko, 319 U.S. at 325.
221. See DwoRm.N, supranote 36, at 166 (criticizing the "odd taste for neatness" of proponents of
a "constitution of detail" who "want rights mapped uniquely onto constitutional clauses with no

overlap").
222. Id. But see Richard A. Posner, Legal Reasoning From the Top Down and From the Bottom
Up: 7he Question of Unenumerated Constitutional Rights, 59 U. Cm. L. REv. 433, 441-42 (1992)
(characterizing Roe as "the Wandering Jew of constitutional law" because the efforts to justify the
decision have traveled through so many clauses).
223. See note 27 supra and accompanying text.
224. Poe, 367 U.S. at 521 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
225. See ELY, supra note 20, at 12 (criticizing a narrow "clause-bound" approach to interpretation
in favor of a holistic approach, which looks to "general themes of the entire constitutional document").
226. For a sophisticated development of the idea of "transcendent structuralism," see HARrus,
supra note 131, at 144-58. Harris explains: "Transcendent structuralismlooks for structures and coherent wholes outside the Constitution which are signaled by the document.' Id. at 152. He continues:
"This style of interpretation calls for a nondocumentary but still bounded theorizing about the fundamental principles that justify the nature and composition of a set of given political institutions.' Id. at
152-53. Cf B AcK, DEcisioN, supra note 18, at 53 ("
[he
Ninth Amendment... makes possible fully
rational discourse in the formation of personal rights law, toward the construction of a coherent system
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The scope of deliberative autonomy: limited to significant basic
liberties.

Why do only the foregoing "unenumerated" fundamental rights appear on
the list that illustrates deliberative autonomy?22 7 Constitutional constructiv-

ism's answer, and its criterion for specifying the basic liberties in interpreting
the Constitution as a coherent scheme, is in terms of the significance of such
liberties for deliberative autonomy or deliberative democracy. Rawls explains
the criterion of significance: "[A] liberty is more or less significant depending
on whether it is more or less essentially involved in, or is a more or less necessary institutional means to protect, the full and informed and effective exercise
of the moral powers in one (or both) of the two fundamental cases. '228 Constitutional constructivism limits the scope of autonomy to protecting basic liberties that are significant preconditions for deliberative autonomy in'this sense.
All of the liberties on the foregoing list satisfy this criterion. Below, I distinguish deliberative autonomy from comprehensive libertarian and liberal principles of autonomy or individuality, which are broader and encompass liberties
229
that are not significant in this sense.
This criterion for specifying the basic liberties is not one of significance
simpliciter,or simply whether an asserted "unenumerated" fundamental right is
significant or important in the abstract (or in someone's subjective scheme of
values). Rather, the criterion frames the inquiry in terms of whether an asserted
liberty is significant for the development and exercise of one (or both) of the
two moral powers in one (or both) of the two fundamental cases. This criterion
requires reasoned judgment rather than providing a formula or bright-line rule,
but it structures the inquiry along constitutionally appropriate lines. 2 30
Furthermore, applying the criterion of significance does not call for judgments based on subjective interpersonal comparisons of incommensurable values. Within constitutional constructivism, basic liberties are conceived as
primary goods (or all-purpose goods) that are in principle significant for all
.... In this transcendent sense, the Ninth Amendment could be the gate to the best kind we can attain of
decision according to law.").
227. See note 27 supra and accompanying text.
228. RAwIs, supra note 7, at 335.
229. See text accompanying notes 244266 infra.
230. The Supreme Court has rejected the "importance" of an asserted right as the criterion for
deciding whether the Constitution protects it in the context of the Equal Protection Clause. See San
Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 30 (1973). I have several responses. First, the
Court rejected a criterion of significance simpliciter. Second, the early Burger Court was at pains to
cabin equality, especially where the expenditure of money was involved. For institutional reasons, it is
understandable that the Court would shy away from ordering exact equality in education and the restructuring of school financing schemes. But Rodriguez, even while it rejected the importance of an asserted
right as the criterion for deciding whether "to create substantive constitutional rights in the name of
guaranteeing equal protection of the laws," id. at 33, did seem practically to assume that education vas

so significant or important for democracy that there might be a constitutional right to a minimally
adequate education. Id. at 36-37. Third, constitutional constructivism acknowledges that certain basic
liberties that are significant for deliberative autonomy or deliberative democracy nonetheless may be
judicially unenforceable or underenforced norms, especially if they implicate institutional limits of
courts. See text accompanying note 119 supra.
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persons, whatever their particular conceptions of the good. 23 1 And so, the
question framed by the criterion of significance is not: "What liberties does a
particular person need to enable him or her to pursue his or her particular conception of the good?" It is, instead: "What liberties are in principle significant
for everyone, regardless of their particular conceptions of the good and irrespective of whether particular persons happen to value those liberties?" In recognizing the significance of the basic liberties on the foregoing list,232 and of
the rights of persons to make fundamental decisions of the sort encompassed by
it, we need not embrace any particular view of the ultimate meaning or importance of such decisions within any specific comprehensive conception of the
good (though we might well find considerable overlap among a variety of such
conceptions).
Admittedly, "unenumerated" liberties such as those on the foregoing list are
controversial, but that is not because they are merely subjective, insignificant,
or readily disparaged as "liberty as license." To the contrary, they are controversial precisely because they are significant for deliberative autonomy. The
criterion of significance is double-edged, for a government may have obligations with respect to certain matters because of their importance for deliberative
autonomy, or for the ordered reproduction of society over time, but nonetheless
be prohibited from standardizing people with respect to such matters precisely
because they are so important.
In contemporary American society, where "rights talk" is pervasive, persons may try to dress up relatively insignificant liberty claims in the garb of
"unenumerated" fundamental rights to privacy, autonomy, or liberty.233 This
fact poses no special difficulty for constitutional constructivism. First, many
such claims are frivolous as constitutional claims. And second, many of the
claims that could pass that threshold still would not trump the government's
compelling, important, or even merely legitimate interests. 234 According to
constitutional constructivism, the constitutional protection afforded such liberty
claims is merely that of "a general presumption against imposing legal and
other restrictions on conduct without sufficient reason," 235 generally requiring
that political decisions be justifiable on the basis of public-regarding reasons
and public reasons. Only significant basic liberties, including those on the foregoing list and others of similar significance for one or both of the two fundamental cases, have the much-vaunted priority over the polity's pursuit of

231. See RAwLs, supra note 7, at 178-79.
232. See note 27 supra and accompanying text.
233. See generallyGLENDoN, supra note 5 (popularizing the term "rights talk"). For a critique of
Glendon's analysis of "rights talk" and of the assertion of frivolous rights in contemporary American
society, see McClain, supra note 185, at 1001-08, 1046-54.
234. See DwoRmuN, supra note 23, at xi (coining the phrase "rights as trumps").
235. RANLs, supra note 7, at 292.

STANFORD LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48:1

conceptions of the public good or imposition of perfectionist virtues. 236 Those
are the basic liberties to which the call for "taking rights seriously" applies. 237
Rawls issues an important caveat concerning the application of the criterion
of significance in specifying basic liberties in a constitutional democracy such
as our own: "It is wise, I think, to limit the basic liberties to those that are truly
essential in the expectation that the liberties which are not basic are satisfactorily allowed for by the general presumption [referred to above]. '2 38 He explains: "Whenever we enlarge the list of basic liberties we risk weakening the
protection of the most essential ones and recreating within the scheme of liberties the indeterminate and unguided balancing problems we had hoped to avoid
by a suitably circumscribed notion of priority." 239 Some champions of the
right of autonomy have advocated constitutional protection for liberties that are
not essential or significant in this sense. But constitutional constructivism
heeds this caveat.
By accepting this caveat, I do not mean to imply that the basic liberties
analyzed above and the "unenumerated" fundamental rights on the foregoing
list 240 make up a complete, closed list of basic liberties that are significant for
deliberative autonomy. For the unfinished business of Charles Black will never
be completed; the structure or corpusjurisof fundamental rights significant for
deliberative autonomy "will always be building." 241 But tethering the right of
autonomy by limiting it to protecting basic liberties that are significant for deliberative autonomy may render it less vulnerable to the caricatures I began
with, to say nothing of making autonomy less frightening to the conservative
justices and progressive scholars who are tempted to flee it.242 Limiting deliberative autonomy to significant basic liberties may also provide a partial response to the exaggerated complaints that "rights talk" has led to the
236. See id. at 294-99. Constitutional constructivism accords priority to the whole family of equal
basic liberties. No single basic liberty by itself is absolute. This understanding of priority entails that
such significant basic liberties as freedom of association may in many instances have to be regulated or
adjusted in order to secure other basic liberties, or the whole family of such liberties, for all citizens. Id.

For example, the Supreme Court, in upholding application of a Minnesota statute that prohibited sex

discrimination in public accommodations to the Jaycees, correctly decided Roberts v. United States
Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984), notwithstanding the male Jaycees' freedom of association claims. It also
rightly decided Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), despite the white parents' and
students' freedom of association claims. (One of the things that troubled Herbert Wechsler, in his wellknown critique of Brown, was that it did not adequately take into account whites' claims to freedom of
association. Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principlesof ConstitutionalLaw, 73 HARv. L. REv. 1,
34 (1959).) In these instances, the importance of free and equal citizenship for women and AfricanAmericans properly prevailed over the freedom of association claims.
237. DwoRmN, supra note 23.
238. RAwLs, supra note 7, at 296.
239. Id.; cf R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 415 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring)
(arguing that "[ilf all expressive activity must be accorded the same protection, that protection vill be
scant" and thus that decisions purporting to expand First Amendment protection may actually weaken

it).
240. See note 27 supra and accomanying text.
241. Black, Ninth, supra note 18, at 343.
242. See texts accompanying notes 249-254, 327-346 infra (discussing conservative justices'
flight from autonomy); text accompanying notes 267-282 infra (discussing progressive (and feminist)

scholars' flight from autonomy).
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"impoverishment" of political and constitutional discourse and to the243
debilitation of the responsible citizenry upon which our institutions depend.
3.

What deliberative autonomy is not.

Now that I have outlined what deliberative autonomy is, I shall briefly distinguish it from certain familiar understandings and caricatures of privacy, autonomy, or liberty. I contend that many criticisms of these ideas are not well
taken as against deliberative autonomy.
Deliberative autonomy is not a comprehensive liberal "right to be different." Ely mocks the right to autonomy as "the right to be different," belittling
it as being an "upper-middle-class right," or as reflecting the values of the "reasoning class." 244 Moreover, because the best-known liberal conception of autonomy or individuality is that of Mill, Ely rolls out the inevitable paraphrase of
Justice Holmes' dissenting opinion in Lochner protesting against resort to political or economic theory in constitutional interpretation: "If the Constitution
does not enact Herbert Spencer's SocialStatics, does it enact John Stuart Mill's
245
On Liberty?"
Constitutional constructivism does not embrace a comprehensive liberal
"right to be different" that extends constitutional protection to everyone's pursuit of individuality or autonomy in a broad sense. 246 Indeed, as I discuss below, there are affinities between my structural argument for deliberative
autonomy as an "exit" option and Ely's own analysis of the right of "dissenting
or 'different'" individuals to relocate.24 7 I do not consider a right to wear
one's hair as long as one pleases (which Ely mocks 248 ) or a right to loaf to be
illustrations of deliberative autonomy. With all due respect to Justices Marshall
and Douglas, who argued during the early years of the Burger Court that the
Constitution does protect such rights,2 4 9 1 fear that they may have extended the
idea of autonomy too far, well beyond constitutional essentials to a romantic
ideal of self-fulfillment or the development of one's individuality, tastes, and
personality. 250 Constitutional constructivism limits the scope of autonomy to
protecting significant basic liberties. The "unenumerated" fundamental rights
243. See, eg., GLEmDON, supra note 5.
244. See ELY, supra note 20, at 59 n.**, 94; Ely, supra note 6, at 405.
245. Ely, supra note 6, at 401 (quotation omitted); see Fleming, supra note 7, at 301-04 (responding to a similar paraphrase of Justice Holmes' Lochner dissent with respect to Rawls' A Theory of
Justice and PoliticalLiberalism).
246. Rawls distinguishes political liberalism and the comprehensive liberalisms of Mill and Kant.
RAis, supra note 7, at 98-100, 154-58, 199-200. A comprehensive liberalism is itself a comprehensive philosophical conception of the good, from which Rawls distinguishes his own political conception
of justice. Id at 154-58.
247. See ELY, supra note 20, at 178; text accompanying notes 314-325 infra.
248. See Ely, supra note 6, at 405; text accompanying note 6 supra.
249. Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 249-53 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (hair); Doe v.
Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 213 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring) (loaf).
250. See SMrrf, supra note 172, at 234-35 (critiquing the "romantic liberalism" associated with
Justices Douglas and Marshall); Smith, supra note 172, at 189-90 (noting the broad range of freedoms
protected under the "privacy as autonomy" view of Justices Douglas and Marshall).
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on the foregoing list,251 which I have characterized as significant for delibera252
tive autonomy, do not have an elitist cast.
I do not mean to trivialize the significance of hair length or loafing in any
particular conception of the good or ideal of self-fulfillment 253 or to deny that
there may be good arguments against regulations that encroach on such liberty
claims. But advancing such claims as constitutional rights has provided fodder
for those who would trivialize the more significant "unenumerated" fundamental rights mentioned above, making it too easy to caricature arguments for such
significant rights. Perhaps notions of autonomy or self-fulfillment like those
expressed by Justices Marshall and Douglas frightened the conservative Burger
and Rehnquist Courts and fueled their flight from aspirational principles to historical practices in the due process inquiry. 254
My response to Ely's paraphrase of Holmes' dissent in Lochner involves a
strategy of confession and avoidance. The confession is to admit that the first
wave of Rawlsian constitutional theorists, after the publication of Rawls' A
Theory of Justice, may have zealously extended arguments for constitutional
rights of autonomy too far: beyond essential basic liberties that are significant
within a political conception of justice, to something like a comprehensive
moral view, such as Millian individuality or autonomy. They may have embraced what Rawls now calls a comprehensive liberalism as distinguished from
a political liberalism. 255 However attractive such comprehensive moral views
may be from a normative standpoint, they cannot fit and justify, but must criticize as mistaken, a great deal of our constitutional law that fails to recognize
rights to develop one's individuality or autonomy.
The avoidance is to contend that the second wave of Rawlsian constitutional theorists, after the publication of Rawls' Political Liberalism, should
tether constitutional rights of autonomy to the structure of basic liberties that
are significant for deliberative autonomy within a political conception ofjustice
(or political liberalism). They should not try to secure, as constitutional rights,
whatever liberties are entailed by comprehensive moral views of individuality
or autonomy. Understandably, the first wave of Rawlsian constitutional theorists did not appreciate the distinction between a political liberalism and a comprehensive liberalism; in fact, Rawls himself did not.2 56 In working out a
constitutional constructivism, I invoke this distinction to avoid or deflect Ely's
criticism and paraphrase of Holmes' dissent in Lochner by basically agreeing
with it. The Constitution no more enacts Mill's comprehensive moral view of
individuality or autonomy than it establishes the Catholic Church or a Christian
Nation or any other comprehensive conception of the good.
251. See note 27 supra and accompanying text.
252. Cf DwoRKiN, supranote 165, at 17 (responding to similar charges about ideas of autonomy
generally).

253. Especially, for example, if hair length is related to religious or cultural practices. Anti-loafing ordinances might also pose problems if aimed against homeless persons.

254. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 172, at 200-01; see also text accompanying notes 327-346 infra.
255. See RAws, supra note 7, at 98-100, 199-200.
256. See id. at xvi-xvii.
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Deliberative autonomy is not a comprehensive libertarianprinciple of autonomy. Some libertarians might object that deliberative autonomy is too
bounded or does not go far enough in securing autonomy. Indeed, deliberative
autonomy is not a comprehensive libertarian principle of autonomy or limited
government that deems every exercise of the police power of the state presumptively illegitimate. For it is rooted in constitutional constructivism, which is not
a libertarian
view but instead a synthesis of liberalism and civic republicanism. 25 7 Constitutional constructivism accords priority not to a libertarian right
to liberty as such, but rather to the scheme
of basic liberties that is articulated
258
through the two fundamental themes.
As noted above, the right to personal property is a constitutional essential
and indeed a precondition for both deliberative democracy and deliberative autonomy. 259 But constitutional constructivism does not justify special judicial
protection of economic liberties. Property rights are properly judicially underenforced, for there is every indication that they can and do fend well enough for
themselves in the political process. The regulation of property rights does not
present a situation of distrust that would warrant more searching judicial protection.26 0 Thus, despite the views of economic libertarians like Richard A.
Epstein, the opportunity for consenting adults to perform capitalistic acts in
private without governmental regulation is not among the stringently judicially
enforced preconditions for deliberative autonomy, any more than for deliberative democracy.2 61 Much regulation that would be, as Lochner put it, "meddlesome interferences with the rights of the individual" 262 in a libertarian private
society is legitimate, important, or even compelling in a constitutional
democracy.
Nor does deliberative autonomy place off limits certain commonplace, minimal forms of paternalism to which some libertarians might object, such as
social insurance, drug laws, and automobile safety requirements. 263 Unlike
laws regulating or restricting the "unenumerated" fundamental rights on the
foregoing list, such paternalistic laws typically do not implicate the concerns of
the antitotalitarian principle of liberty, infringe on significant basic liberties, or
run afoul of the limits of public reason. There may well be forceful libertarian
autonomy arguments (as well as pragmatic arguments) against some laws of
this sort. But no plausible principle of autonomy secured by our Constitution
prohibits them, for too much of our practice does not square with such a princi257. See text accompanying notes 138-141 supra.
258. See RAWLS, supra note 7, at 291-92, 294-98.
259. See text accompanying note 113 supra.
260. See William Michael Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Takings Clause and the
PoliticalProcess, 95 CoLum. L. REv. 782, 855-87 (1995). Contra Richard A. Epstein, Property,
Speech, and the Politicsof Distrust,59 U. Cm. L. REv. 41, 47-59 (1992).
261. See, e.g., RicHARD A. EpsTENq, TAKiNGs (1985); Richard A. Epstein, Modern Republicanism-Or the FlightFrom Substance, 97 YALE L.J. 1633, 1645-46 (1988). But see ROBERT NozicK,
ANARCHY, STATE, AND UToPIA 163 (1974) (stating that a hypothetical "socialist society would have to
forbid capitalist[ic] acts between consenting adults").
262. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 61 (1905).

263. See MAcEDO, supra note 172, at 209 (arguing that liberalism does not rule out certain mild
forms of paternalism).
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pie. Moreover, the liberty claims infringed by such measures do not satisfy the
constructivist criterion of significance for deliberative autonomy.
Indeed, a constitutional democracy dedicated to securing deliberative autonomy might adopt many legislative measures aimed at preventing or discouraging persons from "destroying those basic rational capacities that make them
moral beings worthy of respect. 2' ' 64 It certainly would pass many legislative
programs designed to promote the development and exercise of those capacities.2 65 There are limits to what measures legislatures may take, but minimal
forms of paternalism such as those mentioned do not transgress those limits. In
sum, deliberative autonomy would not unduly constrain deliberative democracy
266
with a comprehensive libertarian right of autonomy.
Deliberative autonomy is not a "right of men 'to be let alone' to oppress
women. " Some progressives and feminists have been wary of ideas like privacy, autonomy, or liberty because they believe that privacy may be a veil to
mask abuse and oppression. Instead, they emphasize ideas such as deliberative
democracy and an anticaste principle of equality in grounding basic liberties.
For example, Catharine A. MacKinnon has argued that rights of privacy, autonomy, and liberty may readily prove, for women, to be "an injury got up as a
''
2 68
gift 267 or a "right of men 'to be let alone' to oppress women one at a time."
On this view, such constitutional rights not only have been illusory for women,
but indeed have been a hindrance to-rather than a precondition for-securing
equal citizenship for them. 2 69 More generally, feminists have drawn attention
to the social costs of rights (not only privacy but also rights protected by the
First Amendment) to women's equality and liberty, as well as their physical
security. 270
These important concerns do not, however, warrant neglecting the preconditions for deliberative autonomy or overlooking the vital importance of such
264. Id.; see also SMrrH, supra note 172, at 213 (arguing that liberalism allows prohibition of
actions that "endanger[ ] persons' continuing capacities for rational deliberation").
265. Admittedly, some forms of paternalism (or other laws) may drive some people who feel that
"they've had enough" to exercise their "exit" option, pull up stakes, and seek a "last frontier." See, e.g.,
They've Had Enough: Offthe Grid, N.Y. TnsEs MAO., Jan. 8, 1995, at 24 ("Enter government-hating,
home-schooling, Scripture-quoting Idaho, the new leave-me-alone America at its most extreme."). To
do precisely that is itself one of such persons' "unenumerated" fundamental rights encompassed by the
foregoing list. See note 27 supra and accompanying text. For analyses of the "exit" option or the
"frontier" in constitutional law, see note 314 infra and text accompanying notes 314-325 infra.

266. Thus, the idea of deliberative autonomy is not nearly as broad as the general libertarian
slogan "don't tread on me." In a free society, we should be grateful to the libertarians, for they serve as
a salutary reminder that the exercise of coercive political power always requires a justification and
always entails some loss of liberty; but we should not confuse their slogan and beliefs with constitutional essentials such as deliberative autonomy.
267. MACKINON, supra note 4, at 100.

268. Id. at 102.
269. See id. at 100-02; Mary E. Becker, The Politics of Women's Wrongs and the Bill of
"Rights": A Bicentennial Perspective, 59 U. CmI. L. Ray. 453, 453-55 (1992); Robin West, ReconstructingLiberty, 59 TENN. L. REv. 441, 454-61 (1992).
270. See CATHARIN A. MAcKnNoN, ONLY WoRDs 71-110 (1993); Elizabeth M. Schneider, The
Violence of Privacy, 23 CONN. L. Rev. 973 (1991); West, supra note 269, at 454-61.
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autonomy to women's, as well as men's, free and equal citizenship. 2 7' Constitutional constructivism's theme of deliberative autonomy does not secure a private realm or "hellhole" of sanctified isolation wherein men may oppress
women. 272 I have two responses to MacKinnon's critique.
First, MacKinnon mistakenly conflates different senses of privacy, confusing "territorial privacy" with "sovereignty over personal decisions" (or deliberative autonomy).2 73 Consequently, she mistakenly views the right of privacy
that justifies Roe as also shielding a realm of male-perpetrated domestic violence and oppression. As against that right, she supports an antisubordination
principle of sex equality that would protect and secure equal citizenship for
women.2 74 MacKinnon persuasively illustrates the problematic history of treating a private realm of family life as beyond state intervention. But she does not
persuasively link constitutional protection of the right of privacy to such
wrongs. As some feminist defenders of privacy have pointed out, courts have
not invoked the constitutional right of privacy or autonomy, or cited cases such
as Griswold,Eisenstadt,or Roe, to defend marital rape exemptions or to shield
domestic violence from state intervention. 275 To the contrary, courts have inyoked the right of privacy or autonomy, and cited such cases, to justify invalidating marital rape exemptions and to protect against domestic violence.2 76
The idea of deliberative autonomy has affinities with the latter notions of privacy or autonomy, which emphasize women's dignity, decisional autonomy,
and bodily integrity. Deliberative autonomy is an antitotalitarian principle of
liberty that works in tandem with, rather than as a shield against, an antisubordination or anticaste principle of equality.
Second, MacKinnon erroneously conflates the right of privacy with the idea
of the Constitution as a charter of negative liberties. 2 77 On her view, the right
of privacy recognized in Roe directly led to decisions denying rights to affirmative liberties, such as a right to abortion funding in Harris v. McRae2 78 and
ultimately a right to protection against domestic violence in DeShaney v. Winnebago County.2 7 9 It is quite telling against MacKinnon's critique that the
271. For works defending privacy from feminist viewpoints, see ANrrA L. ALLEN, UNEAsY AccEss: PRIVACY FOR VOMEN INA FRaE Socirm (1988); McClain, supra note 188, at 1176; Linda C.
McClain, Inviolability and Privacy: The Castle, the Sanctuary, and the Body, 7 YALE J.L. & HUMAN.
195 (1995) [hereinafter McClain, Inviolability]; Linda C. McClain, The Poverty of Privacy?, 3 COLUM.

J.

& L. 119, 124-50 (1992); Schneider, supra note 270, at 975.
272. See Catharine A. MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality Under Law, 100
1311 (1991).
GENDER

YALE

L.J. 1281,

273. See DwoRcrN, supra note 36, at 53-54.
274. MAcKN NoN, supra note 4, at 100-02.

275. See, eg., McClain, Inviolability, supra note 271, at 207-20. McClain observes that neither
MacKinnon nor Robin West offers any examples of courts using these privacy precedents to justify
marital rape exemptions, and states that she has found no such examples. Id. at 217.
276. See id. at 216-20.
277. By "negative liberties," I mean rights that limit what government may do to persons, as
distinguished from "affirmative liberties," or rights that impose obligations on government to provide
certain services to persons. The distinction, though, is problematic. See Susan Bandes, The Negative
Constitution:A Critique, 88 MicH. L. REv. 2271 (1990).
278. 448 U.S. 297 (1980); see MAcKNoN, supra note 4, at 96-102.
279. 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
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greatest champions of the right of privacy on the Supreme Court, Justices
Blackmun, Brennan, and Marshall, have been the greatest critics of the idea of
the Constitution as a charter of negative liberties. For example, all of them
wrote or joined in powerful dissents in Harrisand DeShaney.280 Furthermore,
the greatest critics of the right of privacy, Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
Scalia, have been the greatest champions of the idea of the negative Constitution.2 81 In any event, MacKinnon's critique does not apply here because the
idea of deliberative autonomy -does not entail the idea of the negative
Constitution.
Progressives and feminists correctly argue that the Constitution, interpreted
as a charter of negative liberties, does not secure the affirmative liberties
needed fully to guarantee free and equal citizenship for women and men. But
that deficiency is one of a negative Constitution, not a shortcoming of deliberative autonomy. Within Rawls' political constructivism, the protection of basic
liberties includes protecting individuals not only from the government but also
from each other, including within families. 2 82 Both women and men are due
the status of free and equal citizenship. Progressives and feminists should not
and need not flee deliberative autonomy for deliberative democracy, or liberty
for equality, but should pursue basic liberties that are grounded in both.
C.

FurtherStructuralJustificationsfor Securing Deliberative Autonomy
1. Deliberative autonomy constitutes a realm of personalsovereignty:
remembering the Ninth and Tenth Amendments.

As stated above, autonomy in some usages connotes the idea of sovereignty-the power or right of self-government-whether that of a people or
that of a person. 28 3 Thus, we find references both to popular sovereignty and to
280. See Harris,448 U.S. at 329 (Brennan, J., dissenting, joined by Justices Marshall and Blackmun); U at 337 (Marshall, J., dissenting); id. at 348 (Blacknun, J., dissenting); DeShaney, 489 U.S. at
203 (Brennan, J., dissenting, joined by Justices Marshall and Blackmun); id. at 212 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
281. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2855 (1992) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting in part); id. at 2873 (Scalia, J., dissenting in part); DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 191 (Rehnquist, CJ.
and Scalia, J., joining majority); Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 113 (1989) (Scalia, J., writing
for the plurality, with which Rehnquist, C.J., joined); Roe v. W'ade, 410 U.S. 113, 171 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
282. See RAwLs, supra note 7, at 221 n.8; accord Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539, 1567 (1988) (stating that it is a "large mistake to suggest that liberal thinkers
believed that threats lay only in government intrusions and that there was no right to protection from
private power"). John Stuart Mill, another important liberal thinker, criticized misplaced protection of
liberty permitting the "almost despotic power of husbands over wives" and argued that "wives should
have the same rights, and should receive the protection of the law in the same manner, as all other
persons." JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 97 (David Spitz ed., 1975) (1859); see also SusAN MOLLER
OKrN, JusICaE, GENDER, AND TH FAnLy 89-109 (1989); Susan Moller Okin, Reason and Feeling in
Thinking About Justice, 99 ETcs 229 (1989) (both setting forth a feminist argument that Rawls' liberal
conceptions provide a basis for a critique of gender inequality). This is not to suggest that our Constitution in general requires protection from private power, but rather to observe that Rawls' political liberalism does.
283. See note 168 supra and accompanying text; see also PAUL W. KAHN, LEamrrMAcy AND HisTORY: SELF-GovERNmENT N AMERIucAN CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 154-209 (1992) (analyzing the "locus of will" in constitutional theory in both itdividual autonomy and community).
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personal sovereignty.2 8 4 For scholars of constitutional law and jurisprudence,
the idea that more than one sovereign could occupy a given territory may be at
once puzzling and familiar. It may be puzzling because on some views, especially those of legal positivists, sovereignty by definition is unitary, not dual:
The sovereign is "a legally untrammelled will" or "a legally illimitable supreme
lawgiver. ' '2 s Nonetheless, the idea that sovereignty is dual is familiar through
the notion that the structure of our system of federalism is one of "dual sovereignty": that of the national government and state governments sharing sovereignty. I shall advance a different model of tripartite sovereignty: that of
governments (national and state) and persons sharing sovereignty. 286 Within
this structure, the basic liberties associated with deliberative autonomy constitute a realm of personal sovereignty.
Throughout this section, I speak of "sovereignty" in the general sense of
allocation of decision making power under our existing Constitution, not the
strict sense of "constituent power" to establish or revise a regime. Strictly
speaking, national governments and state governments do not have sovereignty,
much less share it. They merely have and share the "ordinary power" of officers of government under an existing regime. 287 In speaking of personal sovereignty, I simply mean that persons retain or reserve the right or power to
make certain decisions under our Constitution. I intend here to bracket, and not
take a position on, deeper issues in political philosophy and constitutional theory concerning the character and locus of sovereignty in the sense of constituent power.28 8
Analogies between these conceptions of dual and tripartite sovereignty may
be fruitful from the standpoint of carrying forward the unfinished business of
Charles Black by making structural arguments for securing deliberative autonomy. Interpreting the idea of dual sovereignty in the context of federalism
involves structural inferences, and the derivation of "unenumerated" limits on
national power, from a political theory of federalism. The aim is to preserve a
realm of sovereignty reserved to state governments: the power to make decisions regarding essential attributes of statehood. 28 9 By analogy, construing the
idea of tripartite sovereignty suggested here requires structural reasoning, and
284. Akbdil Reed Amar. The Consent of the Governed: ConstitutionalAmendment Outside Article

V,94 CoLum. L. REv. 457, 458 (1994) (popular sovereignty); Dwoic,

supra note 36, at 53 (personal
sovereignty).
285. H.L.A. HART, THm CoNcEPr OF LAw 51, 149 (2d ed. 1994) (analyzing early British legal
positivists).
286. Cf Abner S. Greene, Uncommon Ground, 62 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 646, 672 (1994) (reviewing RAWLS, supra note 7, and DwoRiN, supra note 36) [hereinafter Greene, Uncommon] (describing
sovereignty in a liberal democracy as "permeable" rather than unitary because there are non-governmental sources of authority and norms); Abner S. Greene, Kiryas Joel and Two Mistakes About Equality,96
CoLuM. L. REy. (forthcoming 1996) [hereinafter Greene, Mistakes] (same).
287. See RAwLs, supra note 7, at 231 (discussing "constituent power," which is expressed in the
higher law of the Constitution, and "ordinary power," which is expressed in ordinary legislation).
288. For a learned and thorough discussion of these matters with respect to our Constitution, see
ONA. RiHns AND PowMs OF THE PEOPLE (forthcoming 1996).
WAYNE D. MooRE, CONmTr
289. See, ag., National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 844-45, 851-52 (1976) (holding
that Congress may not impose federal minimum wage and maximum hour requirements on state and
municipal employers), overruledby Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
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the derivation of "unenumerated" limits on (or "unenumerated" rights against)
national and state governmental power, from a political theory of constitutional
democracy. The aim is to preserve a realm of sovereignty reserved to or retained by persons: the right or power to make decisions concerning central
290
attributes of personhood.
Remarkably, some of the justices who rail most bitterly against deriving
"unenumerated" rights in order to secure personal autonomy (or sovereignty)
are the ones who engage most actively in inferring "unenumerated" limits on
national power in order to preserve state autonomy (or sovereignty). 29 1 That is,
the justices who are most skeptical about deriving central attributes of personhood are the ones who are least skeptical about inferring essential attributes
z92
of statehood (and perhaps vice versa),
It may be instructive to recall that the Tenth Amendment has served as a
textual basis for the idea of dual sovereignty in the context of federalism, and
that the Ninth Amendment has provided a textual underpinning for the idea that
the Constitution protects "unenumerated" fundamental rights that are central to
personhood. 293 Laurence Tribe has observed that "both the ninth and the tenth
amendments may be regarded as meta-constitutional rules for interpreting the
document as a whole," adding that "[t]he ninth amendment is a uniquely central
text in any attempt to take seriously the process of construing the Constitution."'2 94 I contend that the Ninth Amendment, in conjunction with the Tenth,
is a rule of construction that calls for us to construe the Constitution as a whole
See generally BLACK, supra note 16, at 8-32 (engaging in structural reasoning with respect to federalism
and commerce power).
290. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2805 (1992) ("It is a promise of the
Constitution that there is a realm of personal liberty which the government may not enter."); TPmE,
supra note 10, at 1302-1435 (analyzing rights of privacy and personhood).
291. Compare Rehnquist's majority opinions in National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 833 and
United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995), with his dissent in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 171
(1973). See Laurence H. Tribe, ContrastingConstitutional Visions: OfReal and UnrealDifferences, 22
HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 95, 97-105 (1987) (contrasting Rehnquist's approaches to "unenumerated"
limits on powers and to "unenumerated" rights). Note also the contrast between Scalia's grand structural inferences concerning separation of powers in the service of a political theory of the "unitary
executive" and his hostility to the idea of deriving "unenumerated" individual rights. Compare Scalia's
dissent in Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 697 (1988), with his dissent in Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2873.
See Bruce Ackerman, Liberating Abstraction, 59 U. Cm. L. REv. 317, 318-19 (1992) (criticizing the
asymmetry in Scalia's approaches); Martin S. Flaherty, The Most DangerousBranch, 105 YALE L.J.
(forthcoming 1996) (same).
292. The most vigorous defenders of personal autonomy may also take asymmetric approaches to
powers and rights. Compare Blackmun's majority opinion in Garcia, 469 U.S. at 537-47 (expressing
skepticism about inferring traditional governmental functions of state governments and essential attributes of state sovereignty), with his majority opinion in Roe, 410 U.S. at 152-53 (recognizing a woman's
right to decide whether to terminate a pregnancy as "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty").
293. The Tenth Amendment provides: "The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people."
U.S. CONST. amend. X. The Ninth Amendment provides: "The enumeration in the Constitution, of
certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people." U.S. CONSr.
amend. IX.
294. Tribe, supra note 291, at 100; see also LAURENCE H. Tame & MicHtAE. C. Dorn, ON READno =e CoNsTTUrioN 54-55, 110-11 (1991) (treating the Ninth Amendment as a rule of interpretation
that expresses a presumption in favor of generalizing from specific, enumerated rights to others retained
by the people).
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as manifesting a tripartite structural allocation of sovereignty or decision making power within which persons retain or reserve the rights or powers to make
certain fundamental decisions: a realm of personal sovereignty or deliberative
295
autonomy.
Charles Black and John Hart Ely have moved and seconded that the neglected Ninth Amendment "at long last be adopted. '296 Ely argues that "the
conclusion that the Ninth Amendment was intended to signal the existence of
federal constitutional rights beyond those specifically enumerated in the Constitution is the only conclusion its language seems comfortably able to support." 297 Likewise, Black contends that the Ninth Amendment provides, on the
face of the Constitution, an "existence proof" that there are enforceable constitutional rights other than those specifically named in the constitutional document. He also has called for and offered "constructive proofs" of what those
rights are, arguing that we should read and use the Ninth Amendment to justify
the construction of a coherent system of fundamental rights.2 98 Constitutional
constructivism conceives the Ninth Amendment as a rule of construction for
the Constitution as a whole. Its guiding framework provides "constructive
proofs" for constitutional rights that are significant for deliberative autonomy
and deliberative democracy.
Some proponents of narrow theories of originalism have been horrified by
the "recent discovery" 299 of the long "forgotten

300

Ninth Amendment. For the

natural interpretation of the Ninth Amendment expressed by Ely and Black is
an embarrassment to their theories, which presuppose that the only constitutional rights are those specifically enumerated in the Constitution. Also, some
proponents of monist theories of majoritarian representative democracy have
sought to contain the Ninth Amendment. After all, the existence of "unenumerated" fundamental rights that limit majoritarian representative democracy
would suggest the inadequacy of their theories. Such concerns have led to
three accounts that read the Ninth and Tenth Amendments together to deny and
disparage the idea that the Ninth Amendment contemplates constitutional protection of "unenumerated" fundamental rights central to personhood.
The first account is the rights/powers conception or residual rights reading,
which is the traditional federalism account: The Ninth Amendment overlaps
with the Tenth, and the people retain rights to what is left over from grants of
295. The Ninth Amendment is a rule of construction for the Constitution as a whole. It not only
textually authorizes, but indeed calls for, deriving "unenumerated" constitutional rights that are implicit
in the particular provisions of the constitutional document, the general themes of the Constitution as a
whole, and the underlying constitutional order. Because the Constitution as a whole includes manifestations of substantive liberties associated with deliberative autonomy, as well as procedural liberties related to deliberative democracy, a constructivist conception of the Ninth Amendment calls for deriving
both types of liberties.
296. BLAcK, DEcIstoN, supra note 18, at 43-44 (referring to ELY, supra note 20, at 34-41).
297. ELY, supra note 20, at 38. Ely nonetheless attempts to limit the Ninth Amendment to justify
his recognition of only "unenumerated" process-oriented rights. See id. at 87-101.
298. BLACK, DECISION, supra note 18, at 44,53; Black, Unfinished Business, supranote 17, at 36-

37.
299. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 518 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting).
300. Id. (referring to BEN=Nair B. PATTERSON, Tim FoRo-rEN Nnr AmENDMENT (1955)).
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power to the federal and state governments. Proponents of this view do not see
rights as constraints or limits on granted powers, but instead define them
30 1
residually from grants of power.
Adopting this conception in his dissenting opinion in Griswold, Justice
Black wrote that the Ninth Amendment was adopted not to protect "unenumerated" rights but, "as every student of history knows, to assure the people that
the Constitution in all its provisions was intended to limit the Federal Government to the powers granted expressly or by necessary implication." 30 2 The
common rejoinder is that every student of history knows that the Tenth Amendment, not the Ninth, was adopted for that purpose. The Tenth Amendment
refers to undelegatedpowers reserved to the states (or to the people), and thus
addresses the fear of which Justice Black spoke, whereas the Ninth concerns
unenumerated rights retained by the people. Hence, the common rejoinder to
the traditional federalism account is that it renders the Ninth Amendment re3 03
dundant with the Tenth and therefore gives the Ninth no effect whatever.
The second reading is the state law rights thesis, another federalism account, which has been advanced by Russell L. Caplan and embraced by Robert
Bork: The people retain certain rights protected by state constitutions, statutes,
and common law, notwithstanding the enumeration of certain federal constitutional rights in the Constitution.30 4 This thesis, if it had any real force in protecting state law rights, would seem to collide with the Supremacy Clause of
Article VI. 30 5 In fact, it does not, because the rights supposedly protected by
state law against federal denial or disparagement under this thesis are not enforceable against and in no way limit the federal government.
Rather, Caplan and Bork argue that the Ninth Amendment "simply provides
that the individual rights contained in state law are to continue in force under
the Constitution until modified or eliminated by state enactment, by federal
301. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, Introduction: James Madison's Ninth Amendment, in I THE
RIGHTS RETArNED BiYTHE PEoPLE, supra note 18, at 1, 3-19 (distinguishing between the "rights/powers"
conception and the "power constraint" conception of rights, and criticizing the former); Raoul Berger,
The Ninth Amendment, 66 CoRNmu L. REv. 1 (1980), reprinted in 1 THE RIrrrs RETAINED BY THE
PEoPiL, supra note 18, at 191 (advancing the rights/powers conception); Thomas McAffee, The Original Meaning ofthe Ninth Amendment, 90 CoLum. L. REv. 1215 (1990) (defending the "residual rights"
reading).
302. 381 U.S. at 520.
303. See, e.g., ELY, supra.note20, at 34-36; Barnett, supra note 301, at 6-10. But see McAffee,
supra note 301, at 1305-07 (arguing that the "residual rights" reading does not render the Ninth Amendment redundant with the Tenth).
304. BoRc, supra note 3, at 184-85"(citing Russell L. Caplan, The History and Meaning of the
Ninth Amendment, 69 VA. L. REv. 223 (1983), reprintedin 1 THE RIGHrs RErAnED BY Ta PlEoPE,
supra note 18, at 243). Bork also has tried to read the Ninth Amendment (along with the Privileges or

Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment) out of the Constitution with his famous "ink blot"
thesis. See Nomination of Robert H. Bork to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United
States: HearingsBefore the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 249 (1987) (testimony of Judge Robert H. Bork) (analogizing the Ninth Amendment to a text whose meaning cannot be
known because it is covered by an "ink blot"); BoRK, supra note 3, at 166 (likening the Privileges or
Immunities Clause to a provision that has been "obliterated past deciphering by an ink blot").

305. The Supremacy Clause provides: "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof... shall be the Supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in
every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding." U.S. CoNsT. art. VI.
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preemption, or by a judicial determination of unconstitutionality. 30 6 Thus,
Caplan and Bork render the Ninth Amendment pointless on its own terms:
They say that the Ninth Amendment was born of the fear that the federal government might deny or disparage state law rights, yet they also say that the
Ninth Amendment in no way prohibits the federal government from doing pre307
cisely that.
And so, these first two accounts read the Ninth and Tenth Amendments
together to absorb the Ninth into a conception of federalism that obliterates the
idea of "unenumerated" federal constitutional rights. The third reading, illustrated by Akhil Amar, interprets the Ninth Amendment, in conjunction with the
Tenth, to incorporate the Ninth into a conception of popular sovereignty that
practically eviscerates the idea of "unenumerated" fundamental rights central to
personhood that would constitute a realm of personal sovereignty. 308 Amar
argues that when the Ninth Amendment speaks of the rights retained by "the
people," and the Tenth refers to the powers reserved to the states or to "the
people," they use the words "the people" in the sense of "We the People" in the
Preamble. He believes, moreover, that "We the People" refers to popular sovereignty. Hence, he concludes, "the people" in all three instances refers to popular sovereignty. 30 9 And so, far from signaling the existence of
"unenumerated" constitutional rights that limit majoritarian representative democracy, the Ninth and Tenth Amendments together contemplate majoritarian
popular sovereignty practically unconstrained by such rights. As for Amar's
reading of "the people," we should observe that elsewhere in the Bill of Rights
provisions for rights of "the people," such as the Fourth Amendment, refer to
rights of persons instead of to popular sovereignty. 310
306. Caplan, supra note 304, at 228; see Bou, supra note 3, at 184-85 (citing Caplan).
307. Ely aptly put it when he described such a thesis as "silly": "We thus run up against an
inference that seems so silly it would not have needed rebutting. What felt need could there have been
to rebut the inference that the Bill of Rights, controlling only federal action, had somehow preempted
the efforts of the people of various states to control the actions of state governments?" ELY, supra note
20, at 37.
308. See Amar, supra note 284, at 492-93; see also Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a
Constitution, 100 YaLE L.J. 1131, 1199-1201 (1991) (referring to the Ninth and Tenth Amendments as
the "popular sovereignty amendments"). Amar's reading also partly incorporates the Tenth Amendment
and popular sovereignty with federalism. See id. at 1200-01.
309. Amar, supra note 284, at 492-93; see also Amar, supra note 308, at 1200 (referring to the
"obviously collective meaning of 'the people'" in the Tenth and Ninth Amendments).
310. The Fourth Amendment provides: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV.
While arguing that the Fourth Amendment principally protects a collective right, Amar does acknowledge that the "collective reading" is qualified by the appearance of persons in the amendment. Amar,
supra note 308, at 1177; see also Akhil Reed Amar, Some Comments on "The Bill of Rights as a
Constitution," 15 HAxv. J.L. & PUB. PoL'Y, 99, 110 (1992) ("I do not think in the Fourth Amendment
that 'the people' is as strong a phrase as elsewhere, precisely because in this Amendment, but not
elsewhere, the phrase is twice modified by the word 'persons,' which is much more individualistic.").
For a critique of the argument that the Fourth Amendment primarily protects a collective right, see Kate
Stith, The Role of Government Under the Bill of Rights, 15 H~av. J.L. & PUB. PoL'Y 129, 131-32
(1992).
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My strategy is to turn these three accounts on their heads by interpreting the
Ninth and Tenth Amendments together as contemplating a realm of personal
sovereignty. Charles Black argues that we should read and use the Ninth
Amendment to justify constructing a structure of fundamental rights integral to
free and equal citizenship. 311 Ely concedes that the Tenth Amendment "adverts to a tripartite division of decision 'power' - national, local, and individual."' 312 Putting these two ideas together, I argue that the two amendments
justify interpreting the Constitution as a whole to manifest such a tripartite
structural allocation of decision making power. Therefore, they contemplate
retained by or reserved to individuals, in a
that certain fights and powers 3are
13
realm of personal sovereignty.
Of course, it remains to delineate which powers in this tripartite scheme fall
within the domains of national and state sovereignty, and which rights or powers come within personal sovereignty. My general contention is that the core of
the realm of personal sovereignty in our constitutional order is deliberative autonomy over certain fundamental decisions that are central to personhood. In
sum, the Ninth and Tenth Amendments together support a structural justification for securing deliberative autonomy.
2. Deliberative autonomy constitutes an "exit" option: the vanishing
frontier and the growing right of autonomy.
Another structural argument for securing deliberative autonomy is rooted in
the idea that the basic liberties associated with it constitute an "exit" option
from majoritarian oppression. This argument invokes the tradition of dissident
or different individuals and groups having the right to pull up stakes and move

To take another (controversial) example, the Second Amendment provides: "A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall
not be infringed." U.S. CoNsr. amend. II. For readings of the Second Amendment and the Ninth
Amendment to support an individual right to bear arms, see Nicholas J. Johnson, Beyond the Second
Amendment: An Individual Right to Arms Viewed Through the Ninth Amendment, 24 RuTGERs L.J. 1
(1992); Sanford Levinson, The EmbarrassingSecond Amendment, 99 YALE L.J. 637 (1989).
311. BLACK, DECISION, supra note 18, at 53; Black, Ninth, supra note 18, at 347; Black, Unfinished Business, supra note 17, at 44.
312. Ely, supranote 6, at 402-03 (discussing the Ninth and Tenth Amendments and the Privileges
or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, but nonetheless rejecting "the right to be different"). See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) ("Th[e] right of privacy, whether it be founded in the
Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon state action, as we feel it is,
or, as the District Court determined, in the Ninth Amendment's reservation of rights to the people, is
broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy."); see also
Laurence H. Tribe, The Supreme Court, 1972 Term-Foreword: Toward a Model of Roles in the Due
Process ofLife and Law, 87 HA.v. L. Rsv. 1, 10-13, 32 (1973) (advancing a "role-allocation model"
and "personal question doctrine" to justify reservation of rights to persons to decide certain questions).
But see TRIBE, supra note 10, at 1349-50 (partial retraction).
313. I do not intend here to endorse generally the rights/powers conception. Generally, I find the
power constraint conception more compelling. My claim is simply that if the rights/powers conception
has any force in justifying reading the Ninth Amendment to involve powers, then it also has some force
in justifying interpreting the Tenth Amendment to involve rights.
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to the frontier to escape prejudice, intolerance, and oppression, and to pursue
3 14
their own conceptions of the good.
Ely is at pains to maintain, as against arguments for the right to autonomy,
that the Constitution does not protect "the right to be different. '3 15 But he does
derive a right of "dissenting or 'different' " individuals and groups to relocate
through an analysis of the general contours of the Constitution. 3 16 Ely points
out that in Crandall v. Nevada, the Supreme Court justified the "unenumerated" right to travel on the ground that "the right to travel freely through the
various states is critical to the exercise of our more obviously political
rights. ' 3 17 This structural justification links the right to travel with "the idea
that it is some kind of handmaiden of majoritarian democracy," or the "voice"
option.3 18 Ely constructs an alternative structural justification, which associates such a right with "the notion that one should have an option of escaping an
incompatible majority," or the "exit" option. 3 19 Referring to the tradition of the
frontier, he submits that "a dissenting member for whom the 'voice' option
seems unavailing should have the option of exiting and relocating in a community whose values he or she finds more compatible. '320 Thus, Ely claims, the
right manifests a structural concern for protecting "process rights, minority
style.)

32 1

Following Ely's analysis, we should interpret provisions and themes of the
Constitution that relate to the right to relocate, and to the plight of dissenting or
322
different individuals and groups, in light of a line of growth or development.
Thus, we should ponder whether, to the extent that the frontier has diminished,
the right to autonomy has grown and developed. At the present time, the literal
frontier has largely vanished, and we have a plurality of divergent conceptions
of the good in our morally diverse society that individuals and groups might
reasonably entertain and pursue. In such circumstances, an increasingly important analogue to the "exit" option and the tradition of the frontier is the protec323
tion of basic liberties that are preconditions for deliberative autonomy.
These basic liberties constitute a partial "exit" option from majoritarian oppres314. For discussions of the idea of the "frontier" or an "exit" option in constitutional law, see ELY,
supra note 20, at 178-79; H.N. HmscH, A THEORY OF LIBERTY: THE CoNsTrrUIoN AND MINoRrrIIs

243 (1992); Greene, Uncommon, supranote 287, at 672; Greene, Mistakes, supra note 287; see also THE
FRONTIER INAhmaCAN CuT~ruan: ESSAYS BY RICHAR WHrITE AN PATRICIA NELSON LIMERICK (James
R. Grossman ed., 1994).
315. See Ely, supra note 6, at 405 (discussed at text accompanying notes 244-256 supra).
316. See ELY, supra note 20, at 178.

317. See id. (discussing Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1868)).
318. Id. at 179 (referring to the notion of the "voice" option in ALBERT 0. HiRSCHMAN, Exrr,
VOICE, AND LOYALTY (1970)).
319. Id. (referring to the notion of the "exit" option in HIRScM4AN, supra note 318).
320. Id.
321. Id. at 172, 179.
322. See id.at 99, 123.
323. In elaborating the idea of a political conception of justice, Rawls assumes a "closed society"
that members enter only by birth and exit only by death. RAvLs, supra note 7, at 12. In that sense, he
assumes for the sake of simplicity that there is no "exit" option. Bruce Ackerman has criticized Rawls
for making this simplifying assumption. Bruce Ackerman, PoliticalLiberalisms, 91 J. PHIL. 364, 37981 (1994).
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sion because they set aside a figurative "frontier" in which persons, individually and in association with others, may deliberate about and decide how to lead
their own lives. 324 Indeed, historical studies have shown that the development
32 5
of the right of privacy has closely tracked the receding line of the frontier.
This structural argument by analogy to the tradition of the frontier does not
itself settle the question of what basic liberties we should protect to secure an
"exit" option. It might appear that the liberties would be as wild and unruly as
the frontier itself. But the argument is self-limiting in the sense that it supports
protecting only basic liberties that are significant for deliberative autonomy.
After all, it was typically the denial of such significant liberties, not trivial ones,
that prompted individuals and groups to pull up stakes and "exit" to the frontier. In our constitutional democracy, our imperfect souls are our own to craft,
at least with respect to certain fundamental decisions profoundly affecting our
destiny, identity, or way of life.
IV.

RECONCEIVING THE

DuE

PRocEss INQUIRY: BETWEEN ScALIA

AND CHARYBDIS

In this Part, I turn from the theoretical underpinnings of deliberative autonomy to the doctrinal heading of substantive due process, which has served as
the primary textual basis for recognizing or rejecting "unenumerated" fundamental rights such as those on the foregoing list.326 First, I argue for reconceiving the due process inquiry in terms of constitutional constructivism's
criterion of the significance of an asserted "unenumerated" fundamental right
for deliberative autonomy. Second, I attempt to bring a sense of order and
discipline to judgments about the significance of certain rights for deliberative
autonomy through exploring homologies between the structure of deliberative
autonomy and that of deliberative democracy.
The Rational Continuum of OrderedLiberty: Reconceiving the Due
Process Inquiry in Terms of Significancefor Deliberative
Autonomy
1. Due process from Palko to Bowers: the flightfrom aspirational
principles to historicalpractices.
Between Palko, Griswold, and Roe, on the one hand, and Bowers, on the
other, an important change occurred in the Supreme Court's conception of the
A.

324. For the idea of religious exemptions from general laws as a "partial" exit option, see Greene,
Uncommon, supra note 286, at 672; Greene, Mistakes, supra note 286.
325. See Robert F. Copple, Privacyand the FrontierThesis: An American Intersectionof Self and

Society, 34 AM. J. Juius. 87 (1989).
326. See note 27 supra and accompanying text. There are numerous other manifestations of substantive values on the face of the Constitution. Deliberative autonomy better fits and justifies those
substantive values than do process-perfecting theories such as Ely's and Sunstein's. See Fleming, supra
note 7, at 233-35, 256-60; see also text accompanying notes 76-84 supra. For an account of the Bill of
Rights as a "structural whole" that is a poem about human freedom and dignity, not merely a processoriented scheme, see Burt Neubome, Reading the Bill of Rights as a Poem (Jan. 26, 1995) (unpublished
manuscript on file with the Stanford Law Review). But see Amar, supra note 308 (offering a holistic
process-oriented reading).
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due process inquiry. The Court moved from considering whether an asserted
"unenumerated" fundamental right is "of the very essence of a scheme of ordered liberty, 3 2z 7 or is required by a "principle ofjustice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental,"3 2 8 to
considering only whether it historically has been protected against governmental interference. 32 9 To fix ideas: The former cases call for an inquiry into
traditions conceived as aspirationalprinciples,while the latter case makes an
inquiry into traditions understood as historical practices, narrowly conceived. 330 That is, between Palko and Bowers, the Court took a flight from
aspirational principles to historical practices in its understanding of what constitutes a tradition and therefore of the baseline for what due process requires. 33 1 Between these two conceptions of the due process inquiry lie two
other famous formulations of it: Justice Powell's formulation for the plurality
in Moore, "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition," 332 and Justice
Harlan's formulation in his dissent in Poe, a "rational continuum" of liberty
that views tradition as a "living thing. ' 3 3 3
Palko, Griswold,and Roe conceived due process as encompassing the basic
liberties implicit in a scheme of ordered liberty embodied in our Constitutionor the fundamental principles of justice to which we as a people aspire and for
which we as a people stand ("aspirational principles")-whether or not we actually have realized them in our historical practices, common law, and statute
books (collectively, "historical practices"). 334 On this view, our aspirational
principles may be critical of our historical practices, and our basic liberties and
327. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937); see Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,
484-85 (1965) (eschewing substantive due process officially but still protecting an "unenumerated" right
to privacy because several "specific" constitutional guarantees "have penumbras, formed by emanations
from those guarantees that help give them life and substance," that "create zones of privacy"); Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973) (applying Cardozo's formulation in Palko in protecting an
"unenumerated" right of a woman to decide whether to terminate a preguancy).
328. Palko, 302 U.S. at 325 (citations omitted).
329. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 192-94 (1986).
330. I do not claim that the Due Process Clause incorporates all ofjustice, or that due process is
purely aspirational principles as opposed to historical practices, or indeed that the Court ever has fulfilled the promise of the Palko formulation. Rather, I claim that the Court has altered its conception of
the due process inquiry.
331. I put to one side the question of whether the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment (or, for that matter, the First Amendment) provides a firmer ground for protecting
substantive liberties than the Due Process Clause. See, eg., Robert J. Kaczorowski, Revolutionary Constitutionalism in the Era of the Civil War and Reconstruction, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 863, 925-28 (1986)
(arguing that the privileges and immunities of citizenship comprehended by the Fourteenth Amendment
provide a principled basis for protecting rights that are essential to the enjoyment of life, liberty, and
property); Karst, supra note 204 (arguing for a right of "intimate association" on the basis of not only
the Due Process Clause but also the Equal Protection Clause and the First Amendment); text accompanying notes 198-226 supra.
332. Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (plurality opinion). I have discussed Justice Powell's formulation elsewhere. See Fleming, supra note 7, at 268-70.
333. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961) (dissenting opinion). I discuss Justice Harlan's
formulation below. See text accompanying notes 346-364 infra.
334. See Somuos A. BARBER, ON WHAT =rECoNs'nrtoN MEa~s 84-85 (1984) (drawing a
similar distinction between history and tradition); id. at 33-37, 54-62 (making a similar analysis of
constitutional aspirations); see also Frank I. Michelman, Super Liberal: Romance, Community, and Tradition in William J. Brennan, Jr.'sConstitutional Thought, 77 VA. L. Pnv. 1261, 1312-20 (1991) (dis-
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traditions are not merely the Burkean deposit of historical practices. Cases
such as Griswold and Roe, as well as Boiling v. Sharpe and Loving, broke from
historical practices in pursuit of due process and traditions in the sense of as335
pirational principles.
In Bolling, Chief Justice Warren wrote, "[c]lassifications based solely upon
race must be scrutinized with particular care, since they are contrary to our
traditions and hence constitutionally suspect." 336 Warren's argument necessarily presupposes a conception of traditions as aspirational principles, given our
shameful history of slavery and historical practices of enacting laws that drew
classifications based solely upon race, even after the ratification of the Civil
War Amendments and Reconstruction. Similarly, Warren's statement in Loving, that "[t]he freedom to marry has long been recognized as one of the vital
personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men," 337
necessarily reflects a conception of aspirational principles, given our shameful
historical practice of enacting statutes forbidding interracial marriage.
In Bowers, by contrast, the Court per Justice White narrowly conceived the
due process inquiry as a backward-looking question concerning historical practices, stripped of virtually any aspirational force or critical bite with respect to
the status quo. White simply recounted our nation's historical practices disapproving homosexual sodomy and rudely dismissed the claim that the Due Process Clause protects a fundamental right of homosexuals to engage in acts of
consensual sodomy as, "at best, facetious. '338 In fact, even his view of history
was narrow and selective. As Justice Stevens stressed in dissent, White flagrantly ignored that the common law and statutes historically condemned all
339
sodomy, both homosexual and heterosexual.
Justice Scalia's plurality opinion in Michael H. v. Gerald D. represents an
attempt to narrow the Bowers due process inquiry even further, to limit substantive due process to include only those rights that actually have been protected through historical practices, common law, and statutes. 340 Scalia pitches
tinguishing between tradition as historical practice and tradition as abstract norms in analyzing tradition
in Justice Brennan's constitutional jurisprudence).
335. See note 327 supra (discussing Griswold and Roe). To be sure, Boiling and Loving involved
equal protection as well as due process, but that supports my thesis that the two clauses overlap and are
intertwined. See note 61 supra.
336. Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954) (companion case to Brown).
337. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
338. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 192-94 (1986). In dissent, Justice Blackmun criticized

Justice White's formulation of the right at issue, arguing that the case instead was about "'the most
comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men,' namely, 'the right to be let
alone.' "1d. at 199 (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)). For a critique of Bowers' conception of the due process inquiry as "authoritarian" as distinguished from "self-revisionary" (which parallels my distinction between "historical practices" and
"aspirational principles"), see Michelman, Law's Republic, supra note 151, at 1496, 1514.
339. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 214-16 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
340. 491 U.S. 110, 123-27 & 127 n.6 (1989) (plurality opinion); see also Cruzan v. Director, Mo.
Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 294 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("[N]o 'substantive due process'
claim can be maintained unless the claimant demonstrates that the State has deprived him of a right
historically and traditionally protected against state interference."). Scalia's approach is a novel statist
methodology that is more radical than has been generally recognized. See Benjamin C. Zipursky, The
Pedigrees of Rights and Powers in Scalia's Cruzan Concurrence,56 U. Prr-r. L. REv. 283, 287, 299-
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the issue in apocalyptic terms of destruction and salvation. If the Court uses
the Due Process Clause to try to protect the citizenry from "irrationality and
oppression," he warns, "it will destroy itself."34 1 For the ghost of Lochner
lurks. 34 2 By contrast, he declaims, "Our salvation is the Equal Protection
Clause, which requires the democratic majority to accept
for themselves and
'343
their loved ones what they impose on you and me.
To avoid the destruction that he fears would follow in the wake of engaging
in reasoned judgment concerning aspirational principles-veering into the
whirlpool of liberty as unbounded license-Scalia steers into the rock of liberty
as "hidebound" historical practices and narrowly conceived original understanding. As Justice Brennan aptly put it in his dissent in Michael H.: "The
document that the plurality construes today is unfamiliar to me. It is not the
living charter that I have taken to be our Constitution; it is instead a stagnant,
archaic, hidebound document steeped in the prejudices and superstitions of a
time long past."'344 Brennan had taken our Constitution to be one of aspirational principles.
In Casey, the joint opinion rejected Scalia's Michael H. jurisprudence, resisting the "temptation" to take such a flight from substantive liberties to original understanding, narrowly conceived, or from aspirational principles to
historical practices. 345 It instead accepted Justice Harlan's approach to due
346
process in dissent in Poe and concurrence in Griswold.
2. Reconceiving Justice Harlan s rationalcontinuum of ordered liberty
in terms of deliberative autonomy.
Justice Harlan conceived the liberty guaranteed by the Due Process Clause
as a "rational continuum" of ordered liberty, not merely as a "series of isolated
points pricked out" in the constitutional document. Furthermore, he understood
judgment in this area as a "rational process" that views tradition as a "living
thing"-"[w]hat history teaches are the traditions from which [this country]
developed as well as the traditions from which it broke" - not as a mechanical
process of formulas or bright-line rules. 347 The joint opinion in Casey con-

ceived the due process inquiry as requiring "reasoned judgment" in interpreting
304, 310 (1994) (arguing that Scalia applies a "power pedigree principle": "whether the state's asserted

power is an instance of some state power that is historically and traditionally protected").
341. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 300-01.
342. See Fleming, supra note 7,at 211-14 (analyzing the "ghost" or "specter" of Lochner that is
haunting constitutional theory).
343. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 300.
344. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 141 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
345. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2804-06 (1992). For discussion of the debate
in Casey between the joint opinion and Justice Scalia concerning the opposing "temptations" to abdicate
responsibility and to seize power, see Fleming, supra note 7, at 214 n.14.
346. 112 S. Ct. at 2805-06. Thus, Casey to some extent replays the great debate concerning
constitutional interpretation from Griswold, with the joint opinion playing Harlan to Scalia's Black. See
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 499 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring); id. at 507 (Black, J., dissenting); David B. Anders, Note, Justices Harlan andBlack Revisited: The EmergingDispute Between
Justice O'Connor and Justice Scalia over UnenumeratedFundamentalRights, 61 FonRDM L. REv.
895 (1993).
347. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542-43 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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the Constitution, understood as a "covenant" or "coherent succession" whose
"written terms embody ideas and aspirations that must survive more ages than
one" and guarantee "the promise of liberty. ' 348 It stated: "We accept our responsibility not to retreat from interpreting the full meaning of the covenant in
light of all of our precedents. 3 49
Constitutional constructivism provides a guiding framework within which
to fulfill the responsibility not to retreat from interpreting the full meaning of
our covenant of aspirational principles. Only through such a holistic reading of
the Constitution can we guarantee the promise of liberty rather than merely
enforcing historical practices that may have failed to live up to that promise. In
particular, we should reconceive Harlan's and the Casey joint opinion's approach to due process along the lines of a constructivist criterion of significance
for deliberative autonomy or deliberative democracy. Here, I focus on deliber350
ative autonomy.
Justice Harlan's dissent in Poe represents a classic formulation of the due
process inquiry. Nowadays, liberal and conservative fundamental rights theorists alike, from Laurence Tribe to Charles Fried, celebrate it,35 1 perhaps because it offers a safe harbor from the narrow originalism of Scalia or Bork. Put
another way, Harlan's approach epitomizes a preservative conservatism as distinguished from the counterrevolutionaryconservatism of Scalia and Bork.352
Indeed, consider this dramatic testimony concerning how far constitutional law
and theory have traveled since Harlan died in 1971: He, the most conservative
member of the Warren Court, has become the last best hope of liberal theorists
such as Tribe during the era of the Rehnquist Court, as well as the target of an
acerbic attack in Casey by Justice Scalia,35 3 the most conservative member of
the Rehnquist Court.
With all due respect, Justice Harlan's formulation of the due process inquiry suffers from two fundamental shortcomings. Consider his conceptions of
348. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2806, 2833.
349. Id. at 2833; see also id. at 2804-06 (resisting the "temptation" to abdicate the responsibility
to engage in "reasoned judgment" in the due process inquiry).
350. Typically, the Court does not use the Due Process Clause to derive "unenumerated" rights
that are preconditions for deliberative democracy; instead, it uses the First Amendment and Equal Protection Clause or, implicitly, the Republican Form of Government Clause. See ELY, supra note 20, at
122-23.

351. See CARi.as FnjED, ODERt AND LAw 72 (1991); TRIBE & DoRi,

supra note 294, at 76-79,

116-17. It is interesting to note that Fried was Harlan's law clerk during the term that Poe was before
the Court.

352. Preservative conservatives mostly attempt to preserve precedents and principles-rather than
immediately overruling decisions that they, as an original matter, might have decided differentlyperhaps conservatively developing those precedents and principles in subsequent cases rather than liberally expanding them. Counterrevolutionary conservatives seek to purge constitutional law of precedents
and principles manifesting liberal error at the earliest available opportunity or-if they do not have the
votes to do so-to reinterpret decisions so as to extirpate any generative force from them. See Anders,
supra note 346, at 924-26 (contrasting the preservative conservatism of O'Connor with the counterrevolutionary conservatism of Scalia); Zipursky, supra note 340, at 291-304, 310, 318-21 (contrasting the
conservative jurisprudence of Justices Harlan and O'Connor with the statist jurisprudence of Scalia).
353. For Scalia's attack on "reasoned judgment," see Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct.
2791, 2875-76, 2884 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
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what the Constitution is and how it ought to be interpreted. 354 Harlan rightly
conceived the Constitution as a "constitution of principle" (for him, basically
common law principles) as opposed to a "constitution of detail. '355 And he
rightly understood interpretation of the Constitution as a rational process of
reasoned judgment as opposed to a mechanical process of bright-line rules. But
his "common law constitution," to be explained below, is not fully a construc356
tivist "constitution of principle."
First, as for what the Constitution is, Harlan believed that a rational continuum of ordered liberty embodied in the Constitution provided the baseline for
deciding what our "living" traditions are. But Harlan conceived ordered liberty
by reference to what liberties have been protected through the historical deposit
of common law principles (the "common law constitution"). Thus, he insufficiently appreciated that our Constitution reflects a scheme of ordered liberty
that provides an alternative baseline of aspirational principles, which may fit
and justify most of our historical practices, common law, and statutes but will
criticize some of them. The basic reason for this shortcoming is that Harlan's
understanding of what constitutes a tradition is too traditionalist and not sufficiently aspirational or critical. The case of Harlan is evidence that tradition is
too important to be left to the traditionalists.
Second, as for how to interpret the Constitution, Harlan believed that judgment in the due process inquiry is a rational process concerning tradition as a
"living thing." But he did not adequately frame the questions of what are our
traditions and what are the traditions from which we have broken as distinguished from those which have survived. The basic guideline that he offered is
the promise of the ineffable sound judgment or reason of a "first-rate common
lawyer. '35 7 Alexander M. Bickel hardly did any better in formulating such
questions, asking: "Which values... qualify as sufficiently important or fundamental or whathaveyou ... . ,358 Hence, Harlan and Bickel were relatively
easy prey for Ely's well-known critique of tradition, consensus, and reason as
3 59
sources of substantive fundamental values in constitutional interpretation.
Constitutional constructivism would reconceive the due process inquiry to
redress these two shortcomings. First, it would reconstruct Harlan's idea of the
rational continuum of ordered liberty embodied in the common law constitution
354. For an analysis of constitutional interpretation on the basis of the fundamental interrogatives
what and how, along with the interrogative who may authoritatively interpret the Constitution, see MuRPHY, FLEMING & BARBEiR, supra note 142, at 16-19.
355. DwoiucN, supra note 36, at 119-22, 126-29; see Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961)
(Harlan, J., dissenting).
356. For a characterization and critique of Harlan's conception of the Constitution as a "common

law constitution," see Bruce Ackerman, The Common Law Constitution of John MarshallHarlan, 36
N.Y.L. ScH. L. Rav. 5 (1991).
357. Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Supreme Court, 1958 Term-Foreword: The Time Chart of the
Justices, 73 HAv. L. Ray. 84, 101 (1959) ("first-rate lawyers"); see Poe, 367 U.S. at 542 ("The best
that can be said is that through the course of this Court's decisions [due process] has represented the
balance which our Nation, built upon postulates of respect for the liberty of the individual, has struck
between that liberty and the demands of organized society.").
358. BICKEL, supra note 149, at 55.
359. See ELY, supra note 20, at 43-72.
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with the idea of a constructivist constitution of principle underwritten by a substantive political theory that best fits and justifies the constitutional document
and underlying constitutional order as a whole. That substantive political theory articulates a scheme of ordered liberty to which our Constitution aspires,
through the two fundamental themes of deliberative autonomy and deliberative
democracy. Thus, the constructivist constitution of principle reflects a scheme
of ordered liberty that provides a baseline of aspirational principles, centering
on those two themes, which may fit and justify most of our historical practices,
common law, and statutes but will criticize some of them for failing to live up
to our constitutional commitments. 360 If equal protection embodies a forwardlooking anticaste principle, criticizing historical practices that flout our aspirations to equality, due process should secure a forward-looking antitotalitarian
inprinciple, criticizing historical practices that deny the promise of liberty,
3 61
stead of merely safeguarding backward-looking historical practices.
Second, constitutional constructivism would reconstruct Harlan's idea of
judgment as a rational process concerning tradition as a "living thing" with a
criterion of the significance of an asserted "unenumerated" fundamental right
for deliberative autonomy. Such a criterion better frames the due process inquiry-concerning what our "living" traditions are and what are the historical
practices from which we have broken or are breaking-by focusing it on the
question of what are the significant preconditions for deliberative autonomy in
our scheme of ordered liberty. Harlan's more formal and traditionalist formulation basically looked to common law principles for the sake of carrying them
on without offering a substantive account of what our basic liberties are or what
they are for. Also, the criterion of significance for deliberative autonomy better
fits and justifies the "unenumerated" fundamental rights on the foregoing list
than does Harlan's formulation. 362 For example, it is more plausible to argue
that we should protect the right to decide whether to terminate a pregnancy, the
right to homosexual intimate association, and the right to die in order to secure
deliberative autonomy than to contend that we should do so to safeguard longstanding yet evolving common law principles.
The joint opinion in Casey embraced Harlan's formulation of the due process inquiry in attempting to account for what the Court has done in this
360. Cf SuNsrTrN, supra note 21, at 353 (referring to the "right baseline" provided by a suitably
constructed normative political theory). It is important to remember that constitutional constructivism is
not a theory of natural law or natural rights. See text accompanying notes 86-91 supra. Instead, it draws
our aspirational principles from our constitutional democracy's ongoing practice, tradition, and culture.
These principles may not be fully realized in (and certainly are not exhausted by) our historical
practices.
361. See Fleming, supra note 7, at 263-64, 267-68, 273-75 (criticizing Sunstein's argument that
the Equal Protection Clause is forward-looking and critical of existing practices, and that the Due Process Clause is largely backward-looking and supportive of long-standing practices).
362. See note 27 supra and accompanying text. Constitutional constructivism may be a grander
theory than Harlan's approach (or Bickel's), but it would be less vulnerable to democratic and skeptical
objections (such as those advanced by Ely) to theories of protecting substantive fundamental rights. See
text accompanying note 359 supra. I have addressed such matters in James E. Fleming, Constitutional
Constructivism (1988) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton University) (on file with the Stanford
Law Review).
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area. 363 But we should distinguish Harlan's formulation both from how he
himself would have applied it and from how the joint opinion in Casey in fact
used it. For it is unlikely that he himself would have applied his method to
reach many of the due process decisions that the Court handed down between
Griswold and Casey.364 Yet the joint opinion used his formulation to make
sense of those decisions. Indeed, the joint opinion's account of decisions protecting substantive liberties such as decisional autonomy and bodily integrity
has more in common with the justification that constitutional constructivism
provides for them than with the view that Harlan's method would offer. Put
another way, the practice of applying a method like Harlan's, over time, has led
to lines of cases that are themselves better fit and justified, retrospectively, on
the basis of a criterion of significance for deliberative autonomy. In sum, constitutional constructivism's criterion for framing the due process inquiry is
superior, retrospectively and prospectively, to Harlan's more formal and traditionalist methodology.
3. Between Scalia and Charybdis.
Constitutional constructivism's guiding framework, with its criterion of significance for deliberative autonomy, would chart a middle course between
Scalia-the rock of liberty as hidebound historical practices-and Charybdis-the whirlpool of liberty as unbounded license-in the due process inquiry. 365 Haunted by the ghost of Lochner, Scalia writes ominously about the
dangers that judicial protection of basic liberties through the Due Process
Clause, which he finds dangerously unbounded, poses for destruction. 366 But
we need to recall that veering into either the rock or the whirlpool brings destruction. Tethering the due process inquiry to the structure of deliberative autonomy might help stem the Court's flight from aspirational principles to
historical practices in this area.
363. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2805-06 (1992).
364. As stated in the text, we should distinguish between Harlan's due process methodology and
his own application of it. For example, both Fried and Tribe and Dorf claim to apply Harlan-like meth-

odologies to conclude that Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), was wrongly decided, despite the
fact that Harlan, in his dissent in Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 546 (1961), specifically contemplated
that states had the power to outlaw homosexual conduct (and, for that matter, the use of contraceptives).
See FRIED, supra note 351, at 81-85; TRiuE & DoF, supra note 294, at 76-79, 116-17. White's opinion
for the Court in Bowers observes that whereas in 1961 all 50 states outlawed sodomy, by 1986 only 24
states continued to provide cnminal penalties for sodomy performed in private and between consenting
adults. 478 U.S. at 193-94. That legal transformation from 1961 to 1986 suggests a tradition from
which we are breaking, to paraphrase Harlan's dissent in Poe, 367 U.S. at 542 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Harlan wrote in 1961, before the tradition that by his account is a "living thing" began to evolve.
Thus, Tribe and Dorf have sought to save Harlan's formulation from how he himself would have
applied it. While I applaud their effort and accept its soundness and prudence, I would supplement it by
putting forward the criterion of significance for deliberative autonomy. That criterion, though not hostile toward Harlan's formulation, suggests a more focused inquiry and one that is more critical of our
historical practices on the basis of our aspirational principles.
365. I assume (or concede) that Harlan and the joint opinion in Casey also chart a middle course.
But I contend that constitutional constructivism's guiding framework charts a superior middle course.
366. See notes 341-343 supra and accompanying text.
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Constitutional constructivism does not advocate writing on a blank slate
concerning significance for deliberative autonomy. It calls for working within
our ongoing constitutional democracy, which has a long-standing practice and
tradition of protecting "unenumerated" fundamental rights that are essential to
our "scheme of ordered liberty"3 67 or to the "orderly pursuit of happiness. ' 368
In the first instance, my project here is retrospective, contending that a criterion
such as significance for deliberative autonomy accounts for why the categories
of personal decisions encompassed by the foregoing list of "unenumerated"
fundamental rights are indeed fundamental and should be on the list.369 That
established, my proposal is prospective, arguing for using such a criterion in
further specifying the basic liberties presupposed by our constitutional document and underlying constitutional order. Needless to say, offering a criterion
of significance will not resolve all questions of the scope and content of the
basic liberties associated with deliberative autonomy, or concerning the governmental interests that may justify regulating such liberties in particular circumstances. It will, however, help frame and guide our reflections and judgments
concerning those questions, which can be resolved only as they arise.
And so, applying the constructivist guiding framework in giving content to
our rational continuum of ordered liberty, we should interpret the Constitution
to secure the basic liberties that are significant preconditions for deliberative
autonomy (to say nothing of deliberative democracy). By interpreting the Constitution in this manner, to recall the joint opinion in Casey, we would not
abdicate the responsibility to give full meaning to our constitution of principle,
370
a covenant of aspirations and ideals guaranteeing the promise of liberty.
B.

Exploring Homologies Regarding Significance for Deliberative
Democracy and DeliberativeAutonomy
1. Homologies between the structures of FirstAmendment and
substantive due process jurisprudences.

Many constitutional theorists and judges assume that democracy and the
First Amendment are relatively grounded and settled compared to autonomy
and substantive due process, which they regard as free-for-alls that are anathema to constitutional law. They may fear that engaging in "reasoned judgment" concerning which "unenumerated" fundamental rights are significant for
deliberative autonomy is, as Scalia put it in dissent in Casey, indistinguishable
from "Lochnering" or imposing one's own "philosophical predilection[s] and
moral intuition[s]" in the guise of interpreting the Constitution.37 1 Using constitutional constructivism's guiding framework with two fundamental themes,
367. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
368. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).

369. See note 27 supra and accompanying text. The criterion of significance also can account for
why certain other asserted rights are not on the list. See texts accompanying notes 246-254, 257-266
supra.
370. See text accompanying notes 348-349 supra.
371. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2883, 2884 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring in
the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
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however, I attempt to domesticate supposedly wild and unruly judgments about
significance for deliberative autonomy to constitutional law through exploring
homologies between the structure of First Amendment jurisprudence and that
of substantive due process jurisprudence. 3 72 I contend that First Amendment
jurisprudence's refusal to protect certain categories of expression and protection of other expression is a mirror image of substantive due process jurisprudence's protection of certain categories of decision and refusal to protect other
decisions. I also suggest that these jurisprudences are illuminatingly seen as
efforts to cabin comprehensive principles of autonomy by constructing
frameworks requiring judgments concerning significance for deliberative democracy and deliberative autonomy, respectively. For autonomy theories in
these areas of constitutional law push toward protecting all expression and all
decisions.
Using the guiding framework to bring out such homologies between the
First Amendment and substantive due process, or between deliberative democracy and deliberative autonomy, will not itself decide any concrete cases. But
it will suggest coherence and structure in the substantive due process inquiry,
an area where many have persisted in seeing only periodic interventions by
free-wheeling philosopher-judges. Moreover, using the framework will illuminate the structural role of deliberative autonomy in our constitutional democracy in relation to that of deliberative democracy.
Firstfundamental case: the insignificance of categories of unprotected expressionfor deliberative democracy. Our First Amendment jurisprudence has
distinguished two levels of expression-high value and low value speech--on
the basis of judgments about its significance for securing a scheme of deliberative democracy. 373 Rather than making case-by-case judgments about the significance or value of particular expression, however, the Supreme Court has
recognized certain categories of unprotected expression, in advance, as relatively insignificant.374 These categories have included fighting words, obscen-

372. By "homology," I simply mean symmetry in the structures of these two bodies of constitutional law. See note 131 supra. For a somewhat analogous attempt to apply doctrinal structures of the
First Amendment to the Takings Clause, see Epstein, supra note 260, at 47-59.
I do not adopt the view that the First Amendment is solely concerned with process to the exclusion
of substance, or with deliberative democracy to the exclusion of deliberative autonomy. Freedom of
thought and expression are important for deliberative autonomy as well as for deliberative democracy. I
simply am making observations about the structure of First Amendment jurisprudence in relation to that
of substantive due process jurisprudence.
373. See, e.g., TRmE, supra note 10, at 832-944 (discussing "two-level" theory of freedom of
speech based on the Court's assessment of its relative value); see also Harry Kalven, Jr., The Metaphysics of the Law of Obscenity, 1960 Sup. CT. Ray. 1, 10. More than anyone else on the Court today,
Justice Stevens appreciates the centrality of judgments of significance in First Amendment jurisprudence. See, eg., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377,421 (1992) (Stevens, J., concurring) ("Speech
about public officials or matters of public concern receives greater protection than speech about other
topics. It can, therefore, scarcely be said that the regulation of expressive activity cannot be predicated
on its content: Much of our First Amendment jurisprudence is premised on the assumption that content

makes a difference.").
374. See, e.g., ELY, supra note 20, at 105-16; CAss P. SuNsrmrN, DEMOCRACY AND T
OF FREE SPEEcH 8-11, 121-29 (1993).
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ity, libel, and incitement to imminent lawless action.37 5 All of them are
relatively insignificant for securing a scheme of deliberative democracy (or for
the development and exercise of the first moral power in the first fundamental
case 376 ).

Under such a two-level framework, the Court applies most exacting scrutiny to laws that restrict or regulate expression that is outside these categories
of unprotected or insignificant expression: This is the domain of the "absolute"
First Amendment. 377 Within the unprotected categories, the Court generally
applies less stringent scrutiny to laws that restrict or regulate expression. 378
Moreover, Ely and Sunstein, leading theorists advocating reinforcing representative democracy or securing deliberative democracy, have advanced such twotier frameworks, arguing that they serve the central function of the First
Amendment: maintaining democracy. 379 Thus, a criterion like significance for
deliberative democracy has informed First Amendment jurisprudence.
Secondfundamental case: the significance of categories ofprotected decisions for deliberative autonomy. Likewise, our substantive due process jurisprudence has distinguished two levels of decisions on the basis of judgments
about their significance for securing a scheme of deliberative autonomy: unusually important decisions, which are significant for that purpose, and less
important decisions, which are relatively insignificant or of no significance for
it. Rather than making case-by-case judgments about the significance or value
of particular decisions, however, the Court has recognized certain categories of
protected decisions, in advance, as relatively significant. These categories
have included most of the decisions encompassed by the foregoing list of
"unenumerated" fundamental rights. 380 All of them are unusually important or
significant for securing a scheme of deliberative autonomy (or for the development and exercise of the second moral power in the second fundamental case).
Applying such a two-level framework, the Court applies more exacting
scrutiny to laws that restrict or regulate decisions that come within (most of)
these categories of protected or significant decisions: This is the realm of personal sovereignty to make certain fundamental decisions, reserved to or re375. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) (obscenity); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444
(1969) (incitement to imminent lawless action); New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964)
(libel); Beauhamais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952) (group libel); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315
U.S. 568 (1942) (fighting words). Admittedly, these categories have eroded over time, partly due to the

pressure of autonomy and neutrality theories. See SUNMSTEN, supra note 374, at 137-44, 167-208 (defending a two-tier conception of the First Amendment and criticizing autonomy-based conceptions and
some neutrality conceptions); TRma, supra note 10, at 832-944.
376. See RAwLS, supra note 7, at 336; text accompanying notes 106-109 supra.
377. See, e.g., ELY, supra note 20, at 109-11.

378. But see R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391-92 (1992) (extending prohibition on
content discrimination and more stringent scrutiny to apply within traditionally unprotected category of
fighting words). Content-neutral time, place, and manner regulations, erosion of the categories of unprotected expression, and the development of an intermediate level of protection for commercial speech
add complications to this scheme. See TRmE, supra note 10, at 789-94, 890-904.
379. See ELY, supranote 20, at 105-16; SuNm
, supra note 21, at 232-56; SuNsTE=N, supra note

374, at 121-29.
380. See note 27 supra and accompanying text.
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tained by persons, that the government may not enter. 38 1 Outside these
protected categories, the Court generally applies relatively lenient scrutiny to
laws that restrict or regulate liberty and conduct.33 2 Thus, a criterion like significance for deliberative autonomy has informed substantive due process
jurisprudence.
2. The language and design of deliberative democracy and deliberative
autonomy.
Some narrow originalists might object to my sketch of First Amendment
and substantive due process jurisprudences as mirror images of each other.
They might argue that the former secures "enumerated" rights, whereas the
latter protects "unenumerated" rights.
Constitutional constructivism has two main responses. First, as argued
above, the basic liberties that underwrite deliberative autonomy, liberty of conscience and freedom of association, like freedom of expression, have firm First
Amendment roots. 383 Second, none of the categories of unprotected expression
is "enumerated" in the language of the First Amendment; the judgments that
these types of expression are relatively insignificant for deliberative democracy
are instead rooted in inferences of substantive political theory from the underlying structure or design of deliberative democracy.3 84 Likewise, none of the
categories of protected decisions is "enumerated" in the language of the Due
Process Clauses; but the judgments that these types of decisions are significant
for deliberative autonomy are rooted in inferences of substantive political theory from the underlying structure or design of deliberative autonomy. 385
Overblown distinctions between "enumerated" and "unenumerated" rights
aside, are there any relevant differences between the First Amendment and sub381. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791,2805 (1992); id.at 2846 (Blackmun,
J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part).
382. I put to one side the complications introduced by the Court's development of intermediate

levels of scrutiny, undue burden tests, and the like.
383. See text accompanying notes 198-215 supra.
384. Nor are these judgments readily made by studying historical facts in the narrow, neutral way
that Scalia and Bork contemplate. See Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2884 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment
in part and dissenting in part); BoRy, supranote 3, at 139-60, 176-78, 213-14. They can be made only
through elaborating a substantive political theory of the Constitution.
385. Remarkably, the theorists who have the most difficulty with the idea of making judgments
about the significance of certain types of decisions in the substantive due process area are not uncommonly the ones who have the least difficulty with the idea of making judgments about the significance
of certain types of expression in the First Amendment area. Ely and Bork come to mind as leading
examples. Bork would limit the language of the "enumerated" First Amendment to protecting political
speech on the basis of inferences from the structure of a republican form of government, from which he
would also derive the "unenumerated" right to vote, notwithstanding his attacks (a mere 10 pages later)
on the right to privacy for being "unenumerated." See BoRu, supra note 3, at 85-87, 95-100; Robert H.
Bork, Neutral Principlesand Some FirstAmendment Problems, 47 IND. LJ. 1, 19-35 (1971). But see
BornK, supra note 3, at 333 (stating that he "later abandoned" the position that the Constitution protects
only political speech, not because it "was not true, but because it results in an unworkable rule"). Similarly, Ely would construe the language of the First Amendment principally to protect political expression
because it is "critical to the functioning of an open and effective democratic process," despite his critique of theories of protecting "unenumerated" substantive fundamental rights on the ground that they
require judgments concerning what rights are fundamental or important. See ELY, supra note 20, at 4372, 87-88, 93-94, 105.
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stantive due process with respect to judgments regarding significance? Some
narrow originalists would summon the specter of Lochner in an attempt to
frighten us away from substantive due process, as Justice White did in Bowers,
arguing that asserted liberties associated with deliberative autonomy have "lit'38 6
tle or no cognizable roots in the language or design of the Constitution.
They would claim that the specter of Lochner haunts substantive due process
but not the First Amendment.3 87 That putative difference, however, is deeply
problematic. For those, such as Scalia, who most vociferously decry "Lochnering" in substantive due process jurisprudence are often the ones who most vig388
orously engage in "Lochnering" in First Amendment jurisprudence.
Obviously, complex issues lurk here concerning what was wrong with Lochner.
that the judiciary gave heightened protection to "unenumerated" fundamental
rights as such (White's and Scalia's view), or that the judiciary treated the
status quo of existing distributions of wealth and political power as a prepolitical state of nature, or neutral baseline, and therefore held that interfering with it
.was an impermissibly partisan objective (Sunstein's and my view). I have purarguing that securing deliberative autonomy does
sued these matters elsewhere,
' 389
not involve "Lochnering.
Thus, First Amendment jurisprudence and substantive due process jurisprudence do not differ in any way that undercuts my homology. Both are derived
from "enumerated" rights along with underlying structures. Constitutional interpretation in both areas involves structural reasoning, not just textual exegesis
or historical research concerning isolated clauses. Carrying forward the unfinished business of Charles Black, we would become more literate concerning the
language and design of the Constitution by comprehending that the basic liberties associated with both deliberative democracy and deliberative
autonomy
390
have structural roles to play in our constitutional scheme.
Furthermore, this analysis illustrates that carving out categories of unprotected expression, like recognizing categories of protected decisions, requires
386. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 194 (1986).
387. But see SuNsrmN, supra note 21, at 84-85, 223-24 (arguing that the legacy of Lochner
includes First Amendment decisions such as Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976)); accord RAwIs,
supra note 7, at 362; Fleming, supranote 7, at 241,246-48; see also Mark Tushnet, An Essay on Rights,
62 TEx. L. REv. 1363, 1387 (1984) ("The first amendment has replaced the due process clause as the
primary guarantor of the privileged."). In Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,48-49 (1976), the Court struck
down certain campaign finance restrictions on the ground that "the concept that government may restrict
the speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly
foreign to the First Amendment." According to Sunstein, Buckley is part of the legacy of Lochner
because it evinces status quo neutrality in the sense that the Court treats the status quo of existing
distributions of wealth and po!itical power as a neutral, prepolitical state of nature and therefore holds
that interfering with it was an impermissible, partisan objective. SulrmN, supra note 21, at 84-85,
223-24.
388. See Fleming, supranote 7, at 241, 246-49. Scalia embraced Buckley in Austin v. Michigan
Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 683 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
389. See Fleming, supra note 7, at 246-49, 302 (contrasting Ely's and Sunstein's understandings
of what was wrong with Lochner).
390. Black and Dworkin have argued persuasively that the First Amendment is not as different
from other constitutional provisions (such as the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses) with respect
to the largely "spurious" or "bogus" distinction between "enumerated" and "unenumerated" rights as
narrow originalists are at pains to maintain. See note 209 supra.
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judgments of significance grounded in substantive political theory. It simply is
not the case that the former judgments are unproblematically neutral or "process-oriented" while the latter judgments are problematically normative or
"ends-driven." The structure of deliberative democracy and the First Amendment is hardly more determinate, neutral, or uncontroversial than the structure
of deliberative autonomy and substantive due process. We make judgments of
significance for deliberative democracy all the time in the context of the First
Amendment. We should not be overanxious about making judgments of significance for deliberative autonomy in the context of substantive due process.
3. The homologous frameworks for cabining autonomy in First
Amendment and substantive due processjurisprudences.
The constructivist guiding framework suggests another homology between
the two fundamental themes of deliberative democracy and deliberative autonomy: The jurisprudences of both the First Amendment and substantive due
process, by requiring judgments regarding significance, provide frameworks for
cabining comprehensive principles of autonomy that otherwise press toward
protecting all expression and all decisions. Indeed, the two main areas of constitutional law where autonomy theories abound are the First Amendment and
391
substantive due process.
Autonomy as a comprehensive principle, brought to bear on First Amendment jurisprudence, tends to erode if not obliterate all of the categories of unprotected insignificant expression and thus to protect virtually all expression. It
abhors empowering the government, including courts, to make judgments about
the significance of expression for deliberative democracy. All that it would
leave of First Amendment jurisprudence would be generally "absolute" freedom of expression, grounded on something like a comprehensive Millian principle of the autonomy or individuality of citizens. Autonomous individuals
could hear all expression, no matter how insignificant the government might
think it was for deliberative democracy, and decide for themselves the signifi-

391. See, eg., Fallon, supra note 168, at 875-76.
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cance of that expression 392 (subject, perhaps, to a Millian harm principle or the
393
like).

Likewise, autonomy as a comprehensive principle, brought to bear on substantive due process jurisprudence, tends to expand the categories of protected
significant decisions and thus to protect virtually all decisions that persons
might make in exercising their capacity for a conception of the good. It dreads
allowing the government, including courts, to make judgments about the significance of decisions for deliberative autonomy. Substantive due process would
become something like a comprehensive Millian principle of the autonomy or
individuality of citizens. Autonomous individuals, making decisions according
to their own consciences, would become virtually a law unto themselves (subject again, perhaps, to a Millian harm principle or the like). 394
Constitutional constructivism embraces neither comprehensive Millian
principle of autonomy or individuality - either in First Amendment jurisprudence or in substantive due process jurisprudence. Its guiding framework with
two fundamental themes cabins comprehensive principles of autonomy with a
criterion of significance for deliberative democracy and deliberative autonomy
and prevents such principles of autonomy from unduly constraining deliberative democracy.
Thus, the constructivist guiding framework provides a lens through which
we can see that judgments about significance regarding categories of decisions
for deliberative autonomy are neither anomalous in constitutional law nor especially unruly, but are like judgments about significance regarding categories of
expression for deliberative democracy. Put another way, it shows that the Constitution is Janus-faced: The first theme provides an entrance, opening up deliberative democracy with regard to significant expression, while the second
392. Indeed, we sometimes hear calls for a comprehensive autonomy approach to the First
Amendment: to cease allowing regulation of some or all categories of currently unprotected expression,
such as fighting words, obscenity, incitement to imminent lawless action, libel, or group libel. See, eg.,
Eric M. Freedman, A Lot More Comes Into Focus When You Remove the Lens Cap: Why the Supreme
Court Should Abandon Its Inside-OutApproach to Freedom of Speech and Bring Obscenity, Fighting
Words, and Group Libel Within the FirstAmendment, 81 IowA L. Rav. (forthcoming 1996).
In referring to "a comprehensive Millian principle of the autonomy or individuality of citizens," I
mean to evoke but not to offer an interpretation of T.M. Scanlon's well-known autonomy theory and
"Millian principle" of freedom of expression. There are differences between these two sorts of Millian
principle. Scanlon generalized Meiklejohn's famous theory of the absolute First Amendment beyond
political speech to virtually all speech. See Thomas M. Scanlon, A Theory of Freedom ofExpression, 1

PHIL. & Pun. Asi. 204 (1072). He subsequently has reconstructed his theory, allowing greater room for
continuing to recognize categories of unprotected expression. See T.M. Scanlon, Jr., Freedom of Expression and Categories of Expression, 40 U. Prr. L. Rnv. 519 (1979); see also T.M. Scanlon, Jr.,
Content Regulation Reconsidered, in DEMOCRACY AND TH-E MASS MEDIA 331 (Judith Lichtenberg ed.,
1990). For other leading autonomy theories of the First Amendment, see, e.g., C. EDWIN BaYS.R,
HuMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH (1989); RICARDS, TOLERATION, supra note 173; David A.
Strauss, Persuasion,Autonomy, and Freedom of Expression, 91 CoLum. L. REv.334 (1991).

393. By "Millian harm principle," I refer to Mill's idea that the only justification for govermment's
interfering with a person's liberty is to prevent harm to others, not harm to self. In other words, government may regulate only "other-regarding," not merely "self-regarding" action. See MiLL, supra note
282, at 10-11.

394. See, e.g., FEINBERGo, supranote 166, at 56 (arguing that autonomy implies a right of personal
sovereignty that embraces "all those decisions that are 'self-regarding,' that is, which primarily and
directly affect only the interests of the decision-maker").
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theme offers an exit, an escape from deliberative democracy with respect to
3 95
significant decisions.
V.

CONCLUSION

In this article, I have sought to secure deliberative autonomy as a bedrock
structure of our constitutional document and underlying constitutional order.
Through advancing a constitutional constructivism, I have argued that both deliberative democracy and deliberative autonomy have structural roles to play in
our scheme of deliberative self-governance, and that both are integral to our
dualist constitutional democracy. By tethering the right of autonomy in such a
constructivism, I have shown that it is not as unruly, dangerous, and rootless as
some of its critics have charged. Furthermore, by limiting the right of autonomy to protection of basic liberties that are significant preconditions for deliberative autonomy, I have charted a middle course between Scalia and
Charybdis in the due process inquiry. Constitutional constructivism seeks, in
the spirit of Justice Brandeis' famous formulation, to "secure conditions
favorable to the pursuit of happiness" 396 by securing the preconditions for deliberative autonomy. I have not tried to resolve dispositively all questions of
the scope and content of the basic liberties associated with deliberative autonomy, but to outline a structure to help frame and guide our reflections and
judgments concerning such questions along constitutionally appropriate lines.
In calling for the construction of a coherent scheme of fundamental rights
essential to the pursuit of happiness, Charles Black observed: "[Justice]
Holmes once remarked of the first Justice Harlan that the latter's mind resembled a powerful vise, the jaws of which could not be brought closer than two
inches apart. ' 397 Black's rejoinder to Holmes was: "[I]n constitutional-law
work, jewelers' vises are well enough for tasks of detail, but the lack tremblingly to be feared is the lack of a vise whose jaws can be got more than two
inches apart, because if you lack such a vise you cannot handle the big
beams. '398 Constitutional constructivism, with its guiding framework of two
fundamental themes, provides a vise for handling the big beams. It enables us
to interpret our Constitution as a constitution of principle that aspires to secure
for everyone the common and guaranteed status of free and equal citizenship.

395. Cf Fleming, supra note 7, at 274-75 (discussing the Janus-faced Fourteenth Amendment in
criticizing Sunstein's analysis of the relationship between due process and equal protection).
396. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Again, I
make no claim to be interpreting Brandeis' own conception of"the right to be let alone." See note 10
supra.
397. Black, Livelihood, supra note 18, at 1117.

398. Id.

